



Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-90-005
Monday
8 January 1990

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TASS' Chernyshev Discusses Future of Alliances
LD0501175790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1030 GMT 5 Jan 90

[From the "International Situation—Questions and Answers" program presented by Andrey Ptashnikov, with Vladimir Chernyshev, TASS observer on military issues; Nikolay Agayants, All-Union Radio foreign policy commentator; Sergey Pravdin, not further identified; and Oleg Maksimenko, Moscow Radio correspondent in Paris]

[Text] [Ptashnikov] How can the future of the two military blocs—the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO—be seen? Incidentally, this question is quite often encountered in letters from our radio listeners. I think that no one can answer these questions better than a specialist, so I have invited to the studio Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernyshev, TASS observer on military issues, who is already known to you, comrades, from our previous broadcasts and also from numerous publications in the press.

So, Vladimir Nikolayevich, the problem of the future of the two military alliances in Europe—the Warsaw Pact Organization and the North Atlantic alliance, that is the NATO bloc—has, in my opinion, come to the fore through the consideration of ways of improving the military-political situation on our continent in connection with ending the cold war and the change in relations between East and West. What can you say on this topic?

[Chernyshev] Without doubt, Europe is moving toward abolishing the division of states into the opposing blocs which currently exist. Members of the Warsaw Pact Organization are consistently coming out in favor of abolishing the Warsaw Pact and NATO, including the abolition of their military structures as a first step. However, as political practice has shown, these processes demand a certain price and, moreover, no small amount of time. The creation of a common European home and the destruction of the Warsaw Pact and NATO at one stroke, having skipped over all the problems and difficulties which now exist in many spheres of international life in Europe, is hardly possible. It is hardly possible to consider such an approach as anything other than illusory, for it has nothing in common with practice.

In connection with this, I would like first and foremost to draw attention to the meeting which took place on 4 December 1989 between the leaders of Warsaw Pact member states in Moscow and the special session of the NATO council at the level of heads of states and governments in Brussels. They were a logical continuation of the meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and George Bush off the coast of Malta. As I see it, the main thing was the unanimity with which a conclusion was reached in both Moscow and Brussels regarding the importance of the conditions which had taken shape for providing stability in Europe. Moreover, the stability intended is of the type which not only inspires feelings of security and confidence in all European states, without

exception, but which also will guarantee the future of the European structures that are in the process of being born, and, for this reason, still fragile.

A realistic approach to the situation which has currently been taking shape has brought the leaders of the countries of both blocs to one and the same conclusion. At the present stage in the historical development, the necessity for preserving the conceivable prospects for the North Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Pact Organization should be heeded, since these may make a contribution toward strengthening European security, and may become a bridge in the future Europe based on a high degree of joint responsibility.

I would like to express another thought. The expediency of preserving the military and political alliances for some historical space of time is not only conditioned by the necessity to preserve stability on the continent but also by the fact that, despite the attainment of major agreements on disarmament—for example, at the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces—and the transition to the organization of armed forces on the principle of reasonable defense sufficiency, it is simpler and, let us state frankly, it is cheaper to achieve defense on the basis of alliances.

[Ptashnikov] Vladimir Nikolayevich, you mentioned the changes currently occurring in the countries of Eastern Europe. So, in the last few days, and recently in general, some people in the West have been forecasting that these changes will lead to the Warsaw Pact living out its last days. How do you react to these so-called prognoses?

[Chernyshev] Well, I think these prophets are far removed from the true state of affairs within the Warsaw Pact Organization. It is not for a moment considered how such a development of events could affect the situation in Europe as a whole, and also the situations of individual Warsaw Pact countries. Things are going quite differently. The disbandment of the Warsaw Pact is not on the agenda, but rather the imparting of new quality to this alliance. A frank discussion took place at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states in July 1989. This meeting put forward both the general approaches of the allies, especially in the disarmament sector, and the differences in positions, primarily on issues connected with the renewal and improvement of socialism. The Soviet Union's implementation of policies directed toward respectful relations with its allies based on full equality of rights and the encouragement of their initiative in international affairs has aided the strengthening of the contribution by each state in elaborating the agreed foreign policy line. This has essentially revealed, in a new fashion, the overall potential of the allies and the Warsaw Pact. The socialist countries in Europe now have moved to a new stage in their interrelations at a time when work is progressing toward implementing all forms and methods of cooperation in accordance with the real needs and possibilities of the countries. At a meeting of the Warsaw Pact leaders on 4 December 1989

in Moscow, the significance of close interaction and the need for renewing the forms and methods of activities of the Warsaw Pact Organization under contemporary conditions were stressed.

[Ptashnikov] But what, in your view, may specifically comprise the renewal of the Warsaw Pact?

[Chernyshev] What is being talked about is the transformation of the Warsaw Pact from a military and political organization into a mature political alliance.

[Ptashnikov] What does this entail?

[Chernyshev] First of all surmounting the Stalinist legacy in relations between the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe, and the creation of an alliance based on the authentic and not just the formal equality of its members. The Soviet Union, by implementing perestroika and leading the new political thinking, has condemned the actions of the past that placed these countries in the position of satellites and not as allies, while decisively dissociating itself from them. In particular, the declaration of the Soviet Government of 5 December 1989 states directly that during the famous events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 the Soviet leadership used an unbalanced and inadequate approach and directly interfered in the affairs of a friendly country. The entry of the armies of given socialist countries into Czechoslovakia is classified as groundless and erroneous.

Perestroika in interrelations between our country and its European allies means that these relations are now built on rigorously observed principles of full equality of rights, taking into account mutual interests, respect for the independence of each state in the resolution of national problems, a simultaneous improvement of and increase in solidarity and cooperation, and the development of integratory processes. Respect for freedom of choice and noninterference in internal affairs are a feature of principal importance in the policies of the Soviet Union in relation to the countries of Eastern Europe, and not only in relation to these countries. Such choice can and should not be revoked by force. Categorically unacceptable are any manifestations of power politics and any application of pressure.

In connection with the latter point, I would draw attention to this factor: In the Soviet-Finnish declaration signed at the summit of October 1989, it clearly formulated that no matter who's country it might be, no application of force may be justified either by any military alliance against another or within these alliances. This was another confirmation of our country's full renunciation of its previous internal bloc policies, which had earned the name of the Brezhnev doctrine in the West. It has confirmed the fundamental proposition of new thinking on the freedom of any country to choose its own path. This means that it is an important step along the road of the politicization of the Warsaw Pact.

[Ptashnikov] Well, all right, but how do you now view this new, mature, political alliance? And what about relations among its members with other countries and with international organizations?

[Chernyshev] According to current concepts, a mature political alliance—which the Warsaw Pact is supposed to become—is an alliance based on a diversity of the social structures of its member countries, on a diversity of political institutions and public life—in a word, on diversity in the pattern of development. All of this already has found an incarnation in the practical policies of the Soviet Union, which welcomes the very profound internal political changes now occurring in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union's attitude toward the breakthrough by any of the countries into common European structures and institutions, and toward the development of bilateral relations with one or more European countries, also is positive. The common interests of its members in a whole series of spheres serve as connecting links in the alliance, justifying the preservation and improvement of the Warsaw Pact Organization at the current stage in history. In particular, the common nature of the socioeconomic problems of those countries that are members of the alliance does not just link Eastern Europe—including the Soviet Union—into an integral whole, but just as objectively places them in opposition to the western part of the continent.

Can the Warsaw Pact countries at present quickly, under conditions equal to those in Western countries, join in the process of world political and economic integration? In all probability, it is still too early to rely on this primarily because the East European countries and the Soviet Union are at a level of economic and technological development insufficient for this. For this reason, if they do not wish to remain outcasts before the rich and flourishing Europe of the 21st century, it is expedient for them to act together.

If everything said is summarized, the following conclusion may be drawn: Without renouncing the ultimate aim of abolishing the military and political alliances in Europe and, as a first step, their military organizations, things must be brought to a transformation in relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. For this the emphasis must be moved from the military aspects of the alliances' activities to the political aspect; contacts must be established and cooperation developed between them in matters of arms reduction and on issues of guaranteeing security in the economic sphere and others. For both alliances it is expedient to establish relations of political dialogue. Only in this way will both the Warsaw Pact and NATO serve the aims of guaranteeing stability on our continent and in the world as a whole.

[Ptashnikov] Thank you, Vladimir Nikolayevich.

NATO's 'Reforger' Maneuvers Cut Back

LD0401205790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1730 GMT 4 Jan 90

[Aleksandr Zholkver commentary]

[Text] NATO normally holds its maneuvers every winter in West Germany and sometimes in other Western European countries, too, under the now-traditional codename of "Reforger," which means: return. Tactics are rehearsed for the rapid transfer of large units of the U.S. Army from the United States to Europe. On this occasion, 15,000 U.S. servicemen already have been delivered to the FRG by air and sea. The overall number of servicemen involved in the exercises, which will last the whole of January, will amount to 50,000, according to the NATO Command's figures. True, it has been announced at NATO Headquarters that the numbers of troops participating in the maneuvers will be almost 50 percent fewer than usual, while tank units will not be involved in the exercises at all.

NATO's supreme commander, U.S. General Galvin, added that in the future the scale of the "Reforger" exercises probably will be cut even further. As a reason for this, the general noted that the likelihood of a threat from the Warsaw Pact countries has markedly lessened, and what is more, negotiations are being held about a general reduction of troops and armaments in Europe. Here, in my view, we come to the most important aspect of present events—the political aspect.

The times of the cold war and the policy of acting from strength are plainly receding into the past, and relations based on the principles of the new political thinking are taking shape between European states and between the USSR and the United States. The recent first visit to NATO Headquarters in Brussels by our foreign minister showed that the question of practical cooperation between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization is also coming onto the agenda. Not so much military matters as political ones now are assuming priority importance in their activities.

True, this is not a simple process. Take just the latest reports from the FRG. On the one hand, a special subunit of military men and diplomats is being set up there to be directly involved in the reduction of armaments: the so-called disarmament battalion. On the other hand, the chief of the West German military department has just issued a type of ultimatum demanding the definite production of new combat aircraft: the notorious Eurofighters of the 1990's. So developments are not proceeding uniformly, and to a certain extent they are even proceeding in a contradictory way.

Nevertheless, I feel that the changes gathering momentum in Europe and throughout the world certainly will not bypass NATO.

Team in Belgium To Inspect 'Military Activity'

LD0601125390 Moscow TASS in English 1248 GMT
6 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 6 TASS—It was announced here that, in accordance with the provisions of the document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe, the Soviet Government requested the Belgian Government on January 4, 1990, to allow an inspection of military activity on its territory.

After receiving a positive reply to the request, a team of Soviet Military inspectors arrived in Belgium today for the inspection.

General Kuklev Welcomes 'Open Skies' Concept

LD0501152690 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1421 GMT 5 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 5 Jan (TASS)—"The Soviet side sincerely shares and approves the 'open skies' concept as a factor in further openness in the military sphere," Major General Vladimir Kuklev, deputy chief of a directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, stated. He gave an interview today to a TASS correspondent in connection with the announcement by Canadian External Relations Secretary Clark on the first flight of a Canadian aircraft over Hungary on 6 January under the program of the "open skies" concept.

Gen Kuklev recalled that the Soviet side regards such a flight as an opportunity for the establishment of an "open skies" regimen. He also said that Hungary had responded to Canada's proposal for the test flight to be carried out over any Warsaw Pact country. In turn, Canada had proposed that an airplane from any Warsaw Treaty country fly over its territory.

Welcoming the implementation of the "open skies" concept, Gen Kuklev said at the same time that purely technical questions would have to be resolved before such flights could begin. He considers that all countries should use identical aircraft types, and that the equipment installed on board should be unified. The general pointed out that the technical equipment of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries is somewhat different. "The presence of a single aircraft type for such flights would enable the two sides to receive equivalent information," Maj Gen Kuklev said in conclusion.

CEMA Members Preparing for Meeting in Sophia**CSSR To Propose Disbandment***LD0501195190 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1530 GMT 5 Jan 90*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] At the CEMA session slated to open soon in Sofia, Czechoslovakia will propose that the CEMA be disbanded. This was announced by Vaclav Klaus, the Czechoslovak minister of finance. He stressed that if the proposal of the CSSR is not accepted, then it will leave the organization. According to an announcement, the CSSR government has met, and a plan of action has been drawn up at the meeting by the Czechoslovak delegation at the CEMA session and by the CSSR's CEMA representatives.

Need for Change Seen*LD0501102590 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0700 GMT 5 Jan 90*

[Text] According to Soviet opinion, CEMA is completely obsolete and is in need of change, said one of the members of the Soviet delegation preparing for the CEMA summit next week in Sofia. He added that CEMA must be replaced by a new structure which makes the elimination of economic inequalities possible. (Sergey Ugnanov) declared that the cooperation mechanism of CEMA has become increasingly out-of-date over the past 40 years.

Academician Views Reform Issues*LD0301133790 Moscow TASS in English 1211 GMT
3 Jan 90*

[Text] Moscow January 3 TASS—A session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), scheduled for January 9-10, will sum up the results of cooperation over the past year, adopt a five-year cooperation plan, and determine a procedure to coordinate measures within the CMEA framework and the prices of goods in reciprocal trade, Academician Oleg Bogomolov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute for the Economy of the World Socialist system, told TASS. Along with matters concerning the current activities of the CMEA, the sides will discuss a transition of CMEA member countries concerned to the formation of a joint market.

If this is to be the unification of national markets, its establishment will be a complex and long process that will require a well-considered stage-by-stage approach, according to Bogomolov.

Bogomolov mentioned as a possible first step the CMEA countries' transition to reciprocal trade with settlements in freely convertible currency at world prices, through the large-scale application of market mechanisms.

The European Economic Community's more than 30-year-long experience—first joining its member states together in a Common Market and then in a "single

internal market"—should be useful in the establishment of a CMEA joint market, Bogomolov believes.

However, originally the Common Market was formed out of national market mechanisms of the EEC member states. Such mechanisms have not yet been established in CMEA countries. In addition, the competence of the EEC leading bodies is much wider than CMEA's he maintains.

Bogomolov believes that the main aspects of the reform of CMEA activities should be the focus at the session. Its future depends to a certain extent on this reform.

The future of the CMEA is not questioned, as it seems at first glance, by the desire of a number of CMEA member states (Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia) to join the EEC or other international organizations (the IMF and GATT), the academician emphasizes.

"Firstly, the basis for the development of the CMEA member states is kept intact with the maintenance of international socialist division of labour.

"Secondly, the governments of these socialist countries do not intend to break off with the CMEA in the future. Thirdly, as of yet the Common Market does not intend to extend its membership," Bogomolov said.

CEMA Seen Worth Preserving*LD0601125190 Moscow International Service
in Hungarian 2000 GMT 5 Jan 90*

[Text] Academician Oleg Bogomolov, head of the Socialist World Economic System Institute, has given our correspondent an exclusive interview. Our correspondent asked: In these days, prior to the CEMA session in Sofia, some papers and radio stations are spreading news that the CEMA will fall apart if reforms are not effected. There has also been talk of certain countries leaving the organization. What is your opinion on this?

[Bogomolov recording in Russian heard in background] I heard something similar to this yesterday, on London radio, where they referred to Czechoslovakia, said Academician Bogomolov, although the statement itself, in terms of the BBC's interpretation, proved to be rather contradictory. On the one hand, they said that the processes under way in the Eastern European countries are leading to CEMA's destruction; on the other hand, they stated that Czechoslovakia wished to maintain its CEMA membership.

I do not know how creditable the assertions are. What is certain is that the CEMA really does need to be reformed. But, in my opinion, it would be senseless to give up this organization, for the CEMA over decades has accumulated enormous cooperation experience. It has good relations with international economic organizations. All this is particularly needed in the present

period. The experiences must be preserved, and, after a certain reorganization, new life must be breathed into the CEMA.

There is no doubt that the time has come for reform. But to give up the accumulated experience capital would not make sense. If we weigh the problem, then participation in the CEMA has much greater weight. All the things on the other side of the balance must be renewed to the benefit of those participating in CEMA.

Integration of Socialist Economies Discussed

*OW0501200890 Moscow International Service
in Mandarin 0200 GMT 16 Dec 89*

[Latyshev commentary]

[Text] Bulgaria, the GDR, and the CSSR have undergone rapid social changes of late. Station commentator Latyshev wrote the following article:

Although different in their manifestations, crises in these countries share the same fundamental cause; namely, their societies cannot continue in the old way. Their economic and political situations and their social relations are in conflict with the people's understanding of socialism. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said at a plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee a few days ago: What is taking place in socialist countries is the logical outcome of a certain stage of development which made the peoples of these countries aware of the need for change. In other words, these socialist countries are accumulating new experience. Reform in China, Hungary, Poland, and the USSR shows that it is only when producers are free to engage in commodity and currency exchanges that socialist economies will be able to develop smoothly. The socialist economy should be able to readjust and constantly renew itself to adapt to changing situations. Many socialist countries are developing along these lines. Some of them are developing an internal (?exchange) market. In China,

Poland, and Hungary, capital markets and stock, bond, and other negotiable security exchanges have emerged. Debate on establishing a [word indistinct] market is under way in some countries.

The process of renewal in socialist countries certainly will have an impact on their mutual relations and the mechanism of cooperation also must undergo drastic changes. In the first stage, while preserving the established economic policy in some departments, it is necessary to first reform the [word indistinct] relations and coordinate their economic development plans. At present, the CEMA and economic administrative departments in the various countries are discussing new ways of cooperation and the establishment of an integrated socialist market. Hungary and Poland, the two CEMA nations which have pioneered economic reform, have vigorously advocated not only continuing, but further developing cooperation within the CEMA framework. Economic reform will make the economies of socialist countries more open and flexible, which is conducive to the trend toward socialist integration. Administrative interference, disregard of the real values of commodities, formalism, and bureaucracy are beginning to disappear from the framework of the relations among the socialist countries, while direct contact among producers and currency exchanges are beginning to emerge. This will make the integration of socialist economies more effective.

Warsaw Pact's Disarmament Body Meets 4-5 Jan

*LD0601144490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0330 GMT 6 Jan 90*

[Text] A routine session of the Warsaw Pact member states' special commission on disarmament matters was held in Moscow 4-5 January. There was an exchange of views on the holding in Canada this February of an international conference on the establishment of open skies. Consideration was given to the state of affairs at the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces, and on measures to strengthen trust and security in Europe.

Gerasimov Cited on Soviet-Iran Border Unrest*LD0501170790 Tehran Television Service in Persian
1600 GMT 5 Jan 90*

[Text] The REUTER news agency, quoting an Azerbaijani reporter, has reported that in new unrest a group of demonstrators in the Soviet Azerbaijan Republic pulled down border fences along the Iranian-Soviet border. According to the same report, thousands of people from Soviet Azerbaijan, while gathering in the center of the city of Baku, expressed their support for those who had attacked the Soviet-Iranian border.

Meanwhile, following demonstrations by Muslims during the past few days in the Soviet Azerbaijan Republic, Gennadiy Gerasimov, the spokesman of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a Thursday [4 Jan] news conference described these events as being unconnected with Islamic fundamentalism and described them as an internal issue. Gerasimov said: The events which took place last week in the Nukhichevan Autonomous Republic on the Iran-Soviet border are not connected with fundamentalism.

Last Wednesday AFP, in a report about the recent events in Soviet Azerbaijan, quoting Gerasimov, had reported: There are certain fundamentalists who believe that there is no border with Iran. In reply to a question about the sending of reinforcements to Azerbaijan, the spokesman of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs said: The issues of the Azeris in the southern parts of the Soviet Union should be solved without resorting to force, and these forces have been sent only to maintain order.

The people of Soviet Azerbaijan in their recent demonstrations, which were accompanied by the removal of border fences, chanted slogans in the Azeri dialect about the unity and solidarity of Muslims.

French Warship Deal with Taiwan Reported*PM0501111090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Jan 90 First Edition p 5*

[Report by Vladimir Bolshakov under the rubric "Correspondent Comments": "Deal with Taiwan"]

[Text] Paris—Reports have appeared in the Paris press about a deal which is being prepared for France's sale of six military frigates of the *Lafayette* type to Taiwan. These are coast guard ships which also can be used in small local conflicts. A frigate of this type with a displacement of 3,000 tonnes and a crew of 164 men can be equipped with Exocet MM-40 surface-to-surface missiles, Crotale air defense missiles, and 100mm and 20mm rapid-fire guns. The frigate can also take on board one ASW helicopter with Exocet AM-39 missiles.

According to preliminary reports, France intends to sell Taiwan these ships without weapons—that is, without missiles and torpedoes but with all their electronic equipment and technology, including technology for intersatellite communications. But it is far easier to buy

missiles and guns for them on the world market than it is to buy the frigates themselves.

Correspondents of the newspaper LIBERATION report that talks on the deal have entered the final stage and have been given the go-ahead from the Matignon Palace (the French Prime Minister's residence—V.B.) through the "interministerial committee for the study of the export of military materials." Matters obviously have come a long way.

LIBERATION notes that the French Foreign Ministry is afraid that if the Socialist government gives final approval to the planned deal with Taiwan there will be a further deterioration in France's relations with the PRC.

But diplomatic considerations obviously took second place when talk turned to the interests of the French arms dealers. The total volume of these exports reached F37.5 billion in 1988. And here it will be possible to get about F11 billion just for the six frigates, since each frigate is going for F1.8 billion. Interest in the deal has been displayed in the French Defense Ministry and in military industrialists' circles. The press notes that they have long been attracted by the Taiwan market and its constant shortage of military equipment.

Its sale to Taiwan in violation of the embargo to which France adhered until recently could provoke a far more serious crisis in its relations with the PRC than the creation of the "Democratic China Front" in Paris in 1989. In this connection alone about 18 representatives were made to the French ambassador in the PRC. If you recall that back in early December 1989 Beijing stated that the planned deal with the frigates was interference in the PRC's affairs, it will be easy to guess what they will cost the French ambassador in Beijing.

Foreign Ministry Statement on DPRK-ROK Ties*PM0501125190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4*

[Unattributed report: "USSR Foreign Ministry Spokesman's Statement"]

[Text] At a briefing at the USSR Foreign Ministry press center 3 January, the chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration made the following statement:

In his New Year address to the country, Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Workers Party of Korea [WPK] Central Committee and president of the DPRK, urged the Seoul administration to tear down the reinforced concrete wall erected on South Korean territory along the military demarcation line, allow free travel by Korean citizens, and open the doors wide to reciprocal exchanges between the north and south in the political, economic, and cultural spheres. The DPRK leader expressed a readiness to dismantle the barrier in the northern part of the DMZ at any time and advocated that a consultative conference be held involving the

supreme leaders from the north and south and the active continuation of a broad inter-Korean dialogue.

The new peace-loving appeal from Pyongyang reflects the realities of present-day international political life.

The Soviet Union, as a fundamental advocate of the peaceful solution of conflict situations, consistently supports dialogue between the two Korean sides. On that basis, we believe that the consolidation of the foundations of inter-Korean contact and the removal of all obstacles on the path to dialogue between Pyongyang and Seoul meet the interests of all the Korean people and the cause of peace and stability on the peninsula and in the Asia and Pacific region as a whole.

We are convinced that true peace on the Korean peninsula can be ensured not by means of confrontation and building up the sides' military strength but only by the deepening of mutual understanding and the establishment of an atmosphere of trust between them, which the DPRK's new proposals contained in Kim Il-song's New Year's address are designed to promote.

'Observers Roundtable' Looks Forward to 1990

*LD0701191290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1230 GMT 7 Jan 90*

["International Observers Roundtable" program presented by Nikolay Agayants, with All-Union Radio foreign commentators Boris Andrianov and Gennadiy Vedenyapin.]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Andrianov] The year 1989 was a year that saw major advances on the international scene. We have spoken here about how the new political thinking is now starting to bear fruit. A year ago many people viewed the idea of a common European home with suspicion and scepticism—as Utopian. And yet in the twilight of 1989, people were talking about it as a realistic prospect. Yes, the postwar schism in our continent is gradually receding into the past. The past year saw the end of the cold war. The final decade of the 20th century promises to be the most productive period in the history of civilization. But for this opportunity to be taken, more than anything else the world needs solidarity, cooperation, and accord.

[Vedenyapin] It is scarcely necessary to say that the positive advances that are taking place in the world were largely brought about by the turbulent events that enveloped the countries of Eastern Europe during the final 3 months of 1989. The waves of revolutionary renewal swept away the totalitarian regimes that had been ensconced there for years and the administrative-bureaucratic systems that had nothing whatever in common with the socialist ideals that had been solemnly proclaimed. The urgent need once and for all to combine socialism with genuine democracy was resoundingly reaffirmed by the dramatic turnabouts in public life that occurred in Berlin, Sofia, Prague, and Bucharest.

[Agayants] These events confirmed yet another widely known truth: That socialism cannot exist as socialism if the people—the main protagonist in all transformations—are removed from the political decisionmaking process and from the formation of political power right across the board. As with us in the Soviet Union, the countries of Eastern Europe are today seeing the natural breakdown of the administrative-command systems and a switch to democratic ways of governing society. Yes, for many people in Poland, Hungary, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania, a characteristic feature of this is a dogged search for the road along which to proceed. Many today would like to know for sure which road leads to the temple and, indeed, in the long run, which temple is required! [passage omitted]

[Vedenyapin] It should be noted that, contrary to what some in the West claim, the wave of renewal that has surged up in the socialist world in no way signals the collapse of socialism. A profound crisis does lie at the heart of this phenomenon—a crisis in the Stalinist and neo-Stalinist model of a social system. The crisis developed quietly and deepened over the decades until the whole futility of barracks socialism became apparent. The gulf that, over the years, had continued to grow between it and the West in terms of technical progress, labor productivity, and people's living standards, along with ecological misfortunes, inflation, the chronic shortage of many essentials, the uncompetitiveness of most manufactured goods, the fall in the economic growth rates, the growing unwieldiness and bureaucratization of the state machinery, and the subordinate position generally felt by each person within society—those are, in my opinion, the most characteristic manifestations of the crisis that had arisen.

[Agayants] It was not a pretty picture. Moreover, it was all accompanied by paeans to the successes scored, ideological incantations, and interminable slogans. It should be noted that on several occasions the previous attempts at reform and renewal undertaken in several countries of Eastern Europe—in particular Czechoslovakia—were unfortunately accompanied by negative phenomena, were forcibly curtailed, and did not lead to radical change. Nevertheless, as is today quite clear, they did serve as heralds of the impending transformations, although few indeed could have observed in them the shape of things to come.

[Andrianov] But then came 1985 and the situation started to change—literally before our very eyes. Perestroika in the USSR opened up new vistas for expanding the transformation process. While it was engendered primarily by the specific conditions in our country and while it laid no claims to serve as an example for other countries, all the same it has substantially improved the overall climate in the search for new ways of development. Eastern Europe proved to have difficulties very similar to our own, for it had developed largely according to the Soviet model which was foisted upon it and uncritically accepted in the postwar years. For this

reason, the changes in the Soviet Union have met with a fervent response there, bolstering as they do the forces of reform.

[Vedenyapin] It has become commonplace to speak of a rejection of the stereotypes of the past. It turns out that it is easier to destroy the stereotypes of words and phrases than the stereotypes of real life. These included the stereotypes that had become firmly embedded in our consciousness and behavior ever since the Stalin times of our relationship with our little brothers—the European socialist countries—both within the context of the party and state relationship when communist parties held power in all the countries, and within the framework of the administrative-command system that extended the principles of bureaucratic centralism to contacts between states. And then suddenly, in 1989, this entire, apparently unshakeable, reinforced-concrete system collapsed like the wall that had, for 18 years, cut East Berlin off from West Berlin. The notorious Brezhnev doctrine—which had stifled the tender shoots of the Prague Spring—departed this life.

[Agayants] Events have developed unpredictably and at a truly dizzying speed. I remember a placard which was borne along on 19 December by the participants in a mass demonstration on Prague's Wenceslas Square. On it was written: We do not want totalitarianism; we demand pluralism. The changes that engulfed the countries of Eastern Europe in 1989, and particularly in the last 3 months of the year, occurred in the conditions of complete freedom for peoples to choose their own ways, their own methods of building society. And it is very important that the Soviet Union demonstrated its respect for this choice; a respect for the complete sovereignty—unlimited by ideology—of the countries of Eastern Europe; a respect for their desire for independence and for the transformations in their socioeconomic and political institutions which could come about and which, incidentally, I would not rule out.

[Vedenyapin] And which, incidentally, are occurring in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, where the communist parties that have held power for more than 40 years have, for various reasons and to differing degrees, lost their popularity among the masses and have been deprived of their leading role.

[Agayants] Yes, that is true enough; but of no lesser importance is the fact that all the Eastern European countries have reaffirmed their obligations as allies within the Warsaw Pact. Also, they have advocated the need to continue their mutually advantageous and equal cooperation within the framework of CEMA.

[Andrianov] But that is on the firm understanding that it is radically restructured. Preparations are now under way for the 45th meeting of the CEMA session. The participating countries are attaching particular importance to drafting collective decisions on such issues of cooperation as the gradual creation of a unified market, the refinement of the mechanism of socialist economic

integration, the preparation of large-scale projects within the framework of the comprehensive program for scientific and technological progress, and the coordination of national economic plans. However, in spite of the accords reached, the restructuring of CEMA is not proceeding at anything like the desired rate.

[Vedenyapin] Nevertheless, I don't think there can be any suggestion that the organization might be disbanded. [passage omitted]

[Andrianov] I would now like to draw attention to one passage in George Bush's New Year's message, specifically that place where he was speaking about the possibilities of ending regional conflicts and saving humanity from the monstrous miseries which they bring.

[Agayants] But why is it, Boris Vasiliyevich, that you want to draw attention to precisely these words? I assume there is some reason?

[Andrianov] A more than weighty one. On the background of those positive trends which have been noted with regard to East-West relations in Europe one is particularly struck by the fact that in Asia the temperature of the so-called hot spots is not decreasing.

This is quite obvious, for example, in Afghanistan. There the intensity of military action is not decreasing. But why? Because the United States and Pakistan are not fulfilling the conditions of the Geneva agreements.

Or let's take the Korean Peninsula. It is no secret that the main reason for the continuing tension there is provided by the stationing in South Korea of a U.S. expeditionary corps.

[Vedenyapin] If my memory does not deceive me, somewhere around last summer hints started to slip into the Western press that the U.S. Congress was allegedly working out measures directed toward partial or even complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. In Seoul, such news gave rise to a real commotion.

[Andrianov] Now they have calmed down in Seoul. If you want, I will adduce an instance which confirms that this is exactly the case. Literally 3 days ago—last Thursday—Yi Sang-hun, South Korean minister of national defense, met with journalists. He announced that he had received a message from U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney. The head of the Pentagon assured his South Korean colleague that the Washington administration had no plans whatsoever to withdraw U.S. troops from the south of the Korean Peninsula.

It also transpires that Washington does not intend to undo the extremely tight and very complex military-political knot there, which has been exercising a negative influence on the situation in the Far East region for several decades already and, one may say, negatively influences the general situation which has formed in Asia.

[Agayants] All this cannot fail to cause alarm. Particularly since Afghanistan and the Korean Peninsula are by no means the only hot spots in Asia. One should not forget Cambodia, where the situation in the past 3 months has deteriorated noticeably—I might even say deteriorated significantly. [passage omitted]

[Andrianov] I shall quote Jeremy Stone, director and manager of the Federation of American Scientists, from an article published in THE NEW YORK TIMES. This article states frankly that the United States is waging a secret war against the Government of Cambodia—a war which can only benefit the Pol Pot clique.

[Vedenyapin] Very well, Boris Vasilyevich, but how does the U.S. scientist explain these actions of Washington? I imagine he thinks there is some reason for this.

[Andrianov] Certainly he does. Jeremy Stone stresses that the government led by Hun Sen is the only force capable of averting the seizure of power in Cambodia by the Pol Pot supporters and it is for this reason that the United States continues to use its financial and intelligence resources to weaken this government. The U.S. scientist also points out how the United States is acting. It is acting through an ultrasecret working group on Cambodia in Bangkok, which coordinates every step of the military detachments led by Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann who, together with the Pol Pot supporters, are conducting a war against the Government of the State of

Cambodia. [passage omitted: Agayants considers it relevant to quote an open letter to Bush, Thatcher, and Mitterrand from 60 Western public figures to the effect that the Hun Sen government is a considerably lesser evil than the Khmer Rouge]

[Vedenyapin] I should mention that, as it happens, today is the 11th anniversary of the formation of that state [Republic of Kampuchea]. In the time that has elapsed since 7 January 1979, the government headed by Hun Sen has proved its viability. It enjoys truly widespread support among the people, and, of course, it is hardly likely that it could be removed from power by peaceful means, following a free general election. That is understood by the the present Phnom Penh government's enemies who have an interest in removing it. For this reason they do not want to stop the military aid to the Khmer opposition.

[Andrianov] An obviously unsubtle calculation. Without military aid there will not be a civil war. Then, the one and only way of solving the Cambodian problem will be national reconciliation. It, quite understandably, envisages the honest cooperation of all the political groupings for the sake of a future independent, free, neutral and nonaligned Cambodia. It transpires that it is precisely this which the opposition groupings, attempting to seize power by armed force to thrust their will on the Cambodian people, do not want. [passage omitted]

[Agayants] The time has finally come to approach the resolution of the Cambodian conflict also from the position of the new political thinking because there is simply no other way in our era.

United States & Canada

New York Rally Protests Panama Invasion

LD0701145990 Moscow TASS in English 1452 GMT
7 Jan 90

[Text] New York January 7 TASS—By TASS correspondent Sergey Kuznetsov:

A mass demonstration of protest against United States armed intervention in Panama was held in New York on Saturday.

A few thousand people marched along the central streets of this, the largest American city demanding an immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Panama and an end to all other forms of Washington interference in the internal affairs of that sovereign Central American state. The marchers converged on New York's Central Park where a mass rally was held to express solidarity with the struggle of the Panamanian people for the right to determine its own fate.

Panama was invaded and occupied by U.S. troops, which resulted in unjustifiable losses of human life and considerable material resources, the meeting was told by a representative of trade unions, which took an active part in organising and holding the protest action. He said the intervention force enforced a puppet government drenched in the blood of compatriots. The United States once again demonstrated full neglect of principles of international law and the right to national self-determination.

This is not the first case of using U.S. bombers and tanks against a small country in the Western hemisphere, a leaflet circulated by protest organisers said. The Dominican Republic, Grenada, Nicaragua and Salvador are like open wounds in the body of the continent that U.S. Marines have been trampling underfoot.

The present intervention created yet another obstacle to the search for ways to settle the conflict situation and establish peace in Central America, said the U.S. Public Committee Against U.S. Intervention in Panama in a statement published here.

Senator Levin Urges Force Reductions in Europe

PM0501160390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
4 Jan 90 First Edition p 7

[TASS report: "Reducing the Level of Confrontation"]

[Text] Washington, 3 Jan—The U.S. Government must consider the question of considerably cutting back its armed forces stationed in Western Europe. Carl Levin, member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who visited Czechoslovakia and the GDR last month, made this appeal on Tuesday.

The democratic reforms currently being implemented in the countries of Eastern Europe, he said at a Washington

press conference, are removing the idea of the possibility of a Warsaw Pact offensive on NATO. In the senator's opinion, the question of more significant reductions in the numerical strength of U.S. and USSR servicemen than those currently under discussion can be raised at the Vienna CFE talks. In particular, he proposed removing 200,000 U.S. enlisted men and officers from Western Europe.

The funds released in this connection, Levin said, must be used to combat drugs, improve the educational system in the United States, and other important programs. The reduction in spending on armed forces will also help reduce the federal budget deficit.

China

New Year Remarks by CPC's Jiang Zemin Cited

PM0801110490 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
4 Jan 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Overcoming Difficulties"]

[Text] Beijing, 3 Jan—The PRC's immediate task is to ensure social stability. Only when this is accomplished can efforts be concentrated on resolving the problems facing the country, Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the CPC [Communist Party of China] Central Committee, stressed. He was speaking at the traditional New Year tea-drinking ceremony, in which representatives of various Chinese democratic parties took part.

At present the situation in the country is stable, the Chinese leader pointed out. Through joint efforts from all democratic parties and public collectives, led by the Communist Party, China can overcome the temporary difficulties it has encountered. The course of improving economic activity and deepening reform while preserving social stability is an important guarantee of the protracted, stable, and rational development of the national economy.

Currently, important events are taking place in the international arena. There are still contradictions, a struggle is under way, and there are factors of instability. The world as a whole is restless. At the same time the main trends in the international situation are unchanged. China is following attentively the development of the situation in the world and is ready to continue to actively contribute to the defense of peace and progress for mankind, Jiang Zemin said. But first China must tackle internal problems whose resolution is not only directly linked with the country's future but also affects the international situation.

The coming year is a key year in the regularization of the economy and the implementation of reform in China, the CPC Central Committee general secretary pointed out. That is why uniting society under the leadership of the CPC is a guarantee of the resolution of all the tasks facing the country. We must do our utmost in the new year to increase party building and seek new successes in

the struggle to combat bureaucratism and disintegration phenomena. The entire party, particularly high-ranking cadres, must weather the difficulties together with the people.

PRC Envoy Sees Further Cooperation in 1990

OW0701074890 Moscow International Service
in Mandarin 1400 GMT 6 Jan 90

[Text] Before we end the program on Soviet-Chinese cooperation, let us look at the prospects for Soviet-Chinese relations in 1990. Please listen to the views of the person who is best qualified to understand this question: Comrade Yu Hongliang, Chinese ambassador to the USSR.

[Begin Yu Hongliang recording] I think relations between our two countries and two parties will further develop in 1990. [Words indistinct] cooperation in the economic, scientific, technological fields will expand further and assume different forms. In other words, cooperation will develop on the basis of the existing foundation. (We are following the long-term plans of our two countries for promoting scientific and technological development by the year 2000). I think our development in various fields will advance in accordance with the agreements reached during the summit meeting. [end recording]

PRC Denies Exit Authorization for Fang Lizhi

PM0501145190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own Correspondent Yu. Savenkov report: "Chinese Authorities' Denial"]

[Text] Beijing—"China will allow the dissident, Prof Fang Lizhi, and his wife Li Shuxian to leave the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and go to Australia or another country this January"—such was the report that appeared in the Hong Kong newspaper SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST.

The report also claimed that this agreement was reached during a recent visit to China by the U.S. President's National Security Adviser, Scowcroft.

"These rumors are pure fabrication," was the reaction of the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman. He recalled that the Chinese authorities had repeatedly stated that Fang Lizhi and his wife Li Shuxian had broken the criminal law in China. The very fact of the granting of asylum to them by the U.S. Embassy in Beijing "represents interference in the country's internal affairs and also violates the acknowledged norms of international law." This problem, the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman stated, can be resolved only in accordance with China's laws, and the United States is obliged to observe their provisions.

As is well known, during the tumultuous events in Beijing last June, Prof Fang Lizhi, a well-known astrophysicist and associate of the Chinese Academy of sciences, and his wife Li Shuxian, a senior lecturer at Beijing University, asked the U.S. Embassy "to ensure their safety." The Chinese authorities meanwhile officially ordered their arrest on a charge of "counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement" during those tragic events.

Official Describes PRC Technical Cooperation

OW0801013990 Moscow International Service
in Mandarin 1400 GMT 20 Dec 89

[From the "On the Path of Friendship and Cooperation" program]

[Text] In an interview with our station reporter, (Salchenov), chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology, said that Soviet and Chinese scholars were now exploring 10 large scientific and technological projects for possible cooperation. (Salchenov) said:

[Begin (Salchenov) recording in Russian, fading into Mandarin translation] Currently, the scientific and technological cooperation between the two countries is working very well. Both sides began exchanging experts in 1982. The scientific and technological cooperation agreement signed in 1984 laid the legal foundation for restoring scientific and technological cooperation between the two countries. Under the agreement, both sides exchange delegations and scientific information and cooperate in research projects.

To solve any practical problems involved, a standing committee was set up within the Council for Economic, Trade, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation between the two countries and a general plan was drawn up for contacts. [end recording]

Our station reporter asked (Salchenov): What is the general course that the Soviet Union and China take in their scientific and technological cooperation? (Salchenov) replied:

[Begin (Salchenov) recording in Russian, fading into Mandarin translation] We have established such cooperation in 26 areas. We have already progressed from acquiring an understanding of the situation to planning for long-term cooperation. Siberia, the Far East, and Central Asia in the Soviet Union have established direct scientific and technological cooperation with their neighboring Chinese provinces. Song Jian, minister in charge of the Chinese State Science and Technology Commission, discussed this kind of cooperation during his visit to the Soviet Union last summer.

Cooperation between the academies of sciences of the two countries is also thriving. Guriy Ivanovich Marchuk, president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, visited China this year and signed an agreement outlining the

basic goals for cooperation in physics, mathematics, chemistry, biology, and scientific instruments up to the year 2000. [end recording]

(Salchenov) said: I would like to add one more thing. The Soviet science festival held in China in 1988 and the Chinese science festival held in the Soviet Union in 1989 were the first major scientific and technological activities sponsored by the two countries. The activities helped the people in both countries to understand each other's achievements in science and technology.

Both sides are now probing the possibility of further cooperation on a long-term basis, which includes the establishment of joint ventures, laboratories, and research centers. The majority of issues involved will be solved next year.

Soviet Textbook Published in Chinese in Beijing

*OW0601201090 Moscow International Service
in Mandarin 1400 GMT 13 Dec 89*

[Correspondent Babayan Report from Beijing; from the "Current Events and Commentaries" program]

[Text] The Social Science Publishing House in Beijing has published in Chinese the new Soviet textbook titled "Political Economy." The book was written collectively by noted economists, including Academicians Leonid Ivanovich Abalkin and Abel Gezevich Aganbegyan, for students of schools of higher education interested in economy and economic theories.

The book's chief editor, Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev, who is a member of the Politburo and a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, wrote a preface for the Chinese edition.

The preface points out: The authors of this book hold that its publication in China is not just an affirmation of (?their work) but also a reflection of the significant changes in the relations between our two countries and our two peoples.

The preface states: Today both the Soviet Union and China are exploring, under their own unique circumstances, ways to solve their problems. There are many similar characteristics in the two countries.

The preface points out: We try to bring to light, in a comprehensive way, all possibilities that the socialist system has to offer. In working toward this important goal, sciences, including political economy, play an important role.

(Gao Zuni), deputy chief editor of the Social Science Publishing House, in an interview with this correspondent, expressed his hope that the book will help Chinese readers to gain a better understanding of the economic reforms taking place in the Soviet Union and of Soviet scholars' contributions to economic theories.

(Gao Zuni) stressed: The publication of Soviet textbooks in China will surely foster mutual understanding between Chinese and Soviet scholars, as well as between the ordinary people in the two countries.

Northeast Asia

Japan Seen Promoting Military Confrontation

OW0501211890 Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia 1100 GMT 11 Dec 89

[Alekseyev commentary]

[Text] The Japanese prime minister has said that Soviet leader Gorbachev and U.S. President Bush declared at Malta that the cold war is over. This fact cannot but have an impact on U.S.-Japanese military cooperation within the framework of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. He hinted that, as the military and political situation in the Far East is basically different from that in Europe, there is no need to reduce the two nations' military capabilities in the Far East. Our station observer Alekseyev has the following comments:

Prime Minister Kaifu's reasoning is not unfamiliar. Since disarmament began in Europe, Japanese political leaders have stressed frequently that the political and military situation in the Far East is different and this fact, according to their argument, stands in the way of mutual reductions in the military confrontation in the Far East. The fact of the matter is that there are no opposing military organizations in the Far East such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe, whose member nations are bound by treaty obligations to the respective organizations to which they belong. Military alliances in the Far East, as in other parts of Asia, are, for the most part, of a bilateral nature. The argument that this situation represents an insurmountable obstacle to an agreement on greatly reducing troops and armaments in the Far East does not, I believe, hold water. Yes, there are major differences in the European and Far East situations. As a matter of fact, there is no dispute on this point. Evidently, there is military confrontation in the Far East as there is in Europe, and the exact numbers of troops behind this confrontation are also well known. Under such circumstances, what stands in the way of the concerned nations' or organizations' reaching an agreement on reducing their respective troop strength and armaments correspondingly?

To create a most favorable climate, the Soviet Union will unilaterally reduce the number of its troops and armaments in the Far East by a large margin. The number of Soviet troops stationed there will be cut by 120,000 by the end of next year. However, unilateral disarmament will not solve the problem of military confrontation. This is understandable. As Soviet Defense Minister Yazov pointed out: This is as far as the Soviet Union can go in troop reductions without jeopardizing its national security. We must not forget that the strong Japanese and U.S. military strength in the Far East far exceeds the

Soviet Union's defense capabilities. The Soviet Union has proposed on many occasions that both sides start talks on arms reduction in the Far East and that arms reduction be carried out in a way that gives due consideration to the fundamental security interests of each side.

Regrettably, these proposals have gone unanswered. Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu's recent statement undoubtedly indicates that the Japanese Government still opposes such a plan. It appears that the statement was issued as an excuse to defend continued military confrontation in the Far East.

Japan To Back USSR's GATT Observer Status

*OW0501141190 Moscow in Japanese to Japan
1200 GMT 3 Jan 89*

[Text] According to a TASS Tokyo dispatch, the Japanese Government has decided to support Soviet Union's status as an observer at GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. YOMIURI SHIMBUN reports today, quoting a government source remarks, that the Japanese Government will officially declare this stand, which was decided following consultations with the U.S. Government, at the GATT council meeting scheduled in Geneva in February.

YOMIURI SHIMBUN holds that this decision signifies a shift in the Japanese Government's past policy. The Japanese Government has so far opposed the Soviet Union's admission into the GATT, an international economic organization, because of political motives. In particular, the Japanese official source has linked the settlement of this issue with the realization of its demand for the return of territories from the Soviet Union.

However, due to the changes in East-West relations, and also because a large number of Western leaders, including President Bush of the United States, have expressed their support for admitting the Soviet Union into the GATT as an observer, it has become inevitable that the Japanese Government take a more practical stand.

USSR, ROK Consular Departments To Open

*LD0501123190 Moscow TASS in English 1223 GMT
5 Jan 90*

[Text] Moscow January 5 TASS—Consular departments of South Korea and the Soviet Union will open in the first half of 1990 at the Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Industry's office in Seoul and at the Korea Trade Promotion corporation (KOTRA) office in Moscow, sources at the Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Industry told TASS.

Staff at the departments, from three to five persons, will carry out limited consular functions: defend the interests of their citizens and their consular service, grant visas and related documents, register citizens staying in the

USSR or South Korea and provide consular services to ships, airplanes and their crews.

Their activities will promote the development of economic, cultural, scientific and other ties between the two countries.

This innovation will in no way imply the establishment of official consular relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea, the representative of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry stressed.

ROK Ship-Repair Firms Set Up Joint Venture

*LD0501124390 Moscow TASS in English 1217 GMT
5 Jan 90*

[Text] Nakhodka January 5 TASS—Heads of the South Korean Hyundai firm and the Soviet Primorremrybflot production amalgamation today signed an agreement to set up a joint ship-repair plant.

This is the first joint venture between the Soviet Union and South Korea.

Primorremrybflot will provide a dock with a loading capacity of 8,500 tonnes, 300 meters of the wharf wall, Finnish gantry cranes and workers. Hyundai will deliver production equipment to clean and repair the hulls of various ships and send its engineers to Nakhodka.

Primorremrybflot General Director Yuriy Repin said that the Soviet side will use its share of foreign currency earnings to modernise its ships.

The contract has a ten year term that can be extended.

Near East & South Asia

Commentator Elaborates on Aid to Afghanistan

*LD0501031190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1230 GMT 4 Jan 90*

[From the "Point of View—International Broadcast" program, presented by Nikolay Agayants, with commentator Vladimir Fadeyev]

[Text] [Agayants] In 1 month and 10 days, the world will mark a very important date in its political calendar, exactly 1 year since the day the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan in precise accordance with the Geneva agreements, and we proved our commitment to the new attitudes in international affairs proclaimed by the new political thinking. The war in Afghanistan continues, however. Civilians are dying there every day, while hunger and poverty accompany the senseless fratricide. In line with existing agreements and accords, the Soviet Union renders the most diverse assistance to Afghanistan.

Now what about this aid? In their letters, certain listeners put things in the following manner. Why, they say, do we criticize Pakistan and the United States for continuing to support the armed Afghan opposition at a

time when we similarly support the present Kabul government—and that includes aid in the form of the latest weaponry—while at the same time declaring that those two countries are violating the provisions of international law?

Other listeners, while putting the matter in the same way, express fears that the continuation of arms deliveries to the belligerents reduces the chances of achieving peace in Afghanistan as rapidly as possible and is pushing the problem up a blind alley. Well, let us take it that we have one point of view on this problem. Let me now ask my colleague, commentator Vladimir Fadeyev, to express his view of this. He has spent more than 4 years in Afghanistan, and he returned from his latest posting there only recently.

[Fadeyev] I would first of all like to remind our listeners that we are not the only ones who are helping Afghanistan today. Afghanistan is being helped by the entire world community. The proportions and scale are another matter. Now, on to our supplies to our southern neighbor. Let us remember the historical background to this question. Bilateral relations between Soviet Russia and Afghanistan began to be formed even under Vladimir Ilich Lenin and Amir Amanullah, that is from 1921. Even then our country found it possible to help our neighbor with technical specialists. Intergovernmental agreements and treaties which have repeatedly been extended since then changed the structure and nature of aid. Military aid was also stipulated in the event of it becoming necessary. This is practiced in interstate relations and is in full accordance with the norms of international law. The sides that conclude such agreements are in the position of subjects in international law. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan has given us no grounds for renouncing the fulfillment of the provisions of treaty relations arranged by the government which gave the order for the troops to go in.

That is the first point. The second point is that the Afghan people would not be able to survive today without the petroleum products, flour, and sugar that we supply. Ultimately, one cannot but admit the fact that our military presence to a certain extent contributed to Afghanistan's isolation from its other neighbors and partners. To leave a neighbor in the lurch is not just immoral, it is a betrayal. As far as our military aid is concerned, now that the troops have been withdrawn, this is the position. We proposed a halt to arms supplies to the belligerents along with a simultaneous cease-fire. However, the United States rejected this proposal simply on the grounds—at least, that is what they said—that the Afghans would fight each other anyway because a lot of weapons had already been stockpiled in the country. In my personal view, this assertion shows the stereotyped U.S. attitude to the Afghan people, which is allegedly incapable of existing without war. Or perhaps one can put it down to the habit of judging everyone by their own standards, as the saying goes. As far as I am aware, the Americans cannot stop themselves from fighting either, although it must be admitted that they do so constantly

on other people's territory, far from home. As is happening in Panama at the moment, for instance.

But let us get back to legal provisions. U.S. arms deliveries to the rebels are a real and genuine violation of international law. In the present instance, they are helping a certain public organization which is wreaking the most ruthless terror on Afghan territory with these weapons. Moreover, the civilian population is the main target.

To put it simply, they are helping terrorists without having legally recognized their so-called provisional government, terrorists who are not thus subjects in international law. We, on the other hand, have diplomatic relations with the Republic of Afghanistan, and the government headed by President Najibullah is officially recognized in almost 70 countries of the world. That is my view of the legal aspect of our aid and U.S. aid to the two belligerents.

I would like to inform our skeptics at home that Najibullah himself recently came out with an initiative to review the principles of our interstate agreements in the direction of their real mutual advantage—in other words, to make them absolutely equal in form, thus removing a certain advantage for the Afghan side.

Finally, is the armed assistance emanating from the two powers prolonging the civil war in Afghanistan? It is unquestionably prolonging it. Let us not close our eyes to this. But let us take another look at the objectives of the continuing war there. The ringleaders of the opposition have already rejected more than 30 peace proposals from Kabul within the framework of the policy of national reconciliation. They declare that they do not wish to share power with the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the same party that in the years of the April Revolution managed to substantially to change the status of the dispossessed social sections of the population and gave Afghan women rights. Incidentally, it did many more positive things for the people as well.

The way in which power is being exercised by the ringleaders of the rebel groupings on the territory they control is also well known—terror, endless requisitions from the peasants, and a return to the old feudal principles. They keep repeating that they don't want to sit down at the negotiating table with Najibullah, but this is just one of the outward pretexts for continuing the war, which brings them fabulous profits. I am reminded of the appearance of some of the rebels: a skull-cap embroidered with gold under a sumptuous turban, an expensive Swiss Rolex watch, and an emerald or diamond ring, not to mention the submachine-gun, which also costs a pretty penny. I once added up the value of this gear—a far cry from evening dress—and it came to about 500,000 afghanis, or about \$25,000 in our money. As for how much is in the account of a fighter like that, he alone knows. In a word, for the majority of members of the opposition the war has long since become a business, and

not a political matter. So the Washington administration's clients know which side their bread is buttered on, and are prepared to fight on for a long time, to their own advantage, of course.

Personally, I am convinced that without U.S. military support, and support from Saudi Arabia, which is also substantial, the very nature of the war in Afghanistan would change. While today the Kabul government has to stay on the defensive, it could then also begin offensive operations very quickly. Without external support, the rebels could be divided into those who intend to continue the war to the last Afghan and those who have joined the rebels as fellow travellers by force of circumstance. I am convinced of that. I am certain that certain people in the White House must also have these thoughts, but sometimes the distance between good intentions and sensible decisions is very long. In the meantime, time is on the side of the Kabul government, I believe.

During my posting, I got to meet a number of field commanders who have concluded agreements with the government on halting military operations against it—naturally in exchange for a number of conditions advantageous to both sides, incidentally. This process is now gaining breadth throughout the country, and only extremely diehard politicians can fail to take it into account. I want to note with pleasure that the prestige of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which had been in danger of being lost, is being revived. It has done much to rid itself of bureaucrats and political babblers. Admittedly, its ranks have been greatly depleted, but I think that the people who remain provide a solid nucleus, tested in action and in battle, and are prepared to work for a new and happy Afghanistan, strong in all respects.

Explosion Reported at India's Parliament

LD0701050390 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0449 GMT 7 Jan 90

[Text] Delhi, 7 Jan (TASS)—An explosion occurred here today at 0900 at one of the entrances to the building of the Parliament of India. According to the information from the police, there are no casualties. No extra information is yet available.

Joint Indian Hydraulic Power Project Suspended

PM0501123590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Jan 90 First Edition p 7

[TASS report: "Work Suspended"]

[Text] Delhi, 4 Jan—Work has been suspended on the construction sites of the hydraulic power complex in Tehri (Indian state of Uttar Pradesh) which is being installed with the technical assistance of Soviet specialists. The decision was taken by the republic's government after environmental conservationists had launched

a powerful protest campaign against the project's implementation. An important role here was played by Sunderlal Bahuguna, one of the leaders of the environmental protection movement.

Libya Issues Denial on Mercenaries in Romania

PM2912162589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 7

[Item from "International Departments' Mailbag" column: "Concerning Reports From Romania"]

[Text] Moscow—The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya People's Bureau in Moscow expresses its respect for the IZVESTIYA editorial board and has the honor to announce that the item "Romania After the Execution of Ceausescu," published in your newspaper under the rubric "Panorama of International Events" (IZVESTIYA No 361), contains the following paragraph: "Citing information from the Romanian city of Arad, the DPA agency broadcast the news of the 'capture of five Libyan mercenaries,' who had participated in the bombardment of a hospital in the city. Hungarian Foreign Minister G. Horn, speaking on Hungarian radio, said that the new Romanian leadership 'has proof of the presence of Arab mercenaries in the country.'"

This "news" compels the People's Bureau to ask you to publish the attached statement by the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya People's Bureau in Moscow in connection with this reference.

The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya People's Bureau in Moscow takes this opportunity to reiterate its assurances of high esteem.

STATEMENT:

Some official circles and media hostile to the Great Jamahiriya have spread fabricated rumors about Libyans participating in the events currently taking place in Romania.

Categorically rejecting these fabrications, the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in Moscow [as published] reaffirms the Jamahiriya's position, based on belief in the peoples' right and ability to seize power from traditional totalitarian and party regimes.

The rumors spread by official circles for overtly provocative reasons have nothing to do with the Jamahiriya—a state of the masses, in which the people possess the power, the wealth, and the weapons.

[Signed] Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya People's Bureau

Sub-Saharan Africa

Commentator Says Mugabe Merits 'Respect'

MB0701145190 Moscow in English to Southern Africa
1900 GMT 6 Jan 90

[Yelena Olgena commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] In my view, writes Yelena Olgena, Robert Mugabe's main credit was putting an end last year to the 10-year-old rivalry between the two parties that had fought for Zimbabwe's independence—that's ZANU-PF [Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front] and ZAPU [Zimbabwe African People's Union].

For Zimbabwe, this primarily meant the end to interethnic strife. One can observe political stability in that state, situated in a turbulent region of Africa. This stability rises from the compromise that both parties have reached. Any African leader, like any leader elsewhere in the world who has managed to resolve interethnic strife peacefully, merits respect.

That is probably the reason why the president of the neighboring Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, has asked the Zimbabwean leader to mediate in the long-standing and blood-letting conflict with Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance]. This has been reported recently (?when) preparations for Frelimo [Mozambique Liberation Front]-Renamo dialogue had been completed. Robert Mugabe has evidently done much for it.

It has been a regrettable tradition to set goals and leave them unaccomplished in many African states, while promising long [word indistinct] of wealth, some politicians are unable to secure even the minimal living standards. Causes for it differ. All the more so, it is worth noting that Zimbabwe has actually obviated such a situation. Although the economic decline of the eighties did not bypass that African country, last year was nonetheless marked by progress both in industries and in agriculture. Zimbabwe is one of the few states on the continent that exports farm produce. People there have not experienced hunger that has exterminated thousands upon thousands of people in Ethiopia, the Sudan, Mozambique, and Angola.

One can argue the exclusive constitutional provision for the one-party system in the country, writes Yelena Olgena. But, it is evident that a multiparty system might lead to a civil war in Zimbabwe. As far back as in 1981, Robert Mugabe said in one of his speeches that he thought the multiparty system was devoid of any (?sense). The line on one-party development was taken then. It was [words indistinct] reached not to domination of one party over another but through close cooperation.

At the end of 1988, ZANU-PF and ZAPU parties merged into one ZANU-PF party. It is evidently presumed that other parties will abandon the political arena

in due course. The way it will happen remains not clear, but we can definitely state the (?premise) of ZANU-PF's positions.

One more bold feature of the present-day life in Zimbabwe is the large number of qualified personnel among Africans. Robert Mugabe, who himself majored in several specialities, justly believes the accessibility of all levels of education to all citizens of the country to be the guarantee of its further success. Amazing progress has been made in the field of education in over 10 years of independence.

Frankly, the other side of the matter was the rocketing unemployment among the young people with higher education. This balanced economic development makes it [words indistinct] the situation may change in the future as the course on large-scale foreign investment had been taken and new jobs are due to arise.

Everything said is certainly only [words indistinct] in the country whose leader has been named person of the year in Africa. But I think the description given in January last year in a publication of the TRANSPRESS news agency can be of interest: Robert Mugabe has the cool British intellect and displays outbursts of nationalistic emotions. He speaks slowly and avoids showing off. He has long got the acclaim of a pragmatist.

Well, summing up, I would like to know that Robert Mugabe is accomplishing the tasks he has set himself. His projects have no fantastic [word indistinct]. They take into account the existing positions of Zimbabwe on the continent and the region within the international system of political and economic ties.

Commentary Discusses Natal Factional Clashes

MB0501152890 Moscow in English to Southern Africa
1900 GMT 4 Jan 90

[Aleksandr Fedorov commentary; from the "South Africa Today" program—read by announcer]

[Text] In South Africa, recent reports from the Namibian front have been replaced by regular reports about clashes between the supporters of Gatsha Buthelezi's organization, Inkatha, and the United Democratic Front [UDF]. The number of victims grows every month, but the authorities often simply report the tragic occurrences and do nothing to stop them.

I do not think that the hostilities in the country do not worry the Frederik de Klerk cabinet. If it really intends to carry out the program of revolutionary changes promised before the parliamentary elections, the clashes in Natal might become a serious obstacle on the road to political and economic reform. The clashes between Africans cannot be ignored because they arouse panic in the white community, which is used by opponents to the National Party. The logic of the Conservative Party and the Afrikaner Resistance Movement is simple: The liberalization can only complicate the situation in the

country, and it is the duty of all white people to adhere to the tested methods of the system of separate development.

You do not have to be a politician to realize that the role of an indifferent onlooker in this is unjustified. On the other hand, it is possible to assume that South Africans view the clashes as the [word indistinct] that can stop a very [word indistinct] course of developments. Now their authorities have promised performance and taken even some concrete steps in this direction, the opponents of apartheid accuse them of slowness. So, at [words indistinct] and desire to win the sympathies of the whites. That is why lately it has been said that the developments in Natal hinder the constitutional dialogue.

The possibility of such a turn in developments was predicted by African liberation organizations, specifically by the UDF. It invited Buthelezi's organization to start negotiations in order to stop the bloodshed in Natal. But apparently Inkatha is concerned about questions of prestige. It ignored the call of the UDF but announced readiness to hold talks on the future of the country, even if all the other African organizations fighting against apartheid are [words indistinct].

There is also another [word indistinct] circumstance. The South African press has reported close cooperation between Inkatha and the police, but not in matters of stopping the clashes in Natal. This does not sound like Buthelezi, who swallowed the accusations made last year in Parliament by a number of ministers who claimed that for every operation in Natal, Buthelezi personally gets big sums that accumulated in his bank accounts abroad.

President de Klerk is in a difficult situation. If he orders an investigation of the special relationship between the police and Inkatha, this will arouse the indignation of the military [words indistinct] away from the leadership. But the president cannot remain an indifferent onlooker, because noninterference is ambiguous. I hope few people in South Africa share the view of Pieter Botha that Africans are to blame for all their problems.

RSA Minister's Hungarian Visit Sign of Change

MB0501100190 Moscow in English to Southern Africa
1900 GMT 4 Jan 90

[Vladimir Tsirollov commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] Reports by Western news media on the visit by Roelof Botha to Budapest that started on Wednesday [3 Jan] are claimed to be sensational.

This is, indeed, the first tour of socialist and Warsaw Treaty country by a member of the South African Government. The most impatient of the observers even allege both countries will soon establish diplomatic relations.

Meanwhile, socialist countries are known to be the most outspoken opponents of the apartheid system in South Africa. Is it a drastic turn in policies?

There is hardly any change in Hungary's attitude to apartheid: a proof of that is the statement by the Hungarian Foreign Ministry timed to the visit of Roelof Botha to Budapest. It stresses that the Hungarian Republic continues to denounce apartheid, and the immediate establishment of diplomatic relations cannot be the primary aim of the visit.

At the same time, one can hardly dismiss the fact that the visit would be impossible without the changes taking place in the socialist countries and South Africa itself.

The South African minister says the goal of the visit is to comprehend the latest developments in Hungary and other East European nations, as well as to inform the Hungarian side on the situation in South Africa proper and the whole of the region.

Both sides do have what to tell each other. [sentence as heard]

The democratic changes in the socialist world and in the Hungarian Republic, in part, are based on the new political thinking that opens up the opportunity for diverse cooperation with any country of the globe, economic cooperation primarily. South Africa will hardly be an exception in this respect.

Meanwhile, the South African Government's reforms inside the country and its search of a dialogue with the opposition forces cannot but be noticed by all those willing peace and justice to peoples of southern Africa.

Hungary's response to South Africa's participation in the Namibian settlement that opened the road to its independence was positive. It is also known that the Soviet Union was, alongside the South African Government, one of the parties to the Namibian settlement.

Concrete results of Roelof Botha's 2-day visit to Budapest will be known tomorrow, but what is happening should not be regarded as sensational. There is a regular search of ways from confrontation and pressure to dialogue and political solutions. (?This has been) the opportunity to secure stability in the interdependent world.

Coup Attempted, Put Down in Liberia

PM0501121590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Jan 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Rebellion Suppressed"]

[Text] Paris, 4 Jan—The Liberian authorities announced on Wednesday [3 January] the "arrest or elimination of opposition forces who invaded the country 24 December from Ivory Coast territory and terrorized the civilian population." Liberian Justice Minister Jenkins Scott announced at a news conference in Monrovia that the

government is now in control of the situation in the northeast region of Nimba where the opposition forces tried to raise a rebellion to overthrow Liberian President Samuel Doe.

The rebels underwent training initially in Burkina Faso and then in Libya. Then they were transferred to the Western Ivory Coast to be moved from there to Liberia. J. Scott called "absolutely false and fabricated" the recent statements in a BBC program by one Charles Taylor, who called himself the leader of the opposition and the organizer of the invasion. In particular he claimed that 250 Liberian soldiers were killed during armed clashes. J. Scott noted that the losses of government troops were insignificant. One soldier was killed and one wounded.

According to reports from Abidjan in recent days 8,000-10,000 Liberians have fled to the Ivory Coast fleeing fierce clashes in Nimba. That country's information minister, Auguste Miremont, has told an AFP correspondent that "artillery shelling can still be heard" on the border between the two countries. The influx of refugees is creating great difficulties for the Ivory Coast, which intends to appeal for aid to the International Red Cross Committee, O. Mirmont said.

The Ivory Coast government is attentively following the development of the situation in Liberia, he said. The security forces along the border with that country have been ordered to "increase their vigilance." A police detachment and gendarme company have been sent to the Danane region.

Eritrean Front To Release 10,000 Prisoners

*EA0801091490 Moscow International Service
in Amharic 1530 GMT 4 Jan 90*

[Text] According to an AFP report from Nairobi, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front [EPLF] intends to release about 10,000 Ethiopian soldiers. The soldiers were captured by the rebels in the war in the northern region of the country. Maksim Yevgenyev has the following commentary on this.

It is clear that the release will show the goodwill of the Eritrean rebels. It should be noted that the release was announced after the Ethiopian Government had agreed to open food corridors in areas controlled by its Army for the distribution of food in areas hit by famine.

These decisions, made on a humanitarian basis, should be supported in view of the general situation obtaining in the northern region of Ethiopia. Especially, we should recall that such a decision was unthinkable just 1 year ago. So, does this not show that the opposing parties have changed their stand, and are slowly giving up the idea of confrontation? The political situation in Ethiopia has changed enormously since the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Government adopted the new peace initiative to stop the civil war. The peace initiative was adopted by the National Shengo last June. The start

of preliminary talks with the Eritrean rebels in Atlanta, in the United States, is clear evidence of the practicality of the initiative. The preliminary talks with the rebels continued on the African Continent—that is, in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi.

Nevertheless, although it is widely accepted by most Ethiopians that the peace efforts of the Ethiopian officials are a step in the right direction to resolve the numerous problems in the country, the other big opposition group, the Tigray People's Liberation Front [TPLF], has hampered them. The recent talks in Rome with the latter did not achieve the expected results—that is, no agreement was reached to stop the war. The Tigray rebels, confident of winning on the battlefield, have intensified the bloodbath. The continued confrontation has aggravated the food shortage resulting from drought in Tigray, and has exacerbated the plight of refugees. Ethiopia has been weakened by the war, which has consumed human and material resources. The war has subjected civilians to untold suffering. The time has come for the TPLF to realize that the continuation of the war is useless. It is believed that the goodwill shown by the EPLF sets a good example to abandon the confrontational approach, Maksim Yevgenyev concludes.

Somalia's Upcoming Constitutional Reforms Viewed

*EA0501101590 Moscow International Service in Somali
1600 GMT 3 Jan 90*

[Text] A referendum will be held in Somalia this year, 1990, which will lead to constitutional reform in the country. A multiparty system will be introduced in the country. Ashkir Botan, the chairman of the new constitutional committee, recently briefed journalists on this issue. The committee was formed in November, 1989. Vladimir Borisov of Radio Moscow comments.

It appears many important changes will take place in Somalia this year. That is how the new constitutional committee sees it. A member of the committee, Isma'il Jama Osbleh, who is also an expert in public law, said some sections of the Constitution would be either changed or completely done away with. As stated earlier, the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party [SRSP] will lose its exclusiveness in the national constitution. The section which states that Somalia is a socialist state may also be removed. The democratic section, on the rights of citizens and freedom of expression, will form the basis of the new constitution. The important point is that this decision was taken by the SRSP. That was said by the head of the Mogadishu regime, Mohamed Siad Barre. Experts on Somali affairs believe that the government aims to surmount the current difficult situation facing Somalia by taking these steps. Our commentator adds that not every party and regime can take such bold decisions, while involved in a difficult situation.

Furthermore, I believe, our commentator said, that among the members of the SRSP there are healthy forces who reason meaningfully. It is these forces, therefore,

who should spearhead the party's stand in the forthcoming political battle in the country. They should demonstrate the party's legitimate role in the future of Somalia. This can only be proved by deeds. However, no one knows which parties will contest the election. When Siad Barre announced that an election would be held this year, he talked of two or three parties. No one knows what he meant. Would the SRSP form several parties, or would there be others?

To date, there are three armed opposition forces in the country. The strongest one is the Somali National Movement [SNM] fighting in the north of the country. The other two are the Somali Patriotic Movement [SPM] and the SAF [expansion unknown] in the south of the country. Apart from the slogan let us topple Siad Barre's regime, they have no obvious clearcut political programs. Moreover, each rebel group is securely attached to one of the Somali tribes. So will it be possible for the leaders of the rebel movements to form political parties and overcome the interests they have represented so far? These are some of the questions which the coming changes in Somalia will answer. If the rebels do not participate in the forthcoming changes, it will be virtually impossible to stop the ongoing civil war in the country, or to preserve the national unity of the Republic. A number of issues are not defined in the forthcoming changes in Somalia. However, the reforms have started, and that is the most important thing, our commentator said.

East Europe

Romania's Prime Minister Roman Praises Relations

LD0501201890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1900 GMT 5 Jan 90

[Text] On the eve of a visit to Bucharest by Eduard Shevardnadze, the USSR foreign minister, which begins 6 January, our correspondent interviewed Petre Roman, the Romanian prime minister.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent] How do you see Soviet-Romanian relations in politics and the economy, and also in the sphere of individual contacts?

[Roman, in Romanian with superimposed Russian translation] I see them as being very good in all spheres, without exception. We know and from the outset were convinced that the peoples of the land of the soviets and the present Soviet leadership support us, and this is very important to us. Undoubtedly, in the future this must continue to be reflected in Romanian-Soviet relations. [end recording]

Moscow TV Interviews Roman

LD0601195190 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1440 GMT 6 Jan 90

[From the "International Panorama" program, presented by Aleksandr Bovin: interview with Romanian

Prime Minister Petr Roman by Viktor Lyubovtsev in Bucharest; date not given—recorded; Roman speaks in Romanian with superimposed Russian translation, except where indicated otherwise]

[Text] [Lyubovtsev] Mr Prime Minister, we are very grateful to you for your agreement to give an interview for the "International Panorama" program. We talked with you for the first time nearly 2 weeks ago, immediately after the victory of the people's revolution. Please say how you would define the main result of these 2 weeks? What has your government managed to do? What has it not yet managed to do?

[Roman, in Russian] First of all, I would like to apologize to Soviet television viewers for the fact that I am not going to speak Russian because I do not want to spoil the wonderful Russian language.

[Lyubovtsev] By all means, speak Romanian.

[Roman] During these weeks, we have tried to get the economic mechanism going again and to get people back to normal life—naturally within the framework that is possible today—to improve their living conditions, and to raise the level of well-being of the citizens of Romania. It can be said that we have managed to do this, for the most part, primarily because we have removed from the economic mechanism all the prohibitions, instructions, and injunctions engendered by centralization, centralization which cannot be compared even with that which has existed in any other socialist country. This alone has turned out to be an enormous reserve for economic activity. Second, we have appointed competent people to leading posts in the ministries, people who had begun to work with a high level of professionalism, even in the old economic structures, but we are using them more productively. I have already said—and I want to repeat it in this interview for Soviet television—that the former dictator had fully eradicated from our life this reserve of competence and professionalism, this intellectual potential of society. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this reserve.

As you know, urgent measures have been adopted to enhance the well-being of the citizens of Romania. This concerns heating, electricity, and food supplies. A whole series of other measures of a social and political nature also have been adopted. Among them, I can name the redistribution of land, which is now going over to use by owners of cooperatives. We are convinced that all this will help advance our society along the road of recovery. The role of the Soviet Union, and principally, its understanding of the significance which supplies of raw materials and fuel have for us, are very important in balancing the economic mechanism and getting it to function in a stable manner.

[Lyubovtsev] Tell me, how do you assess the present state of the country's economy? As facing a crisis? Disastrous? Difficult? Or perhaps, not bad?

[Roman] The state of the economy, if we think only [words indistinct]. Forgive me.

[Lyubovtsev] Yes, go ahead.

[Roman] If we are assessing just the functioning of the economic mechanism, it can be said that we are in a much better situation than we expected, for we have indeed managed to set the main levers of economic development in motion. However, if we are talking about the structure, the infrastructure of the Romanian economy, the situation here is very difficult, for the dictator left us a backward industry and obsolete technologies and equipment that are many decades old. It can be asserted that we have virtually no advanced, highly developed technologies, and this is very dangerous, since it casts doubt on our being included in worldwide economic links. In one sense, we can regard the present situation as acceptable, but in making a deeper assessment of it we have to admit that the situation is a difficult one.

[Lyubovtsev] You were talking about the state of the Romanian economy. How can one assess the present state of Romanian society, its political, moral, and spiritual state?

[Roman] We are sure that the revolution, above all, awakened in the people a feeling of their own dignity. Our nation has regained its dignity. It managed to topple the dictatorship with its own hands. This feeling of dignity is also appearing now, today, when our society—after the tragic events of December—nevertheless is not paralyzed by shock; it is in a state of action. Political problems exist. After all, the organs of power themselves also have not been formed yet. We do not yet know sufficiently accurately how political processes will develop. They are proceeding in a complex situation, but the moral state of our society is positive.

[Lyubovtsev] It is known Mr Prime Minister, that you were a member of the extraordinary tribunal that examined the crimes of the dictatorial couple, Nicolae and Elena Ceaucescu, and pronounced the death sentence on them. It is also known that not everywhere in the world did this decision and the carrying out of the sentence meet with the understanding and support with which they were met by the Romanian people. Tell me, please, why was it necessary to make such a decision and to carry out the sentence immediately?

[Roman] I was not a member of the extraordinary tribunal, but of course I did take part in the National Salvation Front Council's decision that a trial of the dictators was necessary. Why was it necessary? The situation in Bucharest on the evening of Sunday, 24 December, was very difficult from the military point of view. There were many casualties. The country's population was subjected to intimidation. The place where the dictatorial pair were detained could have been subjected to an attack. We received information about a possible airborne raid by a group of special units devoted to the dictator. The possibility of the dictator's being

released and heading a terrorist group could not be entirely ruled out. Tens and hundreds more people would have died. We considered that the Romanian people ought not to pay such a dear price for this in their own blood.

[Lyubovtsev] Another question, if I may, about the work of the Council of the National Salvation Front. One hundred and forty-five people belong to it, representing different social forces and political views. How do you manage to reach common decisions within this pluralism, so to speak?

[Roman] Of course, at first glance it might seem that such a variety of political views could not lead to a working out of a single opinion. Yet the National Salvation Front and its Council are a national consensus. The main desire of our people is to revive and rebuild Romania. It is precisely in this that the national consensus is expressed, as it is within the framework of our front. All the citizens of our country are in agreement with this, consequently the members of the council are in agreement. We can state with great pleasure that in our disputes with one another we have always jointly adopted coordinated decisions.

[Lyubovtsev] How do you see Soviet-Romanian relations in politics, economics, and the sphere of human contacts, as well?

[Roman] In all fields, without exception, the very best of relations. We know, and we were convinced from the very outset, that the people of the Soviet Union and the present Soviet leadership support us. This is very important to us. Undoubtedly, this will continue to reflect on Romanian-Soviet relations.

[Lyubovtsev] Thank you very much, on behalf of all viewers of "International Panorama."

[Roman, in Russian] I also thank you for this interview.

[Lyubovtsev] Thank you.

USSR Foreign Minister Pays Visit to Romania

Shevardnadze Previews Visit

*AU0501221490 Bucharest Domestic Service
in Romanian 2017 GMT 5 Jan 90*

[Interview with USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze by correspondent Alexandru Stark in Moscow on 5 January; in Russian, with superimposed Romanian translation—recorded]

[Text] [Stark] We thank Mr Shevardnadze for granting us this interview. I will go directly to the first question: In the circumstances of life in Romania today, full of important events both internally and internationally, your trip to Bucharest takes place at a moment of wide significance. How does the Soviet Government and the country's leadership assess the importance of our revolution and the changes which have taken place in

Romania, and how do you define in this context the visit which you will pay to Romania?

[Shevardnadze] I would like to start by mentioning that journeys and visits abroad are for me a common activity, a normal thing for a foreign affairs minister. In these past few years, I have been to dozens of countries. I experienced again and again various feelings but now, I am telling you honestly, I admit that on the eve of this visit to Romania I am experiencing a very, very deep emotion.

Why? I think this is very clear. The visit will take place against the background of those huge revolutionary changes which took place in Romania and which, as the leadership of the Soviet Union considers, have a historic significance for the present and the future of the Romanian people, and not only the Romanian people. The revolution we are now talking about has enormous significance for the interests of Europe and has an echo which can justifiably be considered as universal, important for the entire world.

Regarding our viewpoint, our assessment of the revolution, I would like to say that from the start, from the first days, our attitude was defined with clarity and a full sense of responsibility. The full and direct support of the Congress of People's Deputies was expressed and, twice, a declaration to that effect was adopted. The same full and direct support was expressed in the address of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev at the Congress, an address which clearly expressed our stand, first of all in supporting the revolutionary process which is taking place in Romania. This support was also conveyed during the lengthy telephone conversation between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and President Iliescu. This took place before the New Year, and I believe that dialogue has had a special significance for the future development of relations and cooperation in all fields.

[Stark] What are the main issues you will discuss in Bucharest?

[Shevardnadze] I do not think we will have an agenda, but I think we will discuss with the Romanian leadership in particular the current position of Soviet-Romanian cooperation in the broadest sense of the word. I have in mind political cooperation on the great issues, economic cooperation which is of great importance at the moment and a top issue, trade, technical-scientific, cultural relations. I do not rule out the possibility of signing an agreement regarding the opening of cultural centers, a Soviet one in Romania and a Romanian one in the Soviet Union, respectively in Bucharest and Moscow.

There is no doubt that we have plenty to discuss. We have to pay serious attention to modernizing our economic relations and introducing new forms of economic cooperation. You know that this cooperation is very large and has great scope. Now, particularly at this time, we attach great importance to strictly observing our obligations for deliveries of gas, oil, other raw materials, and in all fields. This will be one of the groups of

problems that we will tackle in detail. There is no doubt that we and the Romanian leadership will discuss the current situation in Europe, the problem of building our common European home and European economic region, various humanitarian issues, other problems pertaining to progress at the Vienna negotiations, and the interest shown by the Soviet Union, Romania, and all peoples in reducing military budgets, in order to create a new spirit in Europe. There are prospects for better cooperation in this sphere.

Of course, we will also discuss the problems of immigration currently under way in both West and East, as well as other problems connected with the construction of a new Europe and relations, of a profoundly new kind. Likewise, we can discuss improvements in the mechanism of the Warsaw Pact, its democratization, and the organization and reconstruction of CEMA. Hence, as you can see, there are many problems to be discussed, but I am afraid we do not have time to enumerate them all here.

Let us not forget our joint international cooperation at the United Nations and other international organizations. One should bear in mind that the changes that have occurred in Europe in recent months may raise the issue of rethinking the political relations between various groups of states on the continent. This kind of thinking is going on everywhere in Europe. In view of the importance of the Romanian developments, there are additional opportunities and possibilities to speed up these processes, reduce dissension in Europe, and positively contribute to ongoing processes of political and economic integration and of European construction.

I believe that we will have to profoundly tackle those wonderful prospects opened up by your revolution for improving cooperation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We have advocated and continue to work for abolishing the blocs. At this time, there is a pretty widespread consensus on the need to gradually turn these military-political mechanisms into mechanisms for ensuring stability, which is a very important thing. I believe we will have no difficulty in coming to an agreement on this issue, as well.

[Stark] What would you like to convey to our radio listeners, at the end of this interview?

[Shevardnadze] It is not by accident that I said I am very excited about this trip, I repeat, very excited. We have a heartfelt sentiment of admiration for the Romanian people's heroism and spirit of sacrifice. Once again, I would like to express our joy and admiration for the whole Romanian people, to which I want to add best wishes to the Romanian youth. I know that the Romanian youth were on the barricades of the revolution and the spearheads of the revolution. The fate of the revolution depended on the young people. I extend these sentiments to all those who spearheaded this popular revolution, the revolution of the whole people, for a new

Romania, a democratic Romania. I also extend these sentiments to President Iliescu and the other leaders.

[Stark] Thank you from the bottom of my heart. Good-bye.

Notes Romania's Need for Allies

*LD0601073690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0630 GMT 6 Jan 90*

[Text] I want to recall that a visit of Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR foreign minister, to this country begins today. The day before in a news interview, Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze said that patriots of Romania are now in need of support of their allies and the whole international community. The Soviet Union didn't interfere in the events there. We don't thrust our approaches on anyone, Comrade Shevardnadze said. Every people is free to decide for itself how to make use of the chance that history gives it.

Romanian TV Interview on Visit Eve

*LD0601102790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
0920 GMT 6 Jan 90*

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 6/1/1990—In an interview granted in Moscow with the Free Romanian Television on the eve of his Romanian visit, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze assessed the tremendous revolutionary transformations in Romania as being of historic importance for the present and future of the Romanian people and not only of it. The Romanian revolution, he said, is an event of tremendous importance for Europe's interests and with a reverberation that can be rightly assessed as universal.

Referring to the main issues he intended to approach in his talks with the Romanian leaders, the Soviet minister mentioned that he would first of all discuss the current situation of the Soviet-Romanian collaboration in the broadest meaning of the world. Likewise, Shevardnadze stated he wanted to discuss with the Romanian leaders the current situation in Europe, humanitarian questions, matters related to the progress of the Vienna talks and the reduction of the military budgets, the improvement of the mechanism of the Warsaw Pact and of the CMEA, as well as aspects of the bilateral collaboration in the international arena.

Taking account now of the important factor of the Romanian revolution, Shevardnadze said, there are more possibilities and reserves to accelerate the processes of reconsideration of the political relations between various groups of states in Europe and to lessen the disagreements, to most positively contribute to the processes of political and economic integration and construction of Europe.

Arrives in Romania

*LD0601092790 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0912 GMT 6 Jan 90*

[Text] Bucharest, 6 Jan (TASS)—E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs, arrived here today on an official visit. He was met at the capital city's Otopeni Airport by S. Celac, Romania's foreign minister, and other officials.

Among those meeting him was Ye. M. Tyazhelnikov, the USSR ambassador to Romania.

Interview to Romanian Daily

*LD0701005890 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1733 GMT 6 Jan 90*

[Text] Bucharest, 6 Jan (TASS)—E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, has given an interview to the newspaper ROMANIA LIBERA during his official visit to Romania.

Question: What is the Soviet Government's attitude to events in Romania?

Answer: We are here, and I think that already answers your question. If we date the events 17 December 1989, then it now has been 3 weeks since they began. Much has happened in this brief period of time: a truly popular uprising against the regime that has held the Romanian people in the fetters of totalitarianism for almost a quarter of a century, a bloody carnage instigated by the cut-throats of the dictatorship, a desperate struggle by patriots whose only weapons were a thirst for freedom and a hatred for the oppressors, the movement of the army over to the side of the people, the forming of the National Salvation Front and its coming to power.

In these same days, in our country Soviet people have widely expressed sympathy with those who have risen up against tyranny. The Congress of USSR People's Deputies passed a special decision in support of them. The National Salvation Front was recognized and contacts were established with it. We accepted with gratitude the invitation to visit Romania, came here, and held talks with the country's new leaders. Our conversations with I. Iliescu, chairman of the Council of the National Salvation Front, with Prime Minister P. Roman, and with Foreign Minister S. Celac have confirmed the agreement between the sides and their willingness to cooperate fruitfully with each other. All this is reflected in the joint communique adopted on the results of our visit.

Briefly, the Soviet Union, its leadership, and people, have reacted to events in your country in a way fully adequate to their nature and significance.

A question may arise about our attitude to the previous regime and its domestic and foreign policy.

To say that it was sharply critical is to say nothing. The methods used by N. Ceausescu and his closest entourage at home and abroad were alien to the very essence, ideals, and aims of our perestroika. We were not misled, either by his orthodox vocabulary, or by the appeals to "save socialism" by interfering in events that were happening in the fraternal countries. It was clearly a question of saving not socialism, but the regime of personal power, but we never identified this with the Romanian people and the privations and hardships they had borne in the name of a really lofty aim, creating the future of their homeland through selfless toil.

All this we know very well.

In general, I think excessively emotional denials are dangerous. History is made by living people, and however many black pages it may contain, we do not have the right to simply cancel them out. That way, one could with one stroke delete from history whole generations which have raised on their shoulders a great power. I am speaking now of my own country, of its past, glorious and heroic, in light of concrete human and national destinies.

He who has suffered a serious illness understands better than others the pain and sufferings of people who have endured a serious crisis. He greets with greater joy than others the news of their recovery.

We are emerging from a difficult past. We are emerging from it, having learned well its main lesson: Only an advanced democracy can give guarantees against the abuse of power and can secure a nation against repression and violence.

Therefore, the best reply to the "conductor" (leader - ed.) and to his accusation that we have "betrayed socialism" has been our policy of democratization and renewal of our country, our affirmation of the principles of glasnost and public dialogue, and our decisive break with command methods of leadership.

A direct answer has been heard, too. I myself often heard M.S. Gorbachev tell his interlocutor that without democracy, without the broadest participation of the people in the governing of the country, there is no socialism.

It is not hard to guess the reaction of Ceausescu. Having hushed up the changes in the Soviet Union and the other allied countries, he had criticized them lately.

To our common regret, the former leaders of Romania, whether intentionally or not, brought about the isolation of the country from its allies, and to a certain degree, its alienation, not to mention direct confrontation with its neighbors.

The result of such an existence is only natural.

The Romanian December, which brought to a close the cycle of revolutionary renewal which began in central and Eastern Europe, unfortunately turned out to be fraught with violence, destruction, and the deaths of

thousands of people. We bow our heads in memory of the dead and offer our condolences to those close to them and to the entire Romanian people in their grief. Our sympathy is not only, not merely, a natural human response to the sorrow of a neighbor, but is also, if you like, a principled line of policy. We are categorically opposed to violence, no matter what attire it dons, no matter what slogans and flags it appears under. We do not find to our liking the scum frothing on the lofty wave of renewal in the countries friendly to us. We have condemned and still condemn the wild outburst of dark forces which casts a shadow on the popular surge toward democracy and freedom by its acts of vandalism and by manifesting revanchism and political vengeance, as happened not long ago in the GDR, and by actions that offend the feelings of whole nations and are capable of destabilizing the situation not only without a country, but throughout the continent. Of course, we are wholeheartedly on the side of those who, by actions of protest from all the people against the actions of those forces, are literally sweeping such vermin out of the path of the revolutionary renewal of that same GDR and other countries.

There is nothing worse than when a new dictatorship starts to break through to take over from an old one.

Allow me once again to congratulate the Romanian people on their victory. We will accept whatever choice they make at the free democratic elections forthcoming in the spring.

Question: The Soviet Government has recognised the National Salvation Front Council and decided to provide aid to the casualties of our revolution. What is, or will be the concrete expression of that aid?

Answer: In the very first week of the people's revolution, medical preparations and medicines arrived in Romania from the Soviet Union valued at R1.3 million. Eighty-nine truckloads of clothes, food, and other commodities also were dispatched.

Within the territory of the USSR, 18,000 hospital beds were prepared to treat stricken Romanian citizens. Soviet medical teams also have been working in Romania itself.

There is daily monitoring at the USSR Council of Ministers of the delivery of goods under the Soviet side's obligations under the protocol on goods turnover and payments between our countries for 1990. Every day 22 million cubic meters of gas arrive in Romania from the Soviet Union.

In spite of our own difficulties with food, we have greeted with understanding the decision of the National Salvation Front Council temporarily to halt exports of foodstuffs and certain other commodities to the USSR, which are to be channelled into domestic needs.

During our visit, we also have discussed the outlook for trade and economic cooperation. We now are gaining the

opportunity to make use of new forms of mutually beneficial business partnership, the development of which was previously held back. Much could come of border trade, direct links between oblasts and towns, joint enterprises, and coproduction ties.

The Soviet Union and Romania are neighbors. We not only have a common border and a long interconnected history, but also, I am convinced, an interdependent future within the framework of the common European home, which is being created by joint efforts.

We will trust each other and help each other.

Question: In his New Year address to the Soviet people, M.S. Gorbachev stated that 1989 was the most difficult year for perestroika. In what sense was it the most difficult? In the sense that the speed of transformations and reforms was insufficient for objective reasons or do there exist certain conservative forces that oppose perestroika and they, to some degree, are being successful in this?

Answer: The difficulties were named in the address so I will not enumerate them. I will only say that each one has deep roots they turned out to be much more difficult to root out than it originally seemed. We have inherited a very difficult legacy, and in addition new burdens have been added to the old ones. The reform of the political system is outpacing economic reform, the implementation of which in the conditions of such a large country as ours is very complicated. One can understand the apprehension of the authors of the economic reforms, for the restructuring of a gigantic complicated mechanism is attended by serious risk.

So far it has not been possible to adopt a series of fundamental, extremely important laws. The complexity of achieving a balance of interests of the center and individual regions and union republics is great.

That these issues have not been solved naturally holds back economic activity and hinders a speedy transition to economic methods of management.

One also needs to take into account that the process of forming republican and local soviets has not yet ended. Whether we like it or not, until the new soviets have been elected the old ones have virtually begun to try to get out of conducting affairs. At a local level in places a kind of power vacuum is arising.

In the past year all these and other difficulties were revealed in a most dramatic form. They are discussed openly, they are not camouflaged as before with statements on imaginary successes. In this I see a guarantee for overcoming them. The government has a program for leading the country out of the difficult situation; there are forces and means. We see and use all the preconditions for it being overcome in 1990. The most important thing we now need is agreement, a rallying and consolidation of forces in favor of perestroika, and a clear understanding that disunity may turn out to be ruinous

for us, for all to whom it give the possibility of expressing the will and realizing the aspirations of the people.

The people will not allow the movement—which has given birth to such profound and positive essential changes in the country and the world, saving it and other peoples from the dictate of fear and the evil will of other “leaders” [vozhd] and the threat of war—to be torn apart from the inside by excessive bursts of energy the people themselves released.

Well, and the conservatives, where can't you find them? I would not make their opposition to perestroika absolute. We will cease to be ourselves if we take up chastizing those who disagree with us for having different views. Convincing is difficult, but there is no other way.

Question: How do you view the changes in Romania in light of the Helsinki process?

Answer: You are right to link the changes in your country with the course of the all-European process. It is no secret that the position of the “old” Romania seriously held back the constructive development of this process, and in a number of cases acted as an obstacle to the achievement of agreement on very important issues, above all in the humanitarian and economic spheres. The harshness of this “brake” was felt from the very beginning—at the Madrid meeting, at the Budapest and Sofia forums, and in the course of the Vienna meeting, especially at the development stage of its final document.

Romania's allies profoundly felt her gradually deepening isolation in the European process. Exhortations, requests, and arguments were to no avail. The many proposals and initiatives aimed at developing free exchanges and democratizing relations between states proved unacceptable to the regime of personal power. However, all this is, one would like to believe, in the past.

No one doubts that the new Romania will promote the achievement of all-European accord, and will make its own marked and original contribution to the construction of an all-European home and the strengthening of security and cooperation in Europe.

Talks Results Discussed

LD0601213790 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1800 GMT 6 Jan

[From the “Vremya” newscast]

[Text] This has been the first free Saturday for the Romanian people in many, many years. The point is that the 6-day working week previously introduced by Ceausescu has finally, to general satisfaction, now been replaced by a 5-day week. But, alas, the Romanian leaders have not been able to relax today: They were receiving USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, who has spent the whole of today in Bucharest on an official visit.

Talks were held with Comrades Iliescu, Roman, and Celac. Then a news conference was held and a joint communique signed. I don't think there's any need to speak of the importance or significance of this, the first official Soviet-Romanian meeting at government level since the fall of the totalitarian Ceausescu regime, especially since it passed with complete success; in any case this is what the participants told our correspondents in Bucharest, Sergey Zheleznyak and Viktor Lyubovtsev. [video shows Shevardnadze in talks with Roman, Iliescu, Celac and others]

[Begin recording] [Unidentified reporter] What are your expectations of our future bilateral contacts?

[Iliescu, chairman of the Council of the National Salvation Front—identified by caption] I believe that a situation has now come about in which our relations will develop without obstruction for our mutual benefit.

[Reporter] What do you believe are the priorities both within the country and in Romania's foreign policy?

[Iliescu] A very difficult period is now beginning for us. The overthrow of the old is always somehow easier; it is far more complex, far more difficult to build new structures. What we are trying to do is preserve the unity of the whole people around common purposes for the recovery of the country's economy and of the country's whole public life.

[Reporter] Permit me to ask an undiplomatic question. When does the head of state intend to pay a visit to our country, the Soviet Union?

[Iliescu] I would like it to be as soon as possible, but unfortunately the situation in our country is now very complex. We have received with great pleasure an invitation from Comrade Gorbachev. I believe that we shall carry this out, perhaps before the end of this month.

[Reporter] The program of the Council of the National Salvation Front speaks of a departure from ideological dogmas and a revival of general human values. How do you intend to implement this principle?

[Iliescu] In general, we do not wish to be linked with any dogmas or prejudices; we do not wish to be the slaves of any preconceived ideas, but to take life, realities, as our point of departure.

[Reporter] Eduard Amvrosiyevich, may I ask you whether you are satisfied with the results of the talks?

[Shevardnadze] I have obtained very valuable information about the origins of the revolution, of this historic revolution. I have obtained very valuable information about the plans which the Romanian leadership is making to bring the country out of this present difficult situation. I am have great confidence that these are realistic plans which will undoubtedly be supported by the people and I am also convinced that general human values are indeed being confirmed in Romania. I have drawn this very important conclusion from these talks.

[Reporter] What is your assessment of the prospects for economic cooperation between Romania and the Soviet Union?

[R.Roman, Romanian prime minister—identified by caption] I can now give an assessment that these prospects are very good.

[Reporter] Tell us, in a few days time there will be a CEMA session. What is Romania's position at this meeting?

[Roman] I have already spoken about our position. We are in favor of a very open discussion because CEMA has not been an effective organism, it has not been an effective structure. All this must be considered

[Reporter] Soviet people who have been here in Romania during these December events, during the insurgency, including journalists, have had the feeling that their Romanian friends had a high assessment of our country's position during these events with regard to the people's revolution. Did you also feel this when you were talking with the leaders of the new, free Romania?

[Shevardnadze] I felt this. I felt it and I told the Romanian leaders that the whole Soviet people and each Soviet person were with the Romanian people during these historic days and, at this very important and crucial stage in the development of the society, of the Romanian society, the Soviet people were alongside Romania.

[Reporter] Comrade Iliescu. What is the new Romania's position with regard to the Warsaw Pact Organization?

[Iliescu] We shall examine jointly the issue of the further development of the Warsaw Pact, where political relationships must be placed alongside all our relationships, from a military-political to a political-military association. And I have simply understood from this that we have common positions and thoughts, and I think that we shall jointly find ways to the development of our cooperation in this context. [end recording]

Invites Minister Celac for Visit

LD0601190290 Moscow TASS in English 1845 GMT
6 Jan 90

[Text] Bucharest January 6 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has held talks with Romanian Foreign Minister Sergiu Celac.

They discussed various aspects of the present stage and the prospects of Soviet-Romanian relations and exchanged views on international issues of mutual interest.

Shevardnadze and Celac went on record in favour of the intensification of cooperation between foreign ministries of the two countries.

Shevardnadze invited Romanian Foreign Minister Celac to visit the Soviet Union. The invitation was accepted

with satisfaction. The date of the visit will be coordinated through diplomatic channels.

Holds News Conference

*LD0601222390 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 2000 GMT 6 Jan 90*

[Text] Bucharest, 6 Jan (TASS)—A news conference has been held here by USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E.A. Shevardnadze.

I would like to start with what I said at the beginning of my conversation with the leaders of new Romania, the USSR foreign minister said in his introductory address.

I have never yet come to any country with such a feeling of emotion as I felt and feel here today, on Romanian soil.

It is the feeling of being present at a moment when history is being made. There is no doubt whatsoever that the Romanian revolution is a phenomenon of European and worldwide dimensions.

On behalf of the Soviet leadership, M.S. Gorbachev and N.I. Ryzhkov, we conveyed congratulations and wishes for success to the Romanian people, and assured the leaders of new Romania of unconditional support for the cause of the revolution, and for the renewal of all aspects of social life in the country.

The Soviet Union will render Romania whatever political, moral, and material assistance it can.

We conveyed invitations to the chairman of the National Salvation Front, the prime minister, and the minister of foreign affairs to visit the Soviet Union at a time convenient for them.

Our invitations were accepted.

We were very interested to hear the chairman and the prime minister speak about the pre-revolutionary period, the objectives of the revolution, the course of the transformations in the country, and the plans for Romania's rebirth as a democratic and law-governed state.

Our interlocutors did not conceal from us the tremendous difficulties the country is facing in overcoming the grave inheritance of the dictatorship.

We were deeply impressed by the optimism of the new leadership, its faith in the creative potential of the Romanian people, its resolve to revive its fatherland, its country.

The forthcoming elections in the country should, in the view of our interlocutors, firmly place Romania on the path of democracy, social progress and prosperity.

We felt that the leaders of the new Romania are acting energetically, purposefully, and wisely in order to consolidate political and social forces and to heal the situation in the economy and the political life of the country.

We told our interlocutors that the Romanian revolution has been welcomed enthusiastically by the Soviet people. We see it as support both for our perestroika and for the revolutionary processes taking place in our society.

It goes without saying that in the course of the negotiations we discussed generally the questions of further development of the Soviet-Romanian political dialogue, of economic cooperation, and some other problems.

The near future holds a meeting in Sofia between the prime ministers of our countries followed by the arrival in Bucharest of the deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers for material resources and the leaders of several republics, ministries, and departments.

We have briefed the Romanian leaders on the course of perestroika in the USSR, the processes of democratization and renewal, and political and economic reform.

An exchange of views has been held on the situation in Europe and the development of all dimensions of the Helsinki process.

The Romanian leaders said that the new Romania will play a most constructive role in the development of an all-European process and in working out and achieving an all-European consensus and this, we believe, is a very important acknowledgement.

At the fundamental level, questions concerning the future of the Warsaw Pact, CEMA, and other bodies in which our countries cooperate, were discussed.

Coming to a close, I would like to say that it was a pleasure for us to talk to the new Romanian leaders.

In contrast to the past, we spoke in an atmosphere filled with oxygen, high intellectual content, and human warmth. I would like to emphasize once again that this meeting with the Romanian leaders has left a great impression. These were genuinely profound, interesting and substantive conversations, which, I do not doubt, will be of fundamental significance for the further development and deepening of our cooperation.

In reply to a TASS correspondent's question on the development prospects for Soviet-Romanian cooperation, the USSR foreign minister said that a serious discussion was held today on the need to modernize and reconstruct our economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. We expressed our support for developing cultural ties, for active ties between the two countries' scientific establishments; in a word—for civilized relations between two neighboring countries, peoples, and states.

Replying to other correspondents, Shevardnadze pointed out that dictatorship is unacceptable to the Soviet people in any form. And this is the reason, he pointed out, that we began our revolution known as perestroika, the main feature of which is democratization of socio-political and economic life in our country.

Neither a "communist" dictatorship—or one held out as such—nor a bourgeois dictatorship is acceptable.

A question was asked on whether the termination of the Romanian Communist Party's activities would affect Soviet-Romanian relations.

Relations between the USSR and Romania, Shevardnadze said, will be built on the principles of full equality of rights, mutual advantage, and respect, mutual enrichment and good-neighborliness. It is the Romanian people's business what parties will function in Romania, and we have always respected and will continue to respect the will of the Romanian people.

The new leadership of Romania, the Soviet minister noted, confirmed its adherence to the Helsinki Final Act, which stipulates the inviolability of the postwar borders in Europe. At the same time, agreement was reached on easing visa requirements between the Moldavian SSR and Romania.

With regard to cooperation between the USSR and Romania within the framework of the CEMA and Warsaw Pact, Shevardnadze said that mutual understanding has reached on this matter, and that a great deal of thorough work will have to be done in order seriously to modernize these organizations. Regarding the Warsaw Pact, here too we have no differences of opinion, we reached agreement in principle. Consultations must be continued with the aim of further politicizing this military-political alliance.

An APN correspondent put a question to Romanian Foreign Minister S. Celac, who was present at the news conference, concerning the new Romanian leadership's assessment of the position adopted by the USSR with regard to the Romanian revolution and the prospects for development of bilateral relations.

In the course of the current negotiations, and also during a telephone conversation between I. Iliescu and M.S. Gorbachev, the Romanian minister replied, the sincere gratitude of the Romanian leadership and the council of the National Salvation Front for the good wishes and moral and material support was expressed. I consider that a firm basis is now being created for the further development of good-neighborly, friendly relations of cooperation between our countries.

Replying to a question about the prospects for an all-European conference, Shevardnadze said that the Romanian revolution will contribute to accelerating the convening of such a conference.

As for the construction of the common European home, it appears that the democratization of Soviet society has to a certain degree facilitated the processes which are developing in the Eastern European countries. This is also how it was during the great French Revolution and the Great October Socialist Revolution - major events always evoke consequences. In turn, we shall assimilate

in the construction of our democratic socialism everything positive that we observe in the Romanian or, for example, Czechoslovak experience.

I have been told that before the uprising the National Salvation Front did not exist and therefore we could not have had any contacts with it, Shevardnadze said in conclusion.

Departs 6 Jan

LD0601184590 Moscow TASS in English 1836 GMT
6 Jan 90

[Text] Bucharest January 6 TASS—Today, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who is also a Soviet Communist Party Politburo member, left Romania after an official visit there.

Communique on Visit

LD0601205590 Moscow TASS in English 2037 GMT
6 Jan 90

["Shevardnadze—Communique"—TASS headline]

[Text] Bucharest January 6 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze paid an official visit to Bucharest on January 6, 1990.

Ion Iliescu, chairman of the Council of the National Salvation Front of Romania, and Prime Minister Petre Roman received Shevardnadze and held talks with him.

An oral message and greetings of Mikhail Gorbachev were conveyed to the leaders of the Council of the National Salvation Front.

On behalf of the Council of the National Salvation Front and the Romanian Government, they expressed sincere gratitude for the friendly message of Mikhail Gorbachev, for solidarity displayed by the Soviet leadership and people with regard to the Romanian people from the very first moment of the revolution which was brought about by a massive movement and resulted in the coming to power of the National Salvation Front, as well as for the support in the revival of Romania.

It was stressed that the correct assessment of development in Romania by the Soviet Union was of much importance for the Romanian people.

Participants in the talks devoted much time to the exchange of information on the situation in the Soviet Union and Romania. The Romanian leaders told Shevardnadze about revolutionary changes in the life of the country and measures taken by the National Salvation Front for stabilising the political situation and resolving top-priority socio-economic problems.

It was pointed out that the whole of the nation fully supported the platform of the National Salvation Front, regarding it as the expression of people's will to rebuild and renew Romania.

They told the Soviet foreign minister about the first steps taken by the new power for abrogating anti-people laws and instructions, improving people's living conditions, mapping out guidelines of the economic strategy aimed at creating a sound basis for the national economy, as well as for developing democracy in all the spheres of public life and ensuring respect for human rights and freedoms.

Shevardnadze told the Romanian leaders about the present stage of perestroika in the USSR, the results of the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies, the work for further consolidating people's power and creating a law-governed state based on the principles of humanism and a broad development of democracy.

The Soviet foreign minister reiterated solidarity of Soviet people with the Romanian people working for the realization of the ideals of freedom, independence and national dignity.

He said that the Soviet Union supported efforts exerted by the National Salvation Front for doing away with the legacy of the totalitarian regime and creating democratic structures of power.

They also discussed questions connected with bilateral relations. Participants in the talks pointed to their mutual desire to develop them on a sound, effective and mutually advantageous basis, proceeding from the principles of independence, sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs, mutual trust, freedom of choice and territorial integrity.

Profound revolutionary changes taking pace in the USSR and Romania create additional opportunities for it.

In this setting it was decided to develop bilateral relations in the economic, scientific, technical and cultural spheres. Agreement was reached in principle on the opening on a reciprocal basis of information and cultural centres in Bucharest and Moscow, the development of personal contacts, the simplification of visits by citizens of both countries, specifically in the border areas, as well as on other questions.

The sides stated their identity of views on key international problems and expressed readiness to give a new impetus to cooperation between the two countries in the international arena, including in international organizations, for the purpose of resolving vital problems facing humanity.

On behalf of the Soviet Government, the Soviet foreign minister conveyed to Ion Iliescu and Petre Roman an invitation to visit the Soviet Union, which was accepted with gratitude. The date of the visit will be coordinated later.

Commentary on Romania Ties, Shevardnadze Visit

LD0601142190 Moscow World Service in English
1210 GMT 6 Jan 90

[Yuri Solton commentary on Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to Romania—read by announcer]

[Text] I won't undertake to predict the concrete results of the visit, but I think it would be no mistake if I say that new principled approaches to the development of Soviet-Romanian cooperation will be outlined during the (?tour). Relations between the people of the two countries have always been close. The Soviet Union and Romania were bound by the commitments under the treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation. The two countries are members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

Yet behind the outwardly favorable situation serious differences were piling up, especially in the last years of Ceaucescu's rule. They spread both to bilateral relations and to the partnership in international affairs. Moscow was aware of the anti-Soviet sentiments fanned by the Ceaucescu clique in Romania. It cherished no illusions concerning Ceaucescu's policy of dictating and his fallacious methods. This was the area where open criticism was not allowed. This policy, I think, is one of our political miscalculations, which mustn't be repeated in the future. I'm certain that Soviet-Romanian relations will be cleared of all kinds of innuendos and openness will stimulate the development of cooperation.

The Soviet Union recognized immediately the National Salvation Front and established a permanent contact with it. Now Romania is living through a crucial period. The country's new leaders are charting its political course. The National Salvation Front announced its platform recently. In domestic life it calls for giving up the past methods and for building a state where the most attractive qualities of socialism and capitalism will serve to benefit the people.

On the international scene Romania reaffirms its loyalty to the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Romania intends to expand its contacts with the West at the same time. Some may ask can't this policy have a negative effect on Soviet-Romanian relations? All who think so live under the spell of the old thinking dogmas. Significantly on the (?days) of the revolutionary uprising some countries wanted the Soviet Union to interfere in the affairs of Romania by military means. Moscow refused to take such a step. This country has abandoned the so-called inside the bloc strategy known in the West as the Brezhnev doctrine. Today relations within the Warsaw Treaty organization are developing in keeping with the principle of recognizing the right of every member to choose a way of development freely. The Soviet Union's political leadership, Eduard Shevardnadze declared shortly before the beginning of his visit to Romania, orients our diplomacy on a frank and differential dialogue with its allies and partners, on a joint search of the

balance of interest in the work of acquiring (?by our) relations new qualities agreeing with the lofty ideals of democracy and freedom.

To my mind, this particular search will be determining the progress of Soviet-Romanian negotiations.

Bovin Views Progress of Romanian Revolution

*LD0601204990 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1440 GMT 6 Jan 90*

[From the "International Panorama" Program, presented by Aleksandr Bovin]

[Text] Well, our foreign minister is in Bucharest today. A new chapter in Soviet-Romanian relations is beginning, and of course there is something to talk about. The restructuring, the readjustment of the whole of state life in Romania is continuing. The decree and law of the National Salvation Front Council talks of a rejection of a leading role for any single party and of the establishment of a democratic pluralist system of government. The removal of administrative-bureaucratic methods of centralized economic management, the encouragement of free initiative, and the support of small peasant holdings if envisaged.

ROMANIA LIBERA recently published an interesting article under the title: "Without -isms and parties." Its author was Silviu Brucan, chairman of the Commission for Foreign Policy of the Executive Bureau of the National Salvation Front Council. This is what he writes:

For some time, at least, we have to give up such concepts as socialism, capitalism, and communism. They have no meaning in the present situation, and in any event no connection with social reality. The whole historic system of the so-called inevitable succession of social formations worked out by Marx has manifestly and irrevocably become obsolete, Brucan believes. At the present time, we do not possess a contemporary theory. We do not know the world we live in; we do not know the direction in which this world is moving. The people's revolution has created a National Salvation Front that does not need any party of any -ism. The Communist Party has remained outside the revolutionary process.

Yes, the Communist Party of Romania in its present form has departed from the historical stage. It has, so to speak, been destroyed twice: Once by Ceausescu and a second time by the revolution. The hurricane that passed over Romania sets one thinking: There are few, very few remaining totalitarian regimes or bastions of barrack socialism. Of course, they will fall. One only hopes that no human blood will be spilled. The overall picture of the reforms in the greater part of Eastern Europe still fits into the framework of relatively calm political evolution. The inevitable tensions do not go so far as shocks, explosions, and dangerous collapses. Czechoslovakia provides a typical example of this.

Romanian Government Adopts Decree on Amnesty

*LD0501220790 Moscow TASS in English 2140 GMT
5 Jan 90*

[Text] Bucharest January 6 TASS—The Council of Romania's National Salvation Front on Friday adopted a decree on amnesty of those who were convicted for political reasons after December 30, 1947.

The document says that this applies to those who were sentenced for protest against the dictatorship and the cult of personality, against terror and abuse of power, those who declared for the observance of basic human rights and liberties and waged the struggle for civic, political, economic and cultural rights, against discrimination.

It is said in the decree that if those pardoned commit deliberate crimes in the course of three subsequent years, they will undergo the punishment terminated by the present law. The new punishment will also be administered.

The amnesty applies to persons who committed criminal offenses prior to December 22, 1989.

'Fruits of Vengeance' Seen in Romanian Events

*LD0601231290 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1440 GMT 6 Jan 90*

[From the "International Panorama" program, presented by IZVESTIYA Political Observer Aleksandr Bovin]

[Text] Hello, comrades. Central Television, as you and I can well see, is being restructured. "International Panorama" has been removed from the jurisdiction of the Main News Editorial Department and transferred to the Main International Life Editorial Department, and the time of the broadcast has been changed from Sunday—it has been shifted to Saturday. That is the nature of restructuring—and let's regard it as revolutionary restructuring.

But let's get down to business now. I don't know; perhaps I am exaggerating things, but it seems to me that for several months now the center of world politics has shifted to central, eastern, and southeastern Europe. Events are taking place there whose various consequences, in my view, are capable of changing to a significant extent our traditional ideas about the laws governing world history and social progress. The culmination recently, of course, is Romania—the popular rising, the collapse of the despotic regime, and the execution of the dictator.

Experience shows that it is not enough for autocrats that people fear them. They want to be loved. And official love is the shadow, so to speak, of the unofficial terror, the reverse side of the soul-destroying servility. As you and I have seen repeatedly, huge halls burst out in applause and streets are filled with exultant crowds, and

a servile press goes into ecstasies day after day about some particular leader or other. And the more closely knit this propaganda fabric is woven, the more effectively the mechanisms operate that distil love into hatred and admiration into frenzy. When they plant a tree the roots of which are nourished in blood—as Ferdousi wrote quite a long time ago—then no matter how much time goes by it will bring forth fruits of vengeance. And we have seen how this vengeance is wrought.

For Romania the new year has become the year of entry into new life.

GDR's Honecker Released; Arrest 'Not Valid'

*PM0501153190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Jan 90 Second Edition p 5*

[TASS report: "ADN Report"]

[Text] Berlin, 4 Jan—It has been reported here that E. Honecker, former general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, has been released from house arrest. According to the ADN report, the arrest was not legally valid.

Foreign Ministry Statement on GDR 'Neo-Nazi Virus'

*PM0501113590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Jan 90 Second Edition p 7*

["USSR Foreign Ministry Statement"—PRAVDA headline]

[Text] In recent days all the world's news agencies have begun carrying alarming reports on brazen outbursts by right-wing extremist and neofascist elements in various GDR cities. The memorial to the Soviet servicemen-liberators in Berlin's Treptower Park was defiled recently. A monument to the victims of fascism was damaged in Halle. Gravestones on the graves of Soviet soldiers in the memorial cemetery at Gera have been destroyed. Unrestrained neofascist thugs have repeatedly threatened physical violence against GDR citizens who have attempted to curb them and bring them to their senses. As a rule, neofascist gatherings are held under the slogans: "Hitler Lives!" "We Are Republicans," "Foreigners Out!" "Communists to the Wall!" "Jews Out!" and so forth.

The direct link and close contacts between neofascists in the GDR and the "Republican" party in the FRG are becoming increasingly obvious. The leaders of this party, including former SS officers, openly boast that there are dozens of groups of their supporters operating in the GDR. Taking advantage of the opening of the border between the GDR and the FRG, West German "Republicans" are sending fascist literature and technical facilities to the GDR and even promising to organize support for their confederates in the elections to the GDR People's Chamber.

The Soviet Union repeatedly has drawn attention to the tenacity of fascist ideology and the danger of neo-Nazi forces emerging into the political arena. Unfortunately, Bonn always tries to belittle this danger and to present the actions of neo-Nazi forces as outbursts by individual incorrigible extremists who carry no political weight. However, life refutes over and over again attempts to close one's eyes to the true state of affairs. Neo-Nazism now is acquiring a new nutrient in connection with the campaign unleashed in the FRG for the restoration of the German Reich and a revision of the postwar European borders.

Such a development poses a direct threat to the current processes in Europe of creating the foundations of the common European home and deepening cooperation and mutual trust between East and West.

The emergence of a neo-Nazi virus in the GDR arouses a feeling of profound alarm, anger, and indignation in all honest people of the Republic, workers, peasants, the intelligentsia, antifascist veterans, and young people. The impressive demonstration held at the memorial monument to the Soviet servicemen-liberators in Treptower Park 3 January was a powerful expression of a nationwide protest against neo-Nazism.

The Soviet people, who gave millions of lives of their sons and daughters in the name of routing German fascism, express feelings of sincere solidarity with and support for GDR citizens in their determination to deal a firm rebuff to neo-Nazis and revanchists. The Soviet Union is conscious of the responsibility it bears for preventing the revival of fascism and averting the threat of war from German soil and expresses confidence that all European peoples and everyone who despises fascism and advocates the building of a Europe of peace and cooperation will strive together to erect a reliable barrier to the revival of Nazism.

Commentary Views Neofascism in GDR

*LD0401140290 Moscow World Service in English
0910 GMT 4 Jan 90*

[Mikhail Mayorov commentary]

[Text] A mass rally has been held in Treptower Park, Berlin, against recent manifestations of neofascism and anti-Sovietism in the German Democratic Republic. Our commentator Mikhail Mayorov writes:

I think this is an internal affair of the GDR, and one has to be particularly tactful discussing those events here in Moscow. We should also keep calm, all the more so (?that) the current changes stir up dregs in Soviet society too. My comments are in no way attempts to revive the so-called Brezhnev doctrine, which we are all only too glad to say goodbye to, both in Eastern Europe and here. We are all changing, and can look each other in the eye without fear. So I'd like my treatment of the subject to be seen in that light.

But it is certainly shocking to hear of desecrating the graves of Soviet soldiers who gave their lives in fighting fascism during the Second World War; or of Nazi graffiti on the walls of the houses. We always believed that acts like this could only happen in West Germany or some other western countries. We thought it was absurd to expect Nazi trends (?arise) in the socialist society. That confidence was evidently one of a stereotypes that we will have to discuss now. We are used to idealizing ourselves—more exactly, idealizing the Stalin totalitarian system which existed in several variants in the Soviet Union and in East European countries. Self-admiration made us blind to complexities of our life, to the sources of both good and bad. We followed the ridiculous principle: This cannot be because it can never be at all.

The more painful is the moment of truth now. We have keenly felt that pain in the Soviet Union, and it looks like so have those GDR citizens who have held the rally in Treptower Park, Berlin. Some people may object that restructuring, democratization, should mean the triumph of pluralism, let's have clashes of opinion, that's all welcome; but neofascism, just as neo-Stalinism is the opposite of democracy, of pluralism. It means fanning hatred between nations. Self-criticism cannot do anyone harm, even if some people find that there's too much of it. In this instance it should only stress the loftiness of the set goal: to overcome the distortions of socialism and create a truly democratic and humane society. I'd like to give support, concludes Mikhail Mayorov, to those people who said no to neo-Nazism and anti-Sovietism at the rally in Treptower Park. We should protect our democratic ideals from those who may seem no more than hooligans, but who may become a force threatening democratic process, unless of course we all rally to oppose them.

GDR Poll Shows Opposition to Uniting Germany
*LD0401185290 Moscow TASS in English 1809 GMT
4 Jan 90*

[Text] Berlin January 4 TASS—Most of the GDR citizens oppose the creation of a "single German fatherland". This follows from the results of a representative public opinion poll held before the Christmas holidays by sociologists from the GDR Academy of Social Sciences. Answering the question "What is your attitude to reunification?" which is crucial for present-day relations between the two German states, 69.2 percent of the polled said that they favoured the creation of a treaty-based community of the two states, the GDR and West Germany, along with the ensurance of their sovereignty.

Some 55.7 percent of the polled favour an all-European confederation of which the GDR, a socialist country, would be a component part. 14.3 percent of the polled supported the formation of a federation with West Germany in which the GDR would exist as a federal land. 9.2 percent supported the unconditional joining of West Germany by the GDR. Since many of the polled

supported not one of the proposed plans, but two, a total number of answers exceeds 100 percent.

GDR citizens are pinning great hopes on 1990. 43 percent of the polled believe that their living standards will improve this year. Some 49 percent think that they will remain on the present level. Only 7 percent expect their deterioration.

GDR Conference Makes Government Recommendations
*LD0401203690 Moscow TASS in English 2019 GMT
4 Jan 90*

[Text] Berlin January 4 TASS—By TASS correspondent Igor Osinskiy:

The national economy of the German Democratic Republic is in a difficult situation. The state budget lost some six million marks last year.

More than half the number of complexes forming the economic foundations have not coped with state assignments.

This was discussed by a roundtable conference in which representatives of 16 most influential parties, political groups and public organisations of the GDR participate.

The attention was concentrated on working out urgent measures for economic stabilisation.

Some of the participants in the roundtable conference are critical of the activity of the Moscow coalition government and accuse it of colouring the truth.

But most agree with the fact that a vote of non-confidence should not be passed on the Cabinet before free elections to the People's Chamber to be held on May 6.

Deputy chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers Christa Luft said, specifically, that the government cannot work effectively if some parties, ignoring the joint platform, continue to reject socialism.

The roundtable conference recommended that the GDR Council of Ministers urgently take a number of short-term measures aimed at the localisation of the crisis and stabilisation of the economic situation.

They should envisage functions to ensure stable supply of power, faultless functioning of transport and amenities and the population's supply with food. It was proposed to revise retail prices to eliminate and redistribute subsidies, which should give material incentive to enterprises to manufacture consumer goods.

A number of steps will be aimed at the strengthening of economic independence of complexes and enterprises, at the creation of conditions for their functioning on the basis of cost-accounting, at the further democratisation of the national economy, broad participation of the working people in managing production and more intensive use of market methods.

The roundtable conference also discussed questions connected with the elimination of the National Security Agency of the GDR.

Reform of Hungarian Armed Forces Examined

*PM0501122790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 4 Jan 90 First Edition p 3*

[Article by Colonel L. Zhobitenko, candidate of historical sciences: "Following the Path of Reforms. On the Changes Taking Place in the Hungarian Armed Forces"]

[Text] The changes taking place in socialist countries are attracting close attention among Soviet people, including Soviet Armed Forces servicemen. Letters sent to the editorial office stress the need for fuller information on the specific measures being taken in these countries to renew socialism.

In this connection, the Hungarian Government decision to reform the armed forces has aroused particular interest. This decision has been taken in a complex political and economic atmosphere. A multiparty system is now the reality in Hungary and, consequently, there are different views on Hungary's role and place in Europe, its involvement in military-political alliances, and the purpose and structure of the Hungarian Armed Forces. Official Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] documents and leaders' statements have repeatedly stressed that it is in the interests of stability in Europe to preserve the Warsaw Treaty Organization and Hungary's membership of it at the present stage. At the same time, the nature of this defensive military-political alliance, according to the newspaper NEPSZABADSAG, must change in favor of increasing its political role, as required by the times. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and NATO on a mutual basis is desirable in the long term.

The MSZP believes that it is in Hungary's national interests to cooperate with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries but, naturally, this cooperation must be free of ostentation and empty declarations. Hence the MSZP's attitude to the presence of Soviet troops in the republic. Their complete withdrawal is linked with a positive conclusion to the Vienna talks on reducing arms and armed forces in Europe. Although, judging by Hungarian press reports, the MSZP would like to speed up the process of withdrawing the Soviet troops and is taking certain steps in this direction.

Here are the opinions of such parties as the Union of Young Democrats, the Union of Free Democrats, the Party of October (1956—L.Zh.), and several others. They favor Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, a neutral Hungary, sharp reductions in military expenditure and the length of military service, and the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungarian territory. In this respect they make particular reference to the absence of a direct threat from NATO, because Hungary does not have any land borders with North Atlantic bloc member countries.

These demands should be viewed together with their programs which, economically and politically, are oriented primarily toward the West. At the same time, taking an objective approach to assessing the political situation in Hungary, it must be pointed out that ideas of neutrality are finding a certain degree of understanding among a considerable proportion of the Hungarian population, which has the example of relatively prosperous Austria right in front of it. Plans for reducing the size of the armed forces and the length of military service and for the Soviet troops to be withdrawn from the country also enjoy support. The MSZP and the Hungarian Government have been forced to take these attitudes into account when drawing up their reforms of the armed forces.

Another important factor influencing Hungarian Government policy in the military sphere, as already mentioned above, is the economic situation in the republic. It is fairly complex. The country is going through an economic crisis which has hit industry particularly hard. Hungary's foreign debt is growing and has now reached almost \$20 billion, prices have risen by an average of 17 percent this year, and the standard of living of a substantial proportion of the population, primarily young people and pensioners, is declining. Western promises of economic aid for Hungary are only slowly being put into effect and, moreover, this aid is dependent upon a whole series of conditions. Meeting these conditions will inevitably lead to more price increases and a freeze on working people's wages. It is precisely for this reason that the 3-year Hungarian Government program drafted on the basis of the IMF's "wishes" has prompted strong criticism from the trade unions, parliament, and society as a whole.

These political and economic factors, and also the growing trends toward a reduction in the level of military confrontation, played a crucial role when the Hungarian Government was drafting its reforms of the armed forces, military doctrine, and military policy as a whole. They evidently should be regarded as an integral part of the 3-year program. From a political viewpoint the reforms aim to strengthen the MSZP's positions and, as the leadership of this party believes, guarantee the conditions for a peaceful transition to democratic socialism.

Analysis of the Hungarian Government decisions adopted and published in December last year, particularly in the newspaper MAGYAR NEMZET, shows that one of the main provisions of the national military doctrine is to guarantee the country's defense within the framework of the Warsaw Pact and coordinate actions with Hungary's partners as long as there is confrontation between the two military-political alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As Hungarian Defense Minister F. Karpati has emphasized, the implementation of reforms in the Hungarian Armed Forces is based on the new policy of security and accords with the defensive doctrine proclaimed earlier by the Warsaw Pact member countries. The minister said that, instead of the 9-percent reduction in the army's numerical strength

announced in January 1989, it is planned to cut the armed forces by 30-35 percent over the next 2 years. It is primarily offensive types of weapons—tanks, missiles, and, to a certain extent, aircraft—that will be liable to cutbacks. It is also proposed to reduce the length of service for Hungarian Army personnel. Beginning 1991, the length of active military service will be 12 rather than 18 months. The reductions will also affect the length of alternative service. So, the length of "service without arms" will be reduced from 24 to 18 months and the length of "civilian service" from 28 to 22 months.

The changes have also affected the structure of the armed forces leadership. The defense minister heads the appropriate ministry and is responsible for making the decisions on general administrative matters concerning the armed forces. F. Karpati is still the defense minister, although he has asked the National Assembly to transfer him to the reserve; henceforth he will head the ministry as a civilian. A commanding officer will be in direct control of the troops. The Hungarian Council of Ministers has appointed Lieutenant General Kalman Lerints [name as published] to this position. There is a possibility that in the future the armed forces will be subordinate to the country's president. The question of forming a professional army or initially putting professionals in positions requiring a high level of training is also being discussed. This is intended to compensate for the reduction in the length of active military service.

Under the law on terminating the activity of party organizations in production recently adopted by parliament, the old Main Political Directorate and also political bodies in the units are to be abolished in 1990. It is planned to replace them with a directorate and departments for personnel education respectively. Instead of deputy commanders for political affairs there are going to be deputies for educational work. The activity of party organizations in the armed forces is to come to an end. They have already been disbanded in the defense ministry's central bodies. Military servicemen are to be allowed to take part in the work of party organizations belonging to any party in their place of residence. In this respect it is recommended that party meetings be attended in civilian clothes. However, Hungarian military servicemen may attend church services even in uniform.

The reforms of the Hungarian Armed Forces have begun in conditions of an improving political climate in Europe, which undoubtedly creates a favorable background for their implementation.

West Europe

UK Warship Fitted With Secret Laser Weapon

LD0601225190 Moscow World Service in English
1600 GMT 6 Jan 90

[Text] The British Navy is reported to have equipped some of its warships with a secret laser weapon of a type

banned under a Soviet-American arms agreement. The laser gun, which can temporarily blind an enemy pilot during attack from the air, was detected on the Frigate Coventry by a Spanish journalist who covered NATO naval exercises last November. The information was revealed in the magazine TIEMPO on Friday. It was also reported by the DAILY MAIL, DAILY EXPRESS and TODAY. A spokesman for the scientific JANE's JOURNAL has said British specialist publications have known of the weapon for 2 years but were prohibited by the Ministry of Defense from divulging the information. Now that the weapon is no longer secret, he said, the journal would publish a full article on the subject. He also said Britain was not concerned by the Soviet-American agreement that forbids such weapons. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense is trying to establish how the leak of information occurred.

Results of Kohl-Mitterrand Meeting Commented On

LD0501160190 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1008 GMT 5 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 5 January. (TASS)—TASS political observer Albert Balebanov writes:

In my opinion, the community of positions of the sides on questions ultimately connected with the implementation of the idea of a common European home should be regarded as the main result of the French-West German summit meeting, which took place in France.

An indicator of this is the support expressed by Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl on the completion of the talks of the recent proposal by Francois Mitterrand, President of France, on the expediency of creating over the coming 10 years "a European confederation" uniting the countries of the EEC, CEMA, and EFTA [European Free Trade Association].

In this connection, the words expressed by Kohl at the news conference on the importance of European integration and on the need for guaranteeing the socialist countries of Eastern Europe the opportunity of enjoying participation with full rights in European construction have attracted attention to themselves. Nor did the statement of the head of the French state to the effect that the Soviet Union may soon be brought into the planned "European confederation" go unnoticed. Mitterrand regards such a confederation as "a permanent joint organization, founded on trade, peace and security."

Even just 6 months ago such pronouncements by the leaders of France and the FRG would have seemed unthinkable. But today, following the impressive changes which perestroika has brought with it to the political life of the Soviet Union, the rapid and stormy changes in Hungary, Poland, the GDR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania and since the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Malta, Mitterrand's initiative may be naturally and logically inscribed into the process of overcoming the epoch of the "cold war" and the division

of Europe. Nor can one fail to mention in this connection the Soviet-French summit meeting in Kiev, without which we would not have had Mitterrand's proposal regarding a "European confederation." For it was precisely there that Mikhail Gorbachev and the French leader had a detailed discussion about ways to implement the plans for building a common European home.

On the other hand, Mitterrand's initiative may also be interpreted as Paris' response to the U.S. doctrine of a "new Atlantism," which was formulated last December in West Berlin by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. The fact that France's proposal was supported by the FRG shows that opposition is broadening in Western Europe to Washington's proposals to turn NATO into a kind of super-organization to monitor the development of East-West relations and to step up the United States' influence in the European community. Clearly, such opposition is not dictated last of all by fears that the policy of a "new Atlantism" would undermine the leading role of France and the FRG in Western Europe.

There is no doubt that by coming out in support of the idea of a "European confederation," both Mitterrand and Kohl are striving not only to consolidate their own positions on the European continent but also to advance the cause of European unity and cooperation. Both leaders are taking account of the events occurring on the continent, particularly in its eastern part. In this connection it seems that the idea of creating a "European confederation," which is close to the Soviet concept of a common European home, opens up the prospect of turning Europe into a community of sovereign democratic states and into a continent of peace and equality of rights, cooperation and trust.

FRG Sectors Oppose Oder-Neisse Borderline

PM0501170590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Jan 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Discussion on Borders"]

[Text] Bonn, 4 Jan—The recent proposal by Rita Suessmuth, speaker of the FRG Bundestag, that the two German states issue a joint statement on recognizing the Oder-Neisse border as final has prompted an irritated reaction among the country's right-wing circles, particularly among the leaders of the emigre "union of exiles." Dismissing out of hand this proposal by a prominent member of the Christian Democratic Union, they continue to claim that the German Reich within the 1937 borders "legally still exists," because, according to them, "there are no international legal documents that have abolished it."

This stand has been supported by the press organ of the Bavarian Christian Social Union, BAYERNKURIER, which quotes, in particular, the opinion of Roman Herzog, chairman of the federal Constitutional Court. The latter has said that there can be no question of recognizing the Oder-Neisse border until a peace treaty has been concluded with the future united Germany.

The discussion begun by right-wing circles on the "non-final nature" of the western Polish borders, which has given rise to perfectly understandable concern not only among the FRG's neighbors but also among its allies, has come up against a sharp rebuttal from West German opposition parties. "The specter of a revision of postwar borders which has appeared out of the past and is currently stalking Europe could cause terrible, perfectly real damage today," Norbert Gansel, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany Council, said in an interview with the press bulletin PARLAMENTARISCH-POLITISCHER PRESSEDIENST.

Essentially supporting the proposal made by the Bundestag speaker, N. Gansel spoke in favor of the FRG Bundestag and the GDR People's Chamber issuing analogous statements on the international legal inviolability of Poland's western borders after elections have been held in the GDR this year.

IZVESTIYA Views Norwegian Defense Plans

PM0801114390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 5

[V. Shmyganovskiy dispatch: "Norway: No Faith in Changes on NATO's Northern Flank"]

[Text] Helsinki—The Norwegian Defense Ministry's plans to spend 55 billion kroner on the modernization of military installations in the north of the country has evoked an unexpectedly sharp reaction. Ivan Kristoferesen, editor of the region's most widely read newspaper, NORDLYS, has described them as an "incredible example of economic stupidity."

The problems of that part of Norway, he wrote, cannot be resolved with the help of NATO strategists who have ended up in a rut and who believe that they "can export cold war to the North."

It would be difficult to find another article in recent times which has met with such an angry rebuff from the conservative press. The author was reminded of the broad consensus which exists in the country regarding its membership of the Atlantic alliance and of the commitments which ensue from this, and there were attempts to intimidate him with the modernization of the Soviet nuclear submarine fleet in the Arctic. The conclusion drawn was unequivocal: Is it possible to begrudge money in a situation like this?!

And indeed, recently the Storting (parliament) approved without particular problems the new military budget for the coming year, making provision for a 2.5 percent increase in expenditure. The 3-party bourgeois government had the unequivocal support in this question of the Social Democrats, who have gone over to the opposition... The Progress Party on the extreme right had proposed a bigger increase in defense spending. And only the left-wing Socialists, who have almost trebled their representation in parliament during the last elections, demanded a 10-percent cut in the budget.

So that I. Kristofersen was not alone in thinking: Why does a small country which is not being threatened by anyone need to increase its military power? Incidentally, this is also causing considerable perplexity among Norway's NATO allies. "While Western countries are in a state of euphoria with regard to questions of disarmament," the U.S. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE writes, "and the resulting opportunities to ease the burden of military expenditure, opposite sentiments prevail in Norway... In many NATO countries, as distinct from Norway, military budgets are not increasing or are even decreasing."

"The Arctic is a flank of the West," a ranking Norwegian officer impressed on journalists from that newspaper. "But you must bear in mind that in the USSR's plans it occupies a central place." In our country some shore batteries are still using weapons left behind by Hitler's occupation force, he said. Part of the aforementioned 5 billion kroner will pay for the reequipment of these fortifications. Plans have also been announced for the modernization and construction of Norwegian submarines geared, according to NORINFORM, for the period through 2020-2025! Each new submarine will cost \$140 million.

Let us not feel sorry, as was the custom until recently, for the Norwegian taxpayers. Ultimately, the government which they have elected resolves the security issues itself. So far its approach to these questions is dictated by the caution which still exists with regard to our country. The Soviet initiatives in the sphere of strengthening peace and cooperation in the North of Europe, set out in M.S. Gorbachev's speech at the "Finlandia" palace, met with the support of the Norwegian bourgeois cabinet of ministers, albeit with some reservations. Nevertheless, Soviet defense policy continues to be distrusted here, at times demonstratively so, as it were.

The sincerity of our assurances is now as never before being tested by concrete actions. That is, of course, understood in Norway too. On leaving his post, Johan Jorgen Holst, the former defense minister, stated that in connection with the reforms in Eastern Europe there is no need for NATO to modernize its nuclear forces on the continent, and he proposed that this question should be removed from the agenda altogether.

A decision has been adopted to set up a special Storting commission which will assess the state of the country's defense capability and the expenditure for this purpose in light of the changed international situation. Incidentally, no one is rushing to predict the conclusions which it will reach.

Latin America & Caribbean

Further Reportage, Commentary on Panama Invasion

'Interference' in Panama Viewed

LD0501180590 Moscow World Service in English
1210 GMT 5 Jan 90

[Commentator Mikhail Mayorov Commentary]

[Text] What has been so persistently sought by the United States has come to pass. The former commander of Panama's National Defense Forces, General Manuel Antonio Noriega, is in Miami facing trial on charges of drug dealing. Victory jubilates Washington. But something is rotten about the whole story, comments Mikhail Mayorov of our staff. So, was the general involved in narco-business, helping the Columbian narco-mafia to channel 3 tonnes of cocaine to the United States, getting over \$4.5 million out of that? Well, we can't rule it out. We are not going to side with somebody spreading one of the world's worst evils, when we are all trying to live it down. But can that end justify the means? To get Noriega to Miami an act of aggression was committed against a sovereign country. Shelling by the troops sent to hunt the general cost hundreds of innocent civilian lives. Over 2 dozen zinc coffins came back to America with the bodies of its own servicemen. An estimated \$2 billion worth damage has been caused to Panama's economy. Whatever turn further events in that country may take, it is clear the wound inflicted by a foreign invasion can't be healed for quite some time yet.

Panamanian history has more questions than answers. Whatever agreements bind nations in an antinarcotics drive, why should a man holding such a high post (?have been) captured by invading foreign troops and then tried in a foreign country? Why can't Panamanians sort out their own affairs? Or perhaps the point is after all that Washington is unwilling to hand over the Panama Canal by the year 2000 under the Carter-Torrijos agreement?

All this is happening at a time when Eastern Europe is parting with the so-called Brezhnev doctrine. There is no return to armed interference in East European countries' affairs. But the Panamanian incident shows that in the Western hemisphere the trend is rather opposite. The events in Panama demonstrate what code of conduct this superpower follows towards its neighbors. Is one doctrine of interference to be replaced by another with the names of other politicians attached to it, queries our commentator Mikhail Mayorov?

Cost of U.S. Invasion Commented

LD0501222890 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1800 GMT 5 Jan 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The Panama subject continues to remain one of the main international events. We have asked our commentator Aleksandr Serikov to comment on events in Panama. He was in that country one week before the U.S. invasion.

[Serikov] Good evening. By invading Panama, the United States, according to the President, had four purposes in mind: to protect the lives of U.S. citizens, to help restore democracy, to ensure the implementation of the Panama Canal Treaty, and to bring General Manuel Antonio Noriega to trial.

As is known, General Noriega is already in the United States. However, it is not yet clear when the trial will take place and how it will end up. At least Noriega denies the accusations, and we do not know what he is going to say to justify himself.

In the streets of Panama's cities we met Americans quite often. They were mainly servicemen. On Panamanian soil they were feeling by no means endangered. If anyone had to be protected it was the Panamanians rather than they. We met many statesmen and politicians and they all spoke of the danger of a U.S. invasion. We were also interested to know how the Americans were fulfilling the agreement on the Panama Canal. As is known, by the end of 1999, it must be handed over to the Panamanians. In the view of many of our interlocutors, the United States does not have any intention of handing over the canal, not to mention the liquidation of its military bases on the shores of the canal. The Panamanian patriots were especially offended by the fact that the Americans had appointed their own protege even for the post of the Panama representative in the Canal Management Commission. Here they were, expecting an invasion, but they did not suppose it would be so cruel; about a thousand people killed and the headquarters of the Defense Forces, where it was thought Noriega would be destroyed, razed to the ground—is this not too great a price for an attempt to restore democracy in Panama?

When the conspiracy against Noriega was disclosed in October last year, the U.S. President was criticized in his country for his indecision and the inactivity of the special services, which, it was said, had not brought things to their end. Now they say that the decision on the invasion of Panama has raised his prestige. This is probably what has indeed happened among a certain part of Americans, but certainly not in the world. The Polish newspaper TRYBUNA LUDU, for instance, has very eloquently called the U.S. invasion of Panama a manifestation in the United States of the Brezhnev doctrine.

Bush Seeks to Justify 'Aggression'

*LD0501231490 Moscow TASS in English 2240 GMT
5 Jan 90*

[Text] Washington January 6 TASS—United States President George Bush sought to justify U.S. armed aggression against Panama citing the right of his country "to protect American lives". This right has been repeatedly used by the United States as a pretext for armed intervention in the affairs of Central American countries.

During the news conference here on Friday the President admitted that the action did not meet with support, but caused alarm and considerably undermined relations between the United States with Latin American countries who viewed the action as a clear indication of resumption of the gunboat diplomacy by the United States.

Bush said he was anxious and sent his Vice-President to Latin-American countries to explain the U.S. position and try and calm down their apprehension.

He said the United States was not resuming the policy of using force without reason.

He described the Panamanian case as unique and promised an expeditious withdrawal of U.S. troops from that country.

Questioned about his attitude to the Soviet Union, its leader and the country's internal problems, the President said he thought Gorbachev was a great champion of peaceful changes and that he supported Gorbachev's approach. He said he hoped the Panamanian episode would not do fundamental harm to relations between the two countries.

Bush said the United States was going to hold a fair trial of General Noriega.

TASS on U.S. Forces

*LD0501234990 Moscow TASS in English 2310 GMT
5 Jan 90*

[Text] Washington January 6 TASS—As many as 24,500 U.S. troops now remain in Panama. A thousand servicemen were moved from Panama to the United States on Thursday, a Pentagon spokesman said on Friday.

Almost 12 thousand U.S. servicemen are permanently deployed at U.S. bases in Panama. This means that in addition to U.S. forces permanently deployed in Panama the Pentagon moved from the United States some 13-14 thousand troops for the invasion.

The Pentagon spokesman said that altogether some 4,300 persons were detained during the operations of U.S. troops in Panama. They are servicemen of the Panamanian defences, employees of state institutions and citizens whom the Pentagon regarded loyal to the Noriega regime". [quotation mark as received]

Some 700 Panamanians are being detained by U.S. troops.

The U.S. forces have no legal power to arrest Panamanian citizens, and Panamanian citizens are being detained in U.S. Army camps in violation of international norms.

Noriega Arrest, Response Viewed

*PM0701143790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4*

[Report by A. Blinov in Washington, Evg. Bay in Moscow: "General Noriega Arraigned Before a Court. Irresponsible Actions by U.S. Troops in Panama Continue"]

[Text] Former Panamanian military leader General Manuel Noriega was brought to the Federal District Court in Miami (Florida) on Thursday morning. Noriega

had been flown out of Panama to the United States on a military transport aircraft as soon as he left the Vatican mission and surrendered to the U.S. command. He was promised that the death sentence would not be passed on him.

The Panamanian general, wearing four stars on his uniform, did not reply when the judge asked whether he accepted the charge against him. His defense attorney Frank Rubino explained that the U.S. court was not competent to try Noriega—"a POW captured by the U.S. Army in breach of Panama's national sovereignty and in violation of international law."

Despite the attorneys' protests Noriega has been detained pending trial. Under the number 4186 he will be remanded in custody at a "secret location" in Miami without right to bail until the trial, the date of which has not yet been announced.

According to press reports, the trial will take a long time to prepare. The charge, consisting of 12 points (which could carry a combined sentence of 145 years in prison), is based mainly on the evidence of people who are themselves in the dock. (Let me remind you that Noriega stands accused of smuggling drugs into the United States and "laundering" drug profits). So far the prosecution has no direct evidence at its disposal. The defense has asked for 9 months to prepare its material. It is expected to request official documents from the administration relating to U.S.-Panamanian military and intelligence collaboration. A plea bargain is not being ruled out here: In exchange for the promise of a more lenient sentence, the judicial authorities could ask Noriega, a former CIA agent, not to disclose information about Washington's secret operations in Central America.

Noriega's arrest made it possible for the U.S. Administration to declare that the main objectives of the armed intervention have been fulfilled. The greater part of the U.S. troops will return to the United States and those who remain are likely to stay for a long time to "bolster" the G. Endara regime, which is loyal to the United States. They have already started putting together a Panama police force. Meanwhile, REUTER reports that the new commander of the country's security service Colonel Roberto Armijo has resigned 10 days after his appointment. The reason? The colonel could not explain the "origin" of a large sum of money in his bank account.

The U.S. press points out that Noriega's arrest has boosted Congressional leaders' support for the military action against Panama. At the same time, details about the losses are reported—23 U.S. servicemen were killed and more than 300 wounded. The main losses were sustained by the Panamanians, who lost more than 800 people, mostly civilians, and economic damage is estimated to be at least \$2 billion.

"And all this to arrest a criminal, raised and hired by us, for whom we provided cover while he was serving us," Rear Admiral E. Carroll, retired, deputy director of the Center for Defense Information, has said.

The news of Noriega's surrender to the Americans, a REUTER correspondent reports from Mexico, has met with deathly silence from Latin American countries, and it has in no way affected their stance of resolute condemnation of the U.S. military action. "Despite an obvious lack of sympathy for Panama's toppled 'strong man,' Latin American governments on Thursday reaffirmed their opposition to what they call 'gunboat diplomacy,'" the agency points out.

In the 2 weeks since G. Endara was "proclaimed" the country's president, no Latin American government has taken any steps to recognize the new Panamanian authorities. "There is no connection between Noriega's fate and the puppet regime set up in Panama with the help of U.S. tanks," wrote the Mexican newspaper LA JORNADA on Thursday in this context.

Meanwhile, details about Noriega's voluntary surrender to U.S. troops continue coming in from Panama and Miami. According to Noriega's defense attorney Frank Rubino, the only reason why his client took this step was the new Panamanian Government's threat to deprive the Vatican mission of its diplomatic immunity—which would have led to an immediate assault by the U.S. troops. These fears were not unfounded. According to a REUTER report from Panama City General Mark Cisneros, commander of the U.S. troops in the Panama Canal zone, declared that his men could have stormed the Vatican mission, had Noriega not surrendered voluntarily.

The actions of the U.S. servicemen in that Central American country are becoming more and more high-handed. According to PRENSA LATINA U.S. troops detained Cuban diplomat Victor Gonzalez on Thursday. PRENSA LATINA reports that the diplomat was to all intents and purposes "kidnapped" on leaving the Cuban embassy in Panama City and driven away in a military vehicle in an unknown direction. His arrest took place on the day that Cuban diplomats' dependants were to be flown out from Panama to Havana.

At the same time REUTER reports from Havana that C.R. Rodriguez, vice president of the Cuban State Council, declared on Thursday that his country "does not, in practice, have diplomatic relations with the Panamanian Government, which it has not recognized."

Clearly, it is not yet a question of officially breaking off diplomatic relations. Noriega's wife and three of his children remain on the premises of the Cuban embassy in Panama, agencies report.

U.S. Understanding of Detente Seen

LD0601225290 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1440 GMT 6 Jan 90

[From the "International Panorama" program, presented by Aleksander Bovin]

[Text] Of course, I am pleased that world public opinion puts Gorbachev so high, higher let us say than Bush, his

main political partner, but nevertheless, it would be better if this gap in their rating were to narrow, so to speak. It would be easier to come to agreements; and in this regard Panama unfortunately puts one on one's guard.

Self-sufficiency of force and a cavalier attitude to non-U.S. public opinion have always been typical of U.S. foreign policy. The words of Theodore Roosevelt—I have taken Panama—have become a classic formula, but it would seem that the end of the cold war, the beginning of a phase of confidence in Soviet-U.S. relations, mutual agreement on the inadmissibility of interference and the installation of order in other countries should have put an end to this kind of arbitrariness in the world arena. However, it seems that it has not. What Bush said a month ago in Malta differs strikingly from what he is now doing in Panama. Actually, I can very well understand that the President should have no liking for General Noriega and the regime he established in Panama, but why make a fuss about it? After all, we are at the end of the 20th century, or does every President have to have his Panama or Grenada as proof, so to say, of U.S. decisiveness? I would like to stress that there is absolutely no justification from the point of view of international law, or a modern sense of justice, for the armed invasion of Panama.

The seizure of the Nicaraguan ambassador's residence in Panama by U.S. soldiers was the most flagrant violation of international law. The Americans say there was a stockpile of weapons there, and incidentally scrupulously listed what they found. I will read you the list: 4 Israeli Uzi machineguns, 12 of our Kalashnikovs, 10 rifles, 1 shotgun, 1 carbine, 6 grenade launchers, 27 grenades, 1 light antitank system, 3 handgrenades, and about 1,300 cartridges of various calibers. That is what the Americans found there. Well, let us imagine there were another 5 shotguns, let us say, and 10 Kalashnikovs. You cannot help wondering what has it to with the Americans, and who gave them the right to search even a simple Panamanian house, let alone an ambassador's residence?

A spokesman for the State Department answered the numerous questions this way: A definitive judgment on the question of the status of the ownership of that house and of its occupants was made only after the search had been made. When the diplomatic status of the house ownership and of its inhabitants had been established, the commander of the unit was instructed to return the weapons. It was a blunder. That is how the President defined the situation. In response, the Nicaraguan Government expelled 20 U.S. diplomats from the country and demanded that the staff of the U.S. Embassy be cut from 320 to 100. The Americans are indignant. At the same time the Southern Command, which is acting in Panama, is demonstratively hindering the work of the embassies of Nicaragua, Cuba, and Libya.

The Americans are becoming intoxicated with force and power in what they consider their backyard. Now, I think

that here, perhaps, we ought to say thanks to President Bush, thanks that he has stopped being hypocritical and has shown us and the whole world how the White House understands detente, the nonuse of force, and the democratization of international relations.

Well, we all know that we do not choose our partners; it is politics, it is fate that gives them to us. We will have talks with Bush, we will make agreements with him as far as possible, but we will not forget that his foreign policy arsenal contains not only Malta, but also Panama. Realism is never a bad thing.

Invasion Incompatible With Times

*LD070111190 Moscow in English to North America
0000 GMT 7 Jan 90*

[Text] We begin with our weekly commentary by Valentin Zorin.

I was shocked to learn, he writes, that several thousand American troops were sent to invade the small State of Panama. Several weeks before I had been among the journalists who were covering the Soviet-American meeting off Malta. The American side there made quite a few statements about the need to settle regional conflicts by peaceful means, including (?conflicts) in Central America. And following that the United States took a decision to invade Panama.

The question arises if the American policy can be trusted and the American prestige can remain unimpaired. Indeed, a big country with a huge military potential invades a small country, is shedding blood there, killing defenseless people. American soldiers die as well. More than 20 of them were killed and hundreds were injured. They all fell victim to Washington's desire to settle accounts with one person who has broken the law. After one violation of international law another one follows. American soldiers in Panama broke into the territories of foreign embassies in that country. We may recall at this point how the American public reacted when the inviolability of the American Embassy in Tehran was violated several years ago. Why is it, then, that today's developments are measured with another yardstick?

So on the one hand Washington welcomes the stand of the Soviet Union showing respect for the sovereignty of its neighbors in Eastern Europe and refraining from interference in their affairs in any way. On the other, it thinks it has the right to act in accordance with different rules in relations to its neighbors in Central America by going as far as sending its troops and removing the government in another sovereign country. This is the plain instance of double-dealing.

I was also shocked, writes Valentin Zorin, by the attitude of the American public to the intervention in Panama. The aggression against the UN member-state caused no noticeable protest. What's more, judging by opinion polls, it has won support of many Americans. And this is all pretty disheartening. I think that the stereotypes of

the past are to be blamed for that. The American invasion of Panama can be compatible in no way with the policy of new political thinking and civilized international relations at the end of the 20th century.

U.S. Motives Questioned

PY0501221090 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress
in Spanish 0330 GMT 5 Jan 90

[By Aleksey Pavlov]

[Text] In a news conference at the White House, President George Bush announced that the objectives of U.S. intervention in Panama have been met, and, therefore, the evacuation of the U.S. troops has begun.

As everyone knows, when the U.S. Government announced the invasion of Panama on 20 December, it explained that the action had four objectives: the arrest of General Manuel Antonio Noriega, the protection of U.S. citizens in that country, the reestablishment of democracy, and the defense of the canal treaties.

This morning, when Gen Noriega gave himself up to the U.S. forces, it seemed that all those objectives had been met and that there would be no reason for Washington to leave its forces in Panama. But Bush's statement was not received [words indistinct] in Latin America. The fact is that the evacuation of only 141 U.S. soldiers is nothing, compared with the 26,000 soldiers remaining. At any rate, 4,000 soldiers will remain in the Canal Zone, and the rest—about 14,000, according to Bush—will return to the United States as soon as the situation allows.

This is quite an interesting picture. On one side it looks like the forces did fulfill their mission, but on the other side it looks like they did not. Could it be that the U.S. troops were also given other tasks, which were not officially announced? This is the real situation; you can judge it for yourself. For example, the Yankee government said that its goal was the defense of democracy in

Panama. At the same time the U.S. soldiers ravaged the headquarters of the People's Party of Panama, destroying its archives. The same type of destruction was also carried out in the offices of other parties that advocate the return of the Canal Zone to the Republic.

This shows that by attacking those parties, by arresting their militants, and by terrorizing the people, the Gringos seek to pave the way for political forces that agree with the idea of reviewing the Torrijos-Carter treaties. As everyone knows, Guillermo Endara, the president who was installed by the Yankees, has already talked about this possibility and need several times in the past. The idea of defending the treaties, as reported by Washington, is really an idea of replacing the treaties.

The development of the events in that direction will lead to the consolidation of the U.S. presence in Panama, which has been labeled as an occupation force even by some U.S. allies. Bush said in his news conference that the United States [words indistinct] the obligation to carry out a just investigation of the Noriega case. Noriega's transfer to the United States clearly shows that the United States is out to punish the people responsible for drug trafficking. Without trying to justify Noriega's policies and practices, it is also necessary to emphasize that the U.S. vandalism in Panama cannot be forgiven, because it is responsible for the loss of over 1,000 Panamanian lives. That is why it is not rhetoric to ask which country will be the next victim of the United States; there is no guarantee that yankeeland one day will not invade another country.

In the last few years everyone has become aware that the world is closely linked together. Those who continue to hang on to the old political idea of using force risk being paid with the same token. The confirmation of this possibility is the following information: Several extremist organizations in Chile and Colombia have announced that they would attack U.S. facilities in those countries. The first outbursts have already occurred.

Political & Social**Gorbachev, Meets Lithuanian Party Leaders 4,6 Jan***LD0601174890 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1722 GMT 6 Jan 90*

[Text] Moscow, 6 Jan (TASS)—At the request of the leadership of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee and of the provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform), meetings were held at the CPSU Central Committee on 4 and 6 January between Mikhail Gorbachev, Vadim Medvedev, Aleksandr Yakovlev, Georgiy Razumovskiy, and secretaries and members of the bureaus of these Central Committees. In the course of the meetings, there was an exchange of opinions on ways of getting out of the situation that developed after the 20th Congress of the republic's communist party. The discussion of these issues will be continued.

News Conference on Meeting*LD0601130490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian
0100 GMT 6 Jan 90*

[Excerpts] Leaders of the Provisional Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee on the CPSU Platform—four secretaries and seven members of the bureau—left Vilnius today [6 January] for Moscow to meet with members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. [passage omitted]

As is known, the supporters of unity with the CPSU plan to hold a meeting tomorrow in the square in front of the Palace of Sport. Meanwhile, the Vilnius Sajudis Council announced that it would hold a meeting in the Cathedral Square when Mikhail Gorbachev visits Vilnius. [passage omitted] It seems it is finally known that Mikhail Gorbachev will visit Lithuania from 10-12 January and that he will probably visit not only Vilnius. [passage omitted]

New circumstances of yesterday's meeting and of the coming visit were described at today's press conference by Professor Rolandas Pavilionis, member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Bureau and rector of Vilnius University, and Vladimir Korniyenko, member of the Central Committee and first secretary of the Sirvintos Rayon Party Committee. In their opinion, Mikhail Gorbachev, whose introductory speech at the meeting lasted one and a half hours, is well-informed about the situation in Lithuania. But this information is in some respects one-sided. The congress resolutions have been accepted as a fait accompli and understood. The Soviet leader made it understood that Lithuania will be able to gradually integrate into the Eastern and Western political and economic life and carry out a sufficiently independent policy. He pictures the Soviet Union as a union of sovereign states. But, at least for now, he expresses himself firmly for a monolithic CPSU, although he is ready to look for compromises.

During the meeting guests from Lithuania noted that the resolutions of the Lithuanian Communist Party congress

can be used by some people against Mikhail Gorbachev. He set them at ease saying: Do not get excited. I sleep peacefully. The participants in the meeting have become convinced once again that Mikhail Gorbachev takes practical steps bearing in mind many other factors. The representatives of the Lithuanian Communist Party frankly told the Kremlin leaders that the fate of their party is inseparably linked with the fate of Lithuania, and they see the future of this country only in a restoration of complete independence.

According to the participants in the press conference, Vadim Medvedev, member of the Politburo, will come somewhat earlier to Lithuania. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of PRAVDA, will arrive with Gorbachev. [passage omitted] It is obvious that Mikhail Gorbachev wants as many business-like encounters, frank conversations and constructive dialogues as possible. There are plans to meet representatives of various political forces, because at yesterday's meeting the factual multiparty situation in Lithuania was stressed more than once.

Juozas Gudaitis, another participant in the meeting, said that political negotiations between Vilnius and Moscow have in fact already started.

Lithuania's Brazauskas on Talks With Gorbachev*LD0501211190 Moscow World Service in English
1810 GMT 5 Jan 90*

[Excerpt] Mikhail Gorbachev met the Lithuanian Communist Party leader in Moscow on Thursday. The party declared its independence at a special congress held 2 weeks ago. Our reporter, Renat Abdullin, has asked the first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, Algirdas Brazauskas, who took part in the meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, to comment on its outcome.

[Begin recording] [Brazauskas, in Lithuanian with superimposed English translation] The discussion was very favorable and necessary. It clarified much for all on maybe the most vulnerable issue today—party restructuring. It has often been argued in public and by the media that the party must restructure itself at a faster pace. I think what happened in Lithuania is a step toward party reform.

[Abdullin] As is known, Mikhail Gorbachev is to visit Lithuania next week. Has the visit's program been endorsed?

[Brazauskas] There is no concrete program. Of course, party activists and Central Committee members will get together by all means, perhaps at the end of his tour of the republic. Mikhail Gorbachev expressed the wish to meet various work teams and various parts of the republic, extend his itinerary, travel to rural areas, mix with people to feel the mood prevailing among the population and communists in Lithuania. [end recording] [passage omitted: Boris Markovnikov talks

with Vladislav Shved on the Lithuanian Communist Party declaration of independence]

Further on Brazauskas Interview

LD0601111990

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1400 GMT on 5 January carries a 30-minute recorded interview with Algirdas Brazauskas, Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee first secretary by Lithuanian Radio commentator Benas Rupeika. Rupeika introduces the recorded interview:

"It is a pity that our weather forecast did not tell us what the weather is like in Moscow, because we all know that a Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee 11-member delegation returned yesterday from Moscow." "However, yet another 11-man delegation of Central Committee members is leaving for Moscow following the same route; the difference being that they are members of the alternative Central Committee. I am not quite sure if they are going to meet the same people; however, the number is the same—11. I think that we will hear about the results of their visit as well; and now I would like you to listen to a conversation with Algirdas Brazauskas which was recorded at 1200."

The interview begins with Brazauskas saying that today he is not as busy as on previous days. He mentions the meeting with Gorbachev, Medvedev, and Yakovlev in Moscow. He says: "The conversation was full of content simply because it was possible to voice many ideas with no one interfering or categorically contradicting, as was the case at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 25-26 December, when any thought voiced which did not correspond to the general spirit was met with a certain noise in the background. This time it was a pleasant talk indeed."

Following this, Brazauskas mentions other topics discussed at the meeting, saying that these were not always directly relevant to the core issue of the meeting. He says: "However, how will this conflict, as I call it, end? Or what shall I call this case? What will the final decision be at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum? Of course, most of the time we spoke about this."

Brazauskas then repeats the same ideas V. Beriozovas had voiced previously, that the leadership of the Lithuanian Communist Party had to follow the decisions adopted at the congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party. He also speaks about the unity of the current bureau and Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party. "Of course, the election of individual members of the Sajudis Council into the Central Committee Bureau raised a few eyebrows."

The results of the recent public opinion poll are discussed. "Can the idea of a United Lithuanian Front be justified when members of various parties and movements work together for the sake of Lithuania?", Brazauskas replies. "Here are the results of the answers: 75

Percent answered yes, 17 percent answered partly, which of course could be regarded as the first group, and only 5 percent answered no. So, it appears that the idea we raised at the congress and we continue to maintain is supported."

He then deals with the society's opinion whether Sajudis leaders could be elected to the new Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee: "Yes—77 percent, no—12 percent no opinion—11 percent. I will remind you that 781 people answered the questionnaire." Thus there is approval for the decision of the Lithuanian Communist Party Congress. Rupeika mentions on this occasion that the popularity of the leaders in a five point system is as follows: Algirdas Brazauskas—4.4, Vladimiras Beriozovas—4, Justas Paleckis—4.5.

Returning to the visit to Moscow, Rupeika mentions that THE LOS ANGELES TIMES put the following headline on its article: Gorbachev is seeking unity with Lithuania, and asks Brazauskas to respond to it.

Brazauskas says "Of course, I can state that, of course, he is seeking. It was very pleasant to hear Gorbachev say that they could by no means, although you have taken such bold decisions, not recognize or ignore the Lithuanian Communist Party. We have taken a step which has not been taken by any other party organization, and this, of course, provokes a corresponding reaction among the members of the Central Committee, and there are many letters which do not support our line."

Brazauskas continues: "I said that we are also receiving different letters, and not only from Lithuania. In Moscow I received a whole pile of letters; I receive some almost every day from various towns and oblasts in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and other republics."

Returning to his talks in Moscow, Brazauskas continues: "I very much support Comrade Gorbachev when he says that there can be a fight within the framework of the policy of perestroika. But when this fight, this row, goes beyond the limits of those common strivings, beyond the limits of those common aims, then it is bad. We also maintained that we are for socialism, that we are striving for sovereignty, that we are striving for a completely new concept of self-dependent republics and that this schedule which I started explaining means stages, and that one of such states in political life is the establishment and reorganization of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party, that it is a stage, that it is a step in the common context of restructuring, and that this step had to be taken by somebody, and that Lithuania was the first in this case to take this step."

Rupeika then asks: "Is Brazauskas now Gorbachev's enemy or his ardent ally? How does it look to you and, maybe, there in Moscow?"

Brazauskas replies: "I can by no means say that I am his enemy. It seems to me that Comrade Gorbachev does not regard me as an enemy. Furthermore, he is not an

enemy either to me or to Lithuania. I am still thinking and imagining what will happen when he comes to visit us. That he will come is a fact, and, perhaps, it will happen in the middle of next week, I do not know the date yet. We will have precise information today, and I imagine that Lithuania will welcome him in a very nice manner. Yesterday, speaking about our affairs, there was mention of the results of Comrade Yakovlev's commission. He shared his impressions from his trips to West Germany, Italy, his meeting with Bush. We became convinced once again what a figure of world importance is this leader."

Speaking of Gorbachev's coming visit to Lithuania, Brazauskas continues: "Some processes which are taking place, and there was talk about them yesterday, are not acceptable because some forces, and I have in mind people who are adhering to the platform of the CPSU composition, are too active. We, together with the first secretaries, immediately after the plenum decided that we should wait until Comrade Gorbachev comes to visit us; I have in mind the split in the party, such a formal split. We understand the mood of the people, the mood of the Communists, also of those who remain in the CPSU composition."

Brazauskas says: "This strains the situation now before the arrival of Comrade Gorbachev and of other comrades who will come next week. We are going to have very many guests. I think that this excitement is completely unnecessary in this case. One should let the people think; why apply such a method of pressure? One should not do this now."

Brazauskas concludes: "Next week we will be engaged with many guests; there is a large group of the Central Committee members, Comrade Medvedev is coming, Comrade Maslyukov, two Politburo members, so that they can really feel the true spirit today in Lithuania, experienced by every inhabitant, every Communist in Lithuania; and not only Communists, but representatives of other parties as well, their attitude and this general mood."

Lithuanian Party Spokesmen View Moscow Talks

*PM0701191790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 1*

[Own correspondent L. Kapelyushnyy report: "Press Conference in Vilnius"]

[Text] As is known, the extraordinary CPSU Central Committee plenum which has been discussing the situation in Lithuania following the 20th congress of the republic Communist Party decided to dispatch a representative delegation of the CPSU Central Committee to thoroughly study the situation there. I can say without exaggeration that the days before the guests arrive are filled with anxious expectation on the part of both the majority and the minority too.

We have already reported how the provisional Central Committee of the republican detachment of the CPSU views the prevailing situation. The Central Committee of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party has also organized a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists. It was conducted by A. Semashka, chief of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee press sector. There was heightened interest in the press conference also because, the day before, an 11 member-delegation consisting of members of the Central Committee and its Bureau and Central Committee secretaries had paid a visit to Moscow.

The meeting with journalists was attended by V. Korniyenko, Central Committee member and first secretary of the Shirvintskiy party rayon committee; Professor R. Pavilenis, member of the Central Committee Bureau; and A. Klemaytis, secretary of the Baltic group in the European parliament, who is in Lithuania on a visit.

R. Pavilenis and V. Korniyenko expressed themselves with the utmost clarity: In their opinion the leadership of the CPSU Central Committee is prepared to regard the decision of the extraordinary 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party as not being at variance with the objectives of perestroyka. In the course of the meeting, the leadership was acquainted in greater detail with the situation in Lithuania.

A. Klemaytis, a Lithuanian by origin, who intends to apply for Lithuanian citizenship and move to Lithuania in order to be able to take part in the creation of an independent Lithuanian state, assessed the events taking place in Lithuania as very active, but noted that they are not always understood by the West because people there are trying to measure them by the yardstick of Western rationalism. Therefore, turning to Western journalists who report these events, he asked them to bear in mind that all this is taking place in Central Europe, which may soon become a place of important achievements.

The press conference also covered a range of questions concerning the visit of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to Lithuania. It was stressed that it will be a businesslike visit, without ceremonial.

Lithuania is living in hope.

Lithuania Awaits Gorbachev Visit

*LD0801030190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0000 GMT 8 Jan 90*

[Text] In Lithuania they are awaiting the arrival of a group of participants in the CPSU Central Committee plenum, which consists of members and candidate members of the Politburo, secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee, and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. As you know, comrades, on 4 and 6 January in Moscow meetings of party leaders took place with representatives of Lithuania's communists. In the opinion of both sides of the party majority and minority in the republic the

conversations were constructive ones providing the opportunity to understand one another better. There can be no doubt that both central committees will have to sit down at the negotiating table in Lithuania and weigh everything up well yet again. Many communists support the idea of a party referendum in which each of the 200,000 members of the party could express his opinion.

After the meetings with communists, party organizations, and labor collectives in Lithuania, the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee will resume its work.

Talks Welcomed

PM0601214590 Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 7 Jan 90 p 1

[Own correspondent R. Motskus report: "What We Need Is Dialogue"]

[Excerpts] Lithuania is in a state of expectation. By decision of the CPSU Central Committee plenum a group of its participants made up of members and candidate members of the Politburo and Central Committee secretaries is to pay a visit to the republic in the course of which meetings with communists, party organizations, and labor collectives are to be held. The plenum deemed it expedient that M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, should also visit Lithuania. It is planned that, after this work has been carried out, the plenum will resume its sessions and adopt an appropriate decision.

How do the communists and inhabitants of the republic view the recent 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party? Opinions differ widely—as a rule they are diametrically opposed. Cities and rayons have been engulfed by a wave of rallies which, in the main, expressed support for the ideas of the congress which has ended. The supporters of the alternative party, as it is referred to here, are also staging a rally in Vilnius. Members of its provisional Central Committee (based on the CPSU platform) have held a press conference which was relayed on Lithuanian television. It has been noted that both sides, reflecting on M.S. Gorbachev's report, intend to seek points of contact and to continue the debate on the place, role, and organizational structure of the party—a difficult debate which has been under way in Lithuania for more than 6 months now. And so, what are communists and non-party people saying? [passage omitted]

M. Barisas, editor of the republican newspaper *TIESA* (Truth):

"Those 5 days last December were an important milestone in the republic's life. The bold, unorthodox decisions of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress met with broad support. An independent Lithuanian Communist Party with its own program and statutes—utterly modern and progressive documents—is a practical step along the road toward the democratization of our society. I stress, a practical step, rather than a

discourse in general terms along the lines of: Further expansion of the rights of union republics, giving substance to our federation, and so forth. As far as I remember, L. Brezhnev did nothing but 'expand' and 'adopt additional measures....'

"The unorthodox steps do not come easy. Unfortunately, not just in the country as a whole, but also in the republic, by no means all people have grasped the need for change. We, the majority of the congress delegates, are not to blame for the fact that the minority (some 15 percent of delegates) set up their own provisional Central Committee right there, during the congress, immediately gaining support from Moscow."

On the initiative of the Lithuanian comrades, a meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and representatives of the Lithuanian Communist Party was held in Moscow 4 January.

[Question] How do you assess the meeting in Moscow?

A. Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee:

"It was a working visit; we met at mutual request. A long conversation with M.S. Gorbachev, A. Yakovlev, and V. Medvedev took place. On behalf of our republic 11 representatives took part, including 8 members of the new Central Committee Bureau. Everyone gave their views. We clarified what we had not managed to clarify prior to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum held 25-26 December. The conversation was relatively detailed. It seems to me that we got to understand each other better. We, too, were better understood when we once again explained our motives—I am referring to the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress and the important decisions that were adopted."

Yu. Paletskis, secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee:

"My impressions from the meeting exceed all expectations. An open, constructive conversation took place, acrimonious in parts, but marked by mutual understanding. Naturally, the conflict situation persists, but I believe that the tension has now subsided. After all, we hope, our strategic objectives coincide with the aspirations of that part of the CPSU which favors progress. M.S. Gorbachev's arrival is scheduled for next week and it seems that he will stay 2-3 days."

Aide Denies Gorbachev Cancelled Foreign Visitors

LD0501231790 Moscow *World Service in English*
2200 GMT 5 Jan 90

[Text] A senior aide to Mikhail Gorbachev has denied Western reports that the Soviet leader has cancelled his meetings with foreign visitors scheduled for this month. The aide, Anatoliy Chernayev told United Press International that a very tight schedule has forced the (?likely) postponement of a meeting between the Soviet president and the British Labour Party leader Neil Kinnock. But,

the aide denies that Gorbachev cancelled all talks because of the domestic situation and was certain to meet the United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar at the international ecological congress starting on 15 January.

Deputies View Lithuanian Party's Separation

LD0601232790 Moscow World Service in English
1510 GMT 6 Jan 90

[Text] The Communist Party of Lithuania at its 20th Congress late last year announced its independence from the Soviet Communist Party of which it is a part. The Central Committee in Moscow called a full meeting to discuss the controversial resolution, which was nothing short of a breakaway from the Soviet Communist Party ranks. Our reporter Ludmilla Matenko, asked a number of communist MPs what they thought of the situation. (Vladimir Kuyantso); representing Koryak minority living in Russia's northeast:

[Begin (Kuyantso) recording] The recent session of the Supreme Soviet gave a go-ahead to the Balts' economic autonomy after a heated debate. I'm not much worried over the Lithuanian Communist Party's decision to separate. Let it go, if it wants to. I don't hold with the secessionist trend within the party, but I don't think the Lithuanian Communist Party's decision must be vetoed down out of hand. I'd go along with the general secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, who told the Central Committee's full meeting that arms-twisting or name-calling wouldn't do. [end recording]

For his part, Tufan Minnullin, of the Tatar Autonomous Republic, thinks the Lithuanian Communist Party's resolution follows the party's mishandling of the nationalities policy in the past. He says he regrets that this should happen, but there were reasons behind the Lithuanian Communist Party's resolve. Much was said about friendship in the past but no one bothered to think what it implied. Decades of Stalin rule—under which nationalities' right were trampled upon—have seriously eroded the party's credibility, something secessionists and nationalists are trying to play on in the republic. Attempts are being made to portray the party as a conservative force, incapable of change despite the ongoing reform within it. Tufan Minnullin said secessionism was damaging to perestroika and must therefore be opposed to.

Mikhail Timchenko, who is in charge of the state farm in Altay territory, holds a different view. Mikhail Timchenko says he condemns the Lithuanian Communist Party's resolution as being totally wrong. To split at a time when we have just set upon the reform is unproductive. He says some people appear to be blind to what's being achieved by perestroika, including greater freedom, democratization, and glasnost. The credit goes most to the party which is the driving force behind the reform, something that Lithuanian Communists must know only too well. Mikhail Timchenko says that's the

reason why he does not believe the Lithuanian Communist Party's decision is final. He says rank-and-file Communists in Lithuania have not passed their verdict yet.

Lithuanian Unionists Council Views Restructuring

LD0501171590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1400 GMT 5 Jan 90

[Text] Let's start with a report from Vilnius:

Debates by participants in the enlarged plenum of the Lithuanian republican Council of Trade Unions, which took place on 4 January, lasted until late in the evening.

During the debates and in most of the addresses, an opinion was expressed regarding the crisis situation which has arisen in the republic's trade unions. About a year ago a program of immediate measures for restructuring the activities of this republican public organization was adopted at the plenum of Lithuania's trade unions. However, until now the forms and methods of its operation have remained almost unchanged. That is why a group of members of republican trade unions have stated that they have no confidence in the leading bodies and demand that they resign, which was put on the forum's agenda.

However, the discussion of the questions ended almost without results. Only one decision was made, that it is necessary to form a republican provisional coordinating committee to prepare for the extraordinary congress of Lithuania's trade unions, which is scheduled for March. The industrial trade unions are to delegate their representatives to it. The majority of participants in the plenum agreed that it is necessary to satisfy the application by the chairman of the republican council of trade unions to be relieved of the post held by him and to support the proposal of a group of participants in the plenum for the operation of the republican council, the presidium, and the secretariat to cease. But when it came to adopting a decision, it turned out that there was no longer a quorum of members of the republican council in the hall.

It is planned that a week from the plenum the council will assemble again and will return to the discussion of these questions, which are not simple.

Vilnius Rally Supports CPSU, Unity

LD0701140990 Vilnius in English to North America
2300 GMT 6 Jan 90

[Text] A report on the rally in Vilnius:

The Communists who support the platform of the Soviet Union's Communist Party staged a rally in Vilnius today. The organizers will most probably blame the nasty weather for the small audience, which numbered no more than 1,000 people. The reason, however, must be different—like master like man, as the proverb goes—and (?one did feel nasty), but not due to the weather, rather due to some of the speeches. The speakers were

(?10) and only at the very beginning of the rally there were several phrases said timidly in Lithuanian. Afterwards only Russian was heard from the last speakers, except for a brief appeal in Polish.

At the start of the rally, regret was expressed that the leaders of the pro-Moscow Communist Party could not take part in the rally, since they were at the moment holding talks with Politburo members in Moscow. So the generals having gone to the Kremlin to seek support, the rank-and-file have taken up arms, and with success too, only some of the speakers getting lost in their papers and putting up nervousness for an excuse. But in general everything went off smoothly.

A Polish woman maintained that not a single newly adopted law in Lithuania guaranteed equal rights to non-Lithuanians. So for instance, without knowledge of the Lithuanian language, they would not be able to acquire higher education and would be doomed to toil away in the countryside. Who is to blame for the wrong done? Well, it's Algirdas Brazauskas and his like-minded, it's they who seek prosperity for some at the expense of others. Algirdas Brazauskas was mentioned by other speakers too. (Stanislas Prokarenko) from Snieckus called Algirdas Brazauskas a hypnotist who has been long persuading the people that everything is alright in Lithuania. Such charlatanism, as he put it, could produce only undesirable consequences.

Second Party Secretary Vladimir Berezov was not forgotten either, just as the newly elected Secretary Justas Paleckis and well-known Sajudis leaders. All of them were subjected to harsh criticism to the applause of the audience. More applause was bestowed on another speaker, who said that there was nothing of the Communists' ideas in the independent Lithuanian Communist Party, so he would always remain a member of the Soviet Union's Communist Party.

There was also a guest from the Estonian Inter-Front, People's Deputy of the Soviet Union Yarovoy. He said that the events in all the Baltic republics were being staged after the same script—that non-Estonians were also allegedly wronged in Estonia.

At the end of the rally the resolution was read to the effect that those gathered supported the Soviet Union's Communist Party and called all to rally, since the party's success lay in unity. The resolution also called to bring forward the 28th Congress of the Soviet Union's Communist Party.

Lithuania: Independence Committee Formed

90UN0496A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 December 89 First Edition p 4

[Article by Colonel B. Gavrilenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent: "A Crossroads?"]

[Text] Never before has the temperature of the sociopolitical processes been as high in Lithuania or the spectrum of opinions and judgments as broad as in these December days. From total unanimity to mutual exclusion.

The long-awaited news about granting economic sovereignty to the republic arrived. And several days before this, the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] formed a "commission on the preparation of a plan for restoration of the independence of Lithuania." It seems that sovereignty is one thing, but it is planned "to go farther...." The Supreme Soviet of the republic is sitting almost uninterruptedly. Here, then there, like mushrooms after a rain, unions, leagues, and associations pop up, adding to those that already exist, whose main ideological feature is nostalgia for the prewar bourgeois past. But the closest event is the extraordinary 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania. Elections of the delegates are taking place.

Lists appear almost every day in the press. I find a familiar name in one of them—Vladislav Nikolayevich Shved, the first secretary of the Oktyabrskiy raykom [rayon party committee] of Vilnius. We agreed on a meeting.

"Vladislav Nikolayevich, the congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania is extraordinary. This word suggests something else also—emergency. What can be expected from the congress?"

Judging from the draft Program and Rules of the Party published in the press, and also judging by the document "A Concept of the Independence of the Communist Party of Lithuania," according to the thoughts of the authors of these documents, the Communist Party of the republic can put an end to its existence at the congress. A party will be called to replace it that no longer has a Marxist content. Moreover, apparently, a document will be adopted that proclaims the independence of the new party and its withdrawal from the CPSU. And, finally, I think that under the name of "communist," a transformation of part of "Sajudis" into a new political party will occur.

Last Friday, the parliament of the republic adopted a law on changing Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution of the Lithuanian SSR. In Article 6, as is known, the CPSU was defined as the guiding and directing party in the society. Now it is set forth in the following way: "The party, public organizations, and public movements are created in an established legal procedure and function within the framework both of the Constitution and the laws of the Lithuanian SSR."

A plenum of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party was held on 1 December. V.A. Medvedev, a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, spoke at it, reading the text of an appeal by M.S. Gorbachev to the Lithuanian communists. This document was received in different ways in the republic. But, be that as it may, the ideas expressed in it compel

communists to think and to understand that it is not possible to go forward in politics, by not taking consequences into account and not assuming responsibility for that which this leads to.

Appealing to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania and to all communists of the republic, M.S. Gorbachev at a recent Plenum of the CPSU emphasized once more: "We hope that the congress of the Communist Party of the republic, which you will hold in the near future and which will discuss pressing problems, will become something of a study of proposals for the 28th CPSU Congress. Comrade Brazauskas, I am saying this to you directly, in front of the entire central committee of the party: Do not underestimate your personal role as the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania in the proper decision of these questions.

In the meantime, the polarization of political forces in Lithuania is continuing. I saw a headline in the local KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA of 21 November: "What Kind of An Army Will Lithuania Need?" The publication asserts that, of course, it will not be Soviet. This idea ran like a red thread throughout the constituent conference of the "Union of Officers of the Reserve of Lithuania," which was established recently in the republic. Overall, the publication deserves to be quoted in full. But I select just one phrase: "Some of the participants of the conference very likely not only changed their field overcoats for another uniform in the 1940's, but even fought alongside those to whom they surrendered before that without a fight. This article makes at least one thing clear: The alliance now unites officers of different generations and different armies, and we will call things by their own names. Colonel (Res.) A. Kayris, chairman of the soviet of the "Union of Officers of the Reserve of Lithuania", agreed to a meeting. And so we are in the office of the director of the Vilnius Special Boarding School imeni 50 Years of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League].

"Algerdas-Stanislavas Pranovich, tell us about the aims and the tasks of creating the union."

"The union will undertake efforts to restore the historical truth about the Army of Lithuania and to defend the social and other rights of the officers of the reserve; it will promote the training of youth for service; it will try to see to it that they serve in their own republic, or, at the very least, in the Baltic Military District; and it will become an active defender of the restoration of national formations in Lithuania.

"An idea was heard at the conference, which was formulated in a newspaper publication in this way: 'No one will prepare a concept for the restoration of the Lithuanian army better than the people assembled here....'"

"This idea must be understood in the context of the aspirations of Lithuanians today for an independent state.

"And the last question. The republic's Soviet of War Veterans and Labor Veterans refused to participate in the work of the constituent conference and greeted the creation of the union with disapproval. Does this mean that there is a split in the veterans' movement in the republic?"

"Our union is a voluntary organization, and we, as the saying goes, are not dragging anybody in by force. It is written in our draft laws: 'The organization of officers of the reserve of all generations who are taking part in the Lithuanian movement for perestroika ('Sajudis'), and who support plans of the government of the republic and the Lithuanian movement for perestroika.'"

Young boys in the uniform of Suvorov schools attracted attention in the corridors of the boarding school. So, for whose army are they being trained? Because my interlocutor did not even once mention the USSR Armed Forces, in which he came to serve a good 3 decades.

The very same subject brought me to Kaunas. On 28 November, a meeting of one and a half thousand persons was held in the center of the city that was timed for the 71st anniversary of the creation of the army of bourgeois Lithuania. Once again panegyrics could be heard concerning the old Lithuanian army and appeals for its reconstitution. Toasts could be heard in honor of those who died for the freedom of Lithuania. I thought: This is in reference to those Lithuanian patriots who with weapons in hands fought against the Hitlerites and their accomplices, and after the war—against the band of nationalists who were reared by the same fascists and who terrorized the population of many areas of the republic in the difficult postwar years. But it turns out that this was not the case. The reference was specifically to those blessed Hitlerites who ran away from Lithuania, who were supplied with their weapons and hid in the forests of the bandits, and who have on their conscience thousands of ruined lives of simple Lithuanian peasants whose main fault was that they dreamed of a better fate. Thus, these "fighters for freedom," loudly called Lithuanian partisans, are now glorified at almost every turn. Eulogies about the "forest brothers" are made in the press and on television, and at various kinds of rallies and meetings. History is reshaped before one's eyes, and everything is turned upside down. Does not the fact of persistent efforts to rename the streets and villages of Lithuania with the names of executioners and traitors sound blasphemous. And, unfortunately, there are examples of this.

There is the village of Garlyava in the Kaunasskiy Rayon. It is barely within the boundaries of Kaunas. The informals are insisting here on renaming one of the streets for some Yu. Luksha. Who is this Yuozas Luksha? Back in 1940-1941 he collaborated with Hitler's abwehr, afterwards he performed services for the Gestapo and ended up in the West, he was secretly dropped into

Lithuania as an agent of foreign intelligence, he participated in the murder of his compatriots, and came to an ignominious end in the forests. And now they want to immortalize his name.

I also went to Garlyava, and I found the ispolkom [executive committee] of the settlement soviet, and I ask chairman Mindaugis Lukas about this.

"You know," he answers, "not one of the inhabitants of our settlement even thought about renaming the street, especially since no one knows who this Luksha is. As a matter of fact, he is not from around here. But for some time we have been visited by some people who called themselves representatives of 'Sajudis' and the 'Union of Exiled Lithuanians' who persistently advised renaming the street."

Such a change, at the very least, seems strange to me: To admire former SS members, to revive them, to present them as defenders, and at the same time to downplay the role of the Soviet Army, which sacrificed 138,000 of its soldiers to save Lithuanian land from enslavement. For example, I have the VECHERNIYE NOVOSTI in front of me—a newspaper of the Vilnius gorkom [city party committee] and the city soviet of 17 November 1989. It has a full-page interview with R. Ozolas, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR, a USSR People's Deputy, and a member of the Soviet of the sejm of "Sajudis." Under the headline "For Me 'Sajudis' Will Always Be a Miracle," there are lines that are far from romanticism: "Next year it will be necessary for us to resolve the problem of the relationship with the occupation army, and to establish our own military formations and police."

Even without this, the complicated conditions of life and service of soldiers, officers, and warrant officers in units and subunits stationed on the territory of the republic are becoming aggravated even more. One of the main reasons is the critical shortage of housing and extremely unfavorable living conditions. And, let us be frank, no improvement is expected, because the government of the republic has suspended the effect of the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers of 29 July 1981 which specifies housing privileges for servicemen and officers of the reserve.

We will add to this the attempts to deprive servicemen of voting rights. It is known that elections to the Supreme Soviet of the republic will be held in February and to local soviets on 24 March. It is also known that a collection of signatures in a document was announced in Lithuania which requires that servicemen of the Soviet Army be deprived of voting rights. And an appeal to accelerate and broaden this campaign resounded from television screens in the telecast "Revival Wave." You automatically ask yourself the question: What is this—a coincidence of facts or a planned campaign?

One other fact brought me to Kaunas: 102 former soldier- "afgantsy" [Afghanistan veterans] decided to refuse to accept decorations. They intend, one day in the

middle of December, after a rally and demonstration, to turn them into the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR. The proclamation in this regard will read: "...We hold all of the state decorations conferred upon us to be illegal and immoral. We appeal to all of the participants in the war in Afghanistan to return their decorations to their true owners."

I met in Kaunas with R. Ruzas, the chairman of the city club of former "afgantsy." It is unlikely that he was the initiator of this action, but, nonetheless, I am confident that it will be held. I ask: What is the reason? He repeats several times: It is a form of protest against an unpopular war that brought so much misfortune to our people.

On that very same day, I also talked with six "afgantsy." "Turn in decorations?" S. Kyaushinis, a former combat engineer and recipient of the Order of the Red Star, was astonished. "No, please spare me, I earned it with blood, and I do not intend to make small change out of it in a political game..." And A. Razbadauskas, a former scout who was decorated with the medal "For Bravery," is of a different opinion: I will go and turn my medal in! "Why?" I ask. And the former soldier, one senses that he is a fearless person, talks about the painful experiences that he has to endure here in his home town. They are not hurrying in Kaunas, and even in other localities of the republic, to meet the former soldier- "afgantsy" halfway in granting the benefits that were stipulated for them. And the signatures that appear under the proclamation, is this not a result of an emotional outburst that is skillfully utilized?

The opposition forces that are operating aggressively in the republic are expanding their influence on public opinion. These processes are accompanied by extremism of this kind also: They say that state independence from the USSR is the only way to the national rebirth of the Lithuanian people. I recall the words that I heard from one of the Vilnius residents: "What difference does it make what shore we sail along—left or right? It does not matter, because we are heading for the same objective. The same objective?"

Meeting Decides Latvian Plenum, Congress Dates

LD0501201390 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian
1830 GMT 5 Jan 90

[Text] A meeting of Central Committee Bureau members with the first secretaries of town and rayon party committees took place today at the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee. Its aim was once more to exchange opinions on restructuring in the party in preparation for the regular plenum which, as it is known, was envisaged today, but at this meeting an exact date was fixed—23 January.

What road will the Communist Party take in Latvia, how big are the threats of split; what are the possibilities for consolidation, perhaps for a compromise between its different layers? These and many other questions were at the center of attention at the meeting.

The commissions, which have to carry out corresponding work in preparation for the congress, were also discussed. If nothing will change, then the congress, so the participants at the meeting decided, could take place at the beginning of June.

Also, the role and place of radio and television in depicting and guiding these processes was talked about. Criticism was not, of course, missing. But let us state that this was a frank discussion, an exchange of opinions, as we are accustomed to say, eye to eye, with the heads of radio and television, who were invited to the meeting.

Latvian Supreme Soviet To Discuss Constitution

LD0601103790

[Editorial Report] Riga in Latvian to Europe at 1730 GMT on 5 January carries a report on a session of the Latvian Supreme Soviet Presidium chaired by A.V. Gorbunov. The session discussed changing the state anthem, flag, and coat of arms of Latvia. "This question had to be discussed because it is included on the agenda of the 14th session of the republic's Supreme Soviet of the 11th convocation. The session will continue its work on 11 January.

"At yesterday's session of the Presidium various standpoints were expressed. It was therefore decided to continue the discussion of this question.

"At the forthcoming session, in their turn, the following issues will be examined as well:

"On Articles 6, 7, and 49 of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Constitution;

"On the USSR draft law on ownership in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

"And on alterations and amendments to the Latvian SSR Criminal Code.

"[Words indistinct] information on undertakings for ensuring food products for the republic's inhabitants; and several other questions."

Latvian People's Front on Elections, Peasant Party

LD0601121990

[Editorial Report] Riga in Latvian to Europe at 1730 GMT on 5 January carries a program entitled "For Listeners Abroad" on the Latvian People's Front announcement on a decision not to boycott the republic election. It states:

"The leadership of the Latvian People's Front has issued an announcement which states that under the circumstances, with a split in the communist party, the Latvian People's Front has acquired a realistic role of a political center.

"The Latvian People's Front is turning against any appeals to boycott the elections. The People's Front

must, as far as possible, get into soviets in order to be able to participate in the transformation of Latvia."

At a regular meeting of the Latvian People's Front rural committee a vigorous discussion was held on the political situation in the republic and on the need to establish a peasant party. "It was decided to issue an appeal to members of peasant associations of all rayons and individual peasants to create initiative groups which could begin to draw up draft rules and programs of a peasant party and organize a founding congress."

Estonian Plenum Discusses Party Autonomy, CPSU

PM0501161990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Own correspondent L. Levitskiy report: "Estonian Communist Party Prepares for Congress"]

[Text] Tallinn—The Estonian Communist Party Central Committee plenum is over. There was virtually a month between its first and second sessions.

The Central Committee members had to reassess the prevailing political situation—how quickly the situation is changing. V. Vyalyas, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, and the other speakers stressed the complexity and crucial nature of the stage which the Estonian Communist Party is going through. Its ranks have been reduced by several thousand. It has lost more than passive and complacent people. A number of former Communists are creating new social organizations and parties.

"We have to realize that the path toward autonomy [samostoyatelnost] for the Lithuanian Communist Party cannot serve as a direct example for the reformation of the Estonian Communist Party," V. Vyalyas said. "The building of the CPSU on the principle of the autonomy of republic communist parties is the guarantee of the Estonian Communist Party's autonomy. The separation of union republic communist parties from the CPSU cannot be an end in itself. The aim is the sovereign development of the republic."

There is a wide divergence of views and convictions within the Estonian Communist Party. There is not even any unity on fundamental political and organizational questions. This, needless to say, is not giving the party prestige or clout—it is finding it increasingly difficult to carry out its stabilizing role in society and to reflect the interests of all social strata.

The speakers were unanimous in stating the facts [v konstatsii]. But opposing ways of moving toward political leadership in a diversity of political social organizations were proposed. Two positions and approaches were clearly visible. The first was increased activeness and autonomy for the Estonian Communist Party within a developing CPSU. The second was an autonomous Estonian Communist Party.

These viewpoints also determined the discussion of the "Political Statement"—the plenum's main document. One of its main provisions in the draft was formulated as follows: "The Estonian Communist Party notes that at the present stage of the restructuring of Soviet society it is necessary first to achieve real autonomy for republic communist parties within the framework of the CPSU, along with sovereignty for the republics within a renewed federation. This is the basis of our further development.... [no closing quotation marks as published] After the debate the compromise formula looked different: "...The Estonian Communist Party Central Committee notes that at the present stage... it is necessary to achieve real autonomy for republic communist parties within the CPSU. The decisions of the 20th Estonian Communist Party will be the basis of our further development."

The fundamental debates about the main problems have been postponed until the Estonian Communist Party Congress. The plenum set the date for its convocation—23 March—and the representation norms. M. Titma, secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, reported on how the preparation of the draft law on parties is proceeding. It was recommended that it be submitted to a session of the Estonian Supreme Soviet as a legislative initiative.

Vyalys Addresses Plenum

LD0701162790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0330 GMT 6 Jan 90

[Text] The 16th plenum of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee has ended its proceedings. It discussed matters connected with the political situation in the republic after the extraordinary plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Addressing it, Vayno Vyalys, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, said that the Lithuanian Communist Party's route to independence cannot serve as a direct example for the reshaping of the Estonian Communist Party. The guarantee of its independence is the construction of the CPSU according to the principle of the independence of the republican Communist Party's. A report was also heard from the legislative Initiatives Commission of the Estonian Communist Party on the progress of preparations for a draft law on parties, which is to be proposed as a legislative initiative for consideration by the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet. Other matters were also considered.

Panel Discusses Plenum

LD0501103590

[Editorial Report] Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian at 1200 GMT on 4 January carries a 45-minute program which discusses the 16th plenum of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee. The program is presented by Peeter Sookruus. The guests are Tonu Laak, first secretary of Tartu town party committee, and (Paul Kenkman) at the radio studio. Raul Malk and Enn-Arno

Sillari, secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee participate in the program from a studio at the Central Committee building.

To open the discussion Enn-Arno Sillari summarizes the interim period between the start of the 16th plenum of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee and today, with the local government elections, the Second USSR Congress of People's Deputies, and the CPSU Central Committee meeting on Lithuania having taken place. Having posed the question on whether or not the party sides with the people, Sillari says Lithuania evidently had to answer the way it did, but the Estonian Communist Party must answer the same question. He says, "Today indeed the answering has begun and it will continue; I believe that on the 20th congress will find most extensive reflection."

Sillari continues, "Second, another main problem is also the attitude toward Lithuania. A draft has been presented here—to the participants of CPSU Central Committee plenum—and it was presented by Jaak Allik." The draft has been distributed today for opinions.

Malk says, "Today's plenum has also paid much attention to the emergence of several party-founding groups, to the development of movements in which people participate who hitherto have been party members. An appeal has sounded here to the effect that everybody who is thinking about a step of this kind as leaving the party, that they should also think of the consequences of their deed as the leaving takes place at the most difficult time and that indeed the party congress in March should be the one to determine the fate of the party. This is at least how I have understood the expression of thoughts by Vayno Vyalys and many other speakers who followed, so that this departure at this moment may bring very severe consequences, particularly if it is on a mass scale."

Sillari agrees and says the end result may be that those democratically minded and radical people are simply not there for the 20th congress. "They are those who wish for it and see an opportunity to achieve the independence, sovereignty of Estonia, and achieve that via the Communist Party. One thing is clear, as I said previously: We cannot go to it with ballast. [words indistinct] definition will still occur at the 20th congress and I believe that all democratic forces, all those people who favor the creation of a law-governed state, of true democracy, and are at the moment party members, should seriously consider how we could do this today within the party."

(Paul Kenkman) reflects that the time span between the 7 December when the 16th plenum of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee opened and today has been significant. "I would even be as bold as to say that certain emphases have been raised today, the day of continuing the plenum, up to a point even correct those stances adopted on 7 December. For example, it seems to me that the plenum today is no longer in quite such an optimistic frame of mind, for example, concerning the date of our 20th congress. Well, it was so [optimistic]

that last time the evidently prevailing opinion was still that it could take place at the end of March. Today I believe our plenum will adopt a resolution of this kind: to organize an Estonian Communist Party conference, at the beginning of February the latest. This is no longer the case of an Estonian Communist Party practical-theoretical conference which was discussed on 7 December but the case of Estonian Communist Party conference already, to which town and rayon plenums will elect deputies, their delegates, according to a representation norm. So, in other words, in February already a party forum will come together which will adopt fairly serious resolutions on the issues of further reforms within the party, probably including the issues of both the program and the Constitution."

"Second, it seems to me that today we are indeed unambiguously and unconditionally declaring support to the idea of Estonia independence. About this, likewise, a draft resolution has been presented which envisions the setting up of a commission to this effect at the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet. It will begin to deal with implementing specific steps, concerning the achievement, so to speak, of Estonia as a subject of international law. The activity of this commission, in an unprecedented way for our party, will proceed from the acknowledgement of the annexation of Estonia and of its forcible incorporation into the Soviet Union." (Kenkman) proceeds to talk about Kogan with whom he expects the plenum or at least the majority at the plenum to disagree because he presented "false" information at the USSR Congress People's Deputies at the address of the republican leadership.

Sookruus introduces a question from a listener: Do the people in the studio think they are doing the right thing by being in the same party to which Kogan belongs? "Tonu Laak will be the right one to answer because namely he made a specific proposal to adopt today at the plenum and also a separate resolution in respect of the behavior of communist Yevgeniy Kogan not being in line with his membership of Estonian Communist Party."

Laak does not answer the question directly, but regarding Estonian independence he says. "As both the Soviet Union, and the CPSU are forms which are changing very fast today I think it would be very premature for us to provide some kind of unambiguous formulations at the plenum, for example, along the following lines: the Estonian Communist Party within the composition of CPSU or the Estonian SSR within the composition of the Soviet Union. I think it is our task to formulate an independent Estonian Communist Party and an independent Estonia."

A listener's question asks about the new communist party, its renewal and new aims. "What will, however, be the new aim of the Communist Party? Building up a communist society as it was previously laid down?" (Kenkman) answers by saying that raising the question denotes the change between the 1st day of the plenum

and today's date, "Today we are indeed in a different political life. One issue is that we have the Lithuanian experience of a novel solution to the relationships between the parties, which did not as yet exist on the first day of the plenum." He also mentions the emergence of other new parties in Estonia, "But I think that if we are now talking about the renewal of the Communist Party, we are talking about the Communist Party wanting to be [simply] a party within a multi-party political system of this kind, then the Communist Party will in the future keep associating itself with the struggle for justice, against exploitation, and thus it will associate itself with what we at the same time want to distinguish from in our past."

Next Sookruus reads a listener's question, "When will the Estonian Communist Party say it out straight to the people whether it stands for the sovereignty of Estonia within the framework of the Soviet Union or whether it favors an independent Estonian state?" He addresses Enn-Arno Sillari for an answer.

Sillari responds, "That is, we have here under preparation a political statement of the 16th plenum of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee in which then one can say...which spells out clearly also those aims: that is, in favor of Estonian independence as well as for the independence of the Estonian Communist Party. But I would like to add that our world as a whole is changing; the progress of the restructuring process within the Soviet Union, the present changes in Eastern Europe as well as Western European integration are of a determining importance in planning our future Estonia. One needs to proceed from those characteristics toward which one is advancing, to establish a common European home. I think it will be said out today and also laid down in the document, and of course, the 20th congress by definition will be fundamental.

Malk asks, "attached to this is another question: Can this political statement, should it be adopted, also be considered as a step on the part of the party in the pre-election struggle?"

Sillari replies, "Yes, of course. Because with this statement we express our positions and it must also then serve as a basis for the voters if they support those positions which are expressed in the statement. I think this is indeed a kind of platform of the pre-election time or now already of the election time."

A listener asks about the Estonian Communist Party, which so far in fact has never existed because it was never established in the first place. Leak comments, "Within the framework of this Estonian Communist Party today the contours of different parties are already beginning to be outlined. I would like to name one of those parties, which is about to be formed within the state-party formation today, namely the Estonian Communist Party, or the radically minded section of the party. This would be the section that fights for the independence of the Estonian Communist Party as well

as for the independence and self-determination of Estonia. As I already emphasized here at the beginning the expulsion of Yevgeniy Kogan from the Estonian Communist Party is indeed such an important...symbolic, political act, and not in the old meaning.

"[It is important] regarding the administrative personnel question of communist Yevgeniy Kogan, with the aim of improving him or of giving him a final condemnation. Yevgeniy Kogan will be there and he will continue his political activity but we want namely that the Estonian Communist Party would clearly say it out today that the Communist Party of Estonia [emphasis on "Estonia"] has nothing in common with Yevgeniy Kogan's politics."

When questioned about a new name for this new party, Sillari admits this has been briefly discussed, even mentioned by some speakers at today's plenum, but more in the way of a suggestion of something to be discussed either at the conference or at the congress.

Sillari refers to Mikk Titma's speech just before the lunch break, in which Titma presented a law on parties. "this has also been included in the statement that Estonian Communist Party strives for the adoption of a law on parties in the near future already; that means it will become one party alongside others."

Raul Malk now sums up how he sees the forthcoming congress. "So, I understand that at the moment the Estonia Communist Party at the level of its leadership foresees that the going to the congress will take place with clear positions which have emerged on the basis of discussion, that it is not the congress starting to sort out things but that already before the congress it will be clear what kind of platforms one is going to bring along and the congress will then perhaps adopt the role of already deciding and indeed, laying down the future role."

Sillari says the interim period before the congress is indeed there for the purpose of clarifying what will be actually brought to the congress.

Apathy of primary party organizations is discussed. Laak and (Kenkman) both suggest it is the matter for the Central Committee to renew the party and that there is not much that can be done on the primary level. (Kenkman), however, suggests the following. "It still seems that if we now talk about waiting for the Supreme Soviet resolution in respect of changing Article 6 in the Fundamental Law, should it not be deliberated within the primary chains of the party also how they so far have also been acting on the strength of Article 6 and how the relationship between the present party organization and the management of the enterprise should be transformed within every collective, every establishment. Perhaps it would be possible to bring things here into a more normal political order even immediately, perhaps."

"Several questions have arrived regarding the Lithuania Communist Party if the Estonian Communist Party plans to follow in its footsteps, and a proposal has been

made to send a letter of support from today's plenum to Lithuanian Communists. Sookruus says this latter idea is about to materialize, with Allik and Golikov having drafted a letter, even if it is addressed to Moscow, to the CPSU Central Committee plenum, which continues to discuss the Lithuanian issue. He also says several speeches today as well as the report expressed support for Lithuania.

"Questions have also arrived about the Estonian Communist Party's responsibility for the past and a clear condemnation of the Stalinist past is demanded. Malk asks additionally if this statement to be adopted today proposes perhaps a program in creating a democratic mechanism to avoid rebirth of Stalinism. Sillari says that as yet there is not such mechanism at work in Estonia but that it is important to devise one so that the roots would be cut to prevent it from raising its ugly head. The answer is only to proceed along the path of democracy, and namely in the parliamentary way." I would not now say that the statement provides an opportunity to the effect that it would not occur because the age is still such that the danger has not as yet disappeared. That is my opinion."

Estonian Patriotic Forces Appeal for Unity

*LD0501212390 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian
1800 GMT 5 Jan 90*

[Text] [Announcer] This is a joint statement of the Estonian Christian Democratic Union, Estonian Society for the Preservation of the National Heritage, and Estonian Union of Work Collectives. The struggle for restoration of Estonian independence has reached a crucial stage. Against this background, splits within the popular front cause concern, due to mutual accusations and attacks. We find that in the situation which has evolved the need has increased for a right-centrist core which would carry the ideas of Jaan Tonisson's [moderate politician of the Estonian independence period] centrist party.

Proceeding from the above, we declare that our aims coincide in principle and that we have a will in common to strive for the independence of Estonia on the basis of the Tartu peace treaty [of 1920]. We appeal to our local organizations for cooperation with other patriotic forces—regional people's fronts, the liberals, Estonian National Independence Party, Res Publica—to unite so that candidates who represent the legal continuity of the Republic of Estonia may pass in the forthcoming elections.

Resettlement From Areas 'Polluted' by Chernobyl

*LD0501142690 Moscow TASS in English 1407 GMT
5 Jan 89*

[Text] Kiev January 5 TASS—By TASS Correspondent Alexey Petrunya:

Residents from several areas in the Ukraine that were contaminated during the 1986 accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant are now being resettled, following a government decision to remove people from infected areas:

The government decision was prompted by a new study of the environmental situation in contaminated regions.

"Much has been done to ensure normal living conditions for people living in polluted areas," Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Konstantin Masik said.

"About 11,000 cottages, 25 apartment houses and more than 600 social facilities were built for the 92,000 people evacuated from the 30-kilometer zone around the plant."

"Hundreds of kilometers of roads, power lines, gas and water lines were built. Large areas were cleaned up. However, we failed to ensure safe living conditions in all areas. This prompted the government decision to evacuate residents from several residential areas in the Kiev and Zhitomir Regions."

More than 5,500 people will move elsewhere within the next two years, Masik said.

"Everything will be done to provide them with housing and to preserve their life styles: Rural residents are being resettled to the countryside and city-dwellers—to urban areas. Eighteen high-rises, more than 2,000 cottages, 11 Schools, 16 kindergartens, dozens of medical, trade and service facilities will be built to accommodate these people. The houses and other priority structures will be built this year."

Aims of Moldavian People's Union Discussed

90UN0588A Moscow TRUD in Russian
3 Dec 89 p 2

[Article by A. Yefanov, foreman of the Benderskiy Plant ZhBI and KPD No 3 and member of the coordinating soviet of the Union of Workers of Moldavia: "We Are for Consolidation"]

[Text] Today, when pluralism is the norm of life, the editorial office receives quite a few letters from readers in which debatable and ambiguous questions are raised. This is what the letter being published today is like. A broad open discussion of these questions and the confrontation of various points of view make it possible to represent the real situation more accurately and to find constructive solutions.

The Union of Workers of Moldavia was not created easily, although the new social organization immediately attracted quite a few adherents—representatives of almost 100 work collectives attended the first meeting. Almost all of them recognized that a new union of workers was necessary under the specific conditions that prevail in the republic....

It was during the first few days of August that the main subject of discussion in the press and in meetings of two large informal organizations of the republic—the People's Front of Moldavia and the international movement "Unity"—was the draft of the Law on Language. There is no doubt that the question is vitally important to our region. But it has practically completely absorbed public attention, and it pushed other no less critical problems into second place.

However, for all practical purposes, neither the People's Front nor "Unity" worked at all earnestly on these problems.

Moreover, both the NFM [People's Front of Moldavia] and "Unity" concentrated their energies on the national question and, having selected "rally democracy" as the main method, not only did not promote the consolidation of forces in society, but rather the opposite.

That is why at our second organizational meeting (it gathered about 500 representatives of almost 200 work collectives), after announcing the establishment of the Union of Workers of Moldavia, we proclaimed that our union stands for the priority of creative activity in the implementation of practical realization of plans outlined by the party, and that it will not permit interference with any rights and interests of the working people whatever. Our union firmly condemns the path of confrontation, the wrecking of the fundamental values of socialism, endless rallies, and aggravating international relations. The Union of Workers of Moldavia, it was emphasized in the documents of the organizational meeting, demands unambiguous positions from the political leadership with respect to destructive forces.

It was contemplated to hold a constituent congress of the Union of Workers of Moldavia, to adopt a statute and program of the STM [Union of Workers of Moldavia], and to outline a specific way of implementing it. However, for many—mostly leaders of the party, the soviets, and trade union organs of the republic—our intentions evoked a negative reaction. This was reflected, for example, in certain statements at a recent plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia, which considered the question of the socio-political situation in international relations in the republic. One of the orators literally said the following: "The creation of a so-called 'Union of Workers of Moldavia' is a very serious question. Calling itself not simply a social, but a socio-political organization, this union sets for itself the task of administering all aspects of life and of controlling soviet, party, and economic management organs. Its appeal to the leadership of the republic states that not one political, economic, or social decision that affects the interests of the workers of Moldavia can henceforth be adopted without the approval of the union, and in the event that demands are not satisfied extreme measures of economic pressure will be brought to bear, including taking authority into their own hands."

"I cannot understand how, knowing the true aims of the proposed union, V.F. Semenov, the secretary of the Central Committee of the KPM [Communist Party of Moldavia], and P.I. Shapa, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the MSSR [Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic], who took part in the work of the organizational meeting of the union, could approve the idea of establishing an organization which could lead to stirring up interethnic discord."

The accusations, you will agree, are extremely serious. Especially since they were voiced by the chairman of the Moldavian republic council of trade unions. In such a case, he really was obliged to have a clear understanding of the newly created social organization in the republic and its real intentions. We particularly expected support from the trade unions, knowing, moreover, that the Belorussian republic council of trade unions acted this way in a similar situation.

For the sake of fairness, it is necessary to say that virtually all of the informal organizations of the republic that have appeared recently met with extremely strong opposition from official organs. And, nonetheless, not one of them was subjected to such massive pressure as the STM.

In the middle of October, the constituent congress of the STM was held nonetheless, true, almost under semilegal conditions. People refused to undergo registration, because they feared...persecution.

We were refused premises everywhere. In the end, the congress began its work in the Palace of Culture of the Berdenskiy silk combine, but as early as the first intermission of the organizational committee, it became necessary to make explanations to the militia. They permitted us to complete work, but afterwards they again invited the organizers to the administrative organs. Additionally, literally on the eve of the congress, false information circulated in many Kishinev enterprises that the congress apparently was being adjourned, as a result of which many delegations did not take part in the constituent congress. Even so, 533 delegates from 123 work collectives from 11 cities and population centers of the republic attended the congress. The national composition of the delegates was also diverse—Moldavians, Ukrainians, Russians, Bulgarians, Gagauzy, Jews.... It is understandable, for according to the STM statute, it unites adherents of radical economic organizations regardless of nationality, membership in the CPSU and the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], and other social organizations, religious attitudes, and professions. Membership in the STM is primarily collective.

STM's position and program of action were reflected in the socio-economic declaration that was adopted by the congress. We consider the most important to be the return of the absolute authority of the soviet, the creation of a law-governed state, and the consolidation of the workers around the sensible forces of the CPSU.

For us it is indisputable that a resolution of social problems is incompatible without radical economic reform. The STM stands for the immediate grant to enterprises of genuine independence on the basis of self-government, full cost accounting, and self-financing. It is important to grant work collectives, it seems to us, a free choice of forms of property, the right to buy out the means of production in the state or their lease, the creation of joint stock, cooperative and joint enterprises, and production associations. We are for the elimination of the growing influence of social groups that are parasites on the distribution of material benefits.

In a word, the STM aspires to a maximum expansion of opportunities for the person-worker to realize his socio-economic, political, and civic rights, and to ensure the workers a deserved place in a social community that is free from deformations and distortions. This aim cannot help but attract and unite those who are alarmed by the crisis situation in our economy, the growing political and social tension in society, and the division of workers into groups and narrow ethnic interests.

It is a pity that the trade unions of the republic, just as the party and soviet organs, have not yet seen a source of additional strength in the new social organization, and a helper in the cause of the protection of the interests and rights of the workers.

Crimean Party Plenum Seeks Interethnic Harmony

LD0501212990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1630 GMT 5 Jan 89

[Excerpt] The present plenum of the Crimean Oblast Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party is devoted to harmonizing interethnic relations. It has been relayed over local radio and television. Here is a report by our correspondent Vladimir Plotnikov.

[Plotnikov] The plenum has been taking place at the party obkom building. Meanwhile there have been pickets outside its entrance, representatives of the Crimean Tatars carrying placards. They made various demands of the plenum participants and the leaders of the oblast and country, first and foremost about returning their people to their historical homeland with greater speed.

The proposals that were to be heard today in the report by Nikolay Vasilyevich Bagrov, first secretary of the oblast party committee, and in a number of speeches, included the creation or recreation of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic with equal rights and obligations for all the peoples residing there. However, far from everyone was in agreement with regard to the principle, national or territorial, on which such a republic should be built. [passage omitted]

Discusses Autonomous Formation

*LD0601180790 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1530 GMT 6 Jan 90*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

We are finally beginning to restore justice and to pay back the heavy debts of Stalinism owed to those who suffered in the past from the whims of the great leader. Here is a report from the plenum of the Crimean Oblast Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent V. Plotnikov] A group of Crimean Tatars organized this picket outside the oblast committee building, in which the plenum was taking place. [Video shows demonstrators carrying placards] Their demands can be summarized as follows: the removal of barriers to the people's return to their historical homeland. There have been many such pickets and impassioned meetings previously. There also have been arbitrary seizures of land. I am saying this so you can imagine the atmosphere in which the oblast party committee submitted this matter for consideration for the first time in 50 years. The oblast committee invited the leaders of the Crimean Tatar Action Group and the leaders of the cultural and educational societies of the Krymchaks, Karaims, and other peoples of the Crimea. Earlier, the oblast party committee held a scientific and practical conference, and distributed forms and a draft platform to harmonize relations among the nationalities. All these materials were handed out to all the plenum's participants. Archive materials were on display, as was an ethnographic exhibition.

Also unusual was the fact that there were three sections at work during the plenum, and the speeches were broadcast on the oblast's television and radio. Prior to the plenum, an assessment of the work of the party and local soviet bodies ranged from highly negative to very positive, but as a result of these discussions, a document was unanimously adopted: The Guidelines for the Activities of the Oblast Party Organization To Harmonize Relations Among the Nationalities. It was, naturally, the Crimean Tatar issue that was the focus of attention.

[Ya.M. Kerimov, member of the oblast party committee's commission on relations among the nationalities] The plenum examined the problems of the Crimean Tatar people today, and two major issues were examined at the plenum. The first was the organized return of the people to their historical homeland. The second was about creating an autonomous formation. As for the latter, there are still some matters to be clarified, but I do think that everything now depends on Crimean oblast party committee plenum. As for the organized return of the people, I think that in the past 2 years we have, in general, made very great changes and obtained some favorable results. I think that given a solution to certain economic issues, that of the return of the Crimean Tatar people will find a definitive solution. [end recording]

Process 'Especially Complex'

*PM0801103390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Jan 90 Second Edition p 2*

[RATAU-TASS report under general headline: "Plenums Held"]

[Text] Simferopol, 5 Jan—An oblast party committee plenum held today was devoted to the problem of harmonizing interethnic relations in the Crimea.

The plenum was preceded by broad discussion among the oblast's public of the draft basic guidelines for Communists' activity aimed at promptly "defusing" the contradictions arising on ethnic grounds.

The Crimea is inhabited by representatives of 110 ethnic groups and relations between them are complex [neodnoznachnyy] and, at times, highly confused and contradictory. The process of restoring the rights of peoples exiled from the peninsula during Stalin's repressions and of their return to their ancestral land is especially complex. This primarily applies to the Crimean Tatars.

Plenum participants noted with concern that the uncontrolled flow of migrants could lead to destabilization of the oblast's economy. Only a clear-cut state program backed by real material resources would make it possible to effect the resettlement of Crimean Tatars and representatives of other deported peoples without any detriment to all peoples living on the peninsula's territory.

Explosion in Azerbaijan Kills 2; Investigation Begins

*LD0601153990 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1518 GMT 6 Jan 90*

[Text] Baku, 6 Jan (TASS)—An explosion destroyed a bus station building this morning in the town of Agdam (Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic). As a result, two people died and two were injured.

According to preliminary data, which still requires verification, the cause of the explosion could have been the accumulation of gas in the cellar premises, near to which main gas pipelines run. The population of the town is actively participating in restoratory activities.

The Procuracy and Internal Affairs bodies of Agdam Rayon are conducting an investigation.

Nikiforov Analyzes Nakhichevan Events

*LD0801112390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0330 GMT 8 Jan 90*

[From the "Utro" program presented by Berezhovskaya]

[Text] The first week of the new year has added a further alarming note, another painful spot—Nakhichevan—to previous concerns. The reports about the disorder on the border were full of surprises. Now a large group of party and soviet workers, specialists in the most varied fields, is working in the Autonomous Republic in order to remove the tension which has arisen. Nikiforov, USSR deputy

foreign minister, in an interview with our correspondent appraised events on the Soviet-Iranian border from his department's point of view. This is what he said.

[Begin Nikifirov recording] The incident on the border needs to be viewed not as a bilateral incident between two states, but an internal incident. There are grounds here for people to express dissatisfaction in connection with the fact that really, for a long time in the border region, they had no possibility of maintaining contact with relatives on the other side of the state border. We have a long border. These questions have not been solved. In some places they are decided more quickly, in other places, maybe, more slowly, since this is a double-sided question and people... [changes thought] naturally there was this internal dissatisfaction. It is a different matter that they used this and staged provocations. Of course, this step can in no way be approved, this step was, of course, illegal. But we have to draw the conclusion for ourselves that it is necessary to seek a way to solve this question, which the Foreign Affairs Ministry as a whole and along the whole border, and in particular here, is working on.

But I would like to say that there are already changes, that the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry is working actively here. There are questions in the area of trade links and in the area of cultural links with neighboring Iran. But I think that it is necessary to seek a way to solve this problem. [end recording]

[Berezovskaya] Of course no one approves of the illegal actions. But how many times has it become completely clear that it was possible to avoid conflict, if the people responsible for the affairs with which they are entrusted really were responsible for them. And in the given case, the incident, the outburst and suffering might simply not have happened. And how can we not complain once more that we have again not been informed in time about what has been happening since November in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. For the fire has been smoldering for a fairly long time, though we found out about it only when it flared up and became dangerous.

Azerbaijan Papers View Events in Nakhichevan

NC0701115590 *Baku Domestic Service in Azeri*
0440 GMT 7 Jan 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The newspapers today presented their readers with the reports compiled by TASS on the incidents in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR] under the general heading: "The Democratic Way, Awareness, and Patience."

TASS correspondent (Rodinskiy) gave detailed information on the visit of leading party and government officials to Nakhichevan and on the meetings they had with the people, including those who live in the border regions. (Rodinskiy) reported:

Asad Dzhabbarov Aliyev, a well-known teacher in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], said, during a meeting between a delegation of one of Nakhichevan's border [word indistinct] and the elderly people of (?Babechskiy) rayon: Of course, it grieves us elderly people to witness these incidents. However, think about the people and forgive their mistakes. The situation has been so strained that the people, who have been calling for the restoration of justice for a long time, have not been able to restrain themselves. Under the circumstances, was it possible to avoid a tragic incident?

The people we met in Baku, Nakhichevan, and other rayons and cities linked the main reasons for the incidents with the delay in settling the problems of those who have fled from Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. They explained that, in addition to the main problems, matters related to the wish to improve cultural, (?neighborly), friendly, and trade relations with Iran and use the border region more freely to graze cattle and meet other agricultural needs have also worried the people and prompted them to take part in meetings. Most of the wishes, demands, and hopes are justified. It became apparent during the thorough examination of the matter that meeting all these requirements will demand a realistic approach. The work in that regard does not require special decisions by the supreme organs or the state. These matters can be gradually resolved by the republic or administrative soviets.

The reasons for the incidents are clear. We hope that the problems that have caused them will be resolved in the near future. However, can these problems justify lawless activities? Can it be possible to maintain reconstruction work in the country and in the Azerbaijan SSR by ignoring the laws and resorting to extremist measures? However complex they are, every single citizen of the republic must reply to these questions.

Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities; and Vezirov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, held a meeting with the Nakhichevan ASSR's party economic activists last night. The meeting examined the essential measures that are required to normalize the situation in the republic's border rayons.

Azeri Government Condemns Nakhichevan Incidents

LD0601213690 *Moscow Domestic Service in Russian*
2100 GMT 6 Jan 90

[Text] The Azerbaijan Council of Ministers has condemned the actions that led to flagrant violations of the USSR Law on the State Border of the USSR. The Council of Ministers of Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic has been instructed to consider without delay the demands of those who live in the border areas together with the organizations concerned. The Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already begun examining problems connected with the regulation of

mutual visits by relatives and individuals inhabiting the border zones on either side of the border.

KGB Border Troop Official on Azerbaijan Unrest

*LD0601100290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0800 GMT 6 Jan 90*

[Interview with (Gennadiy Viktorovich Martynov), deputy chief of the USSR KGB Border Troops Political Directorate, by "special" correspondent Leonid Lazarevich; date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer Vladimir Bezyayev] We have already reported that 31 December last year and 2 January this year were marked by unprecedented actions in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. As a result, tens of kilometers of a ploughed strip of land were ruined and engineering and technical structures, lines of communication, and border towers were destroyed along the Soviet-Iranian border.

[Lazarevich] (Gennadiy Viktorovich), we know that the situation on the Soviet-Iranian border in the Nakhichevan region and other regions of Azerbaijan remains complex. Why do you think that these events arose?

[(Martynov)] The main cause of these events was a nationalist grouping which has formed here in the republic. It managed to take command of the mood of a large mass of people, it managed...

[Lazarevich, interrupting] In the border region?

[(Martynov)] Yes, in the border region. Of course, that's what I mean. It managed, in essence, to paralyze the efforts of the local authorities and imposed pressure by force on the population, in order simply to coerce them into going out and committing those illegal acts.

[Lazarevich] In other words, it was simply a provocation.

[(Martynov)] That is precisely correct. Their aim in destabilizing the situation was not simply to seize those posts, so to speak. Something simple was involved: to commit a provocation—to challenge the border troops to perform actions which would destabilize the situation in those regions—under the guise of which politically far-reaching goals could be pursued.

[Lazarevich] In other words, if I understand you correctly, they calculated that the border troops would take up arms and that blood would be shed?

[(Martynov)] Fortunately, this did not happen because the border troops realized in time the danger of all this, and together we all succeeded in frustrating these plans.

[Lazarevich] The events which occurred could have had some real basis. Along that stretch of the border there live a considerable number of related peoples who are divided by it and contact between them has been made very difficult in past years. This could possibly also give rise to dissatisfaction.

[(Martynov)] Indeed, there are questions here of a special situation [osoby rezhim] in this sector, the special characteristics of industry and agricultural work. There is an opinion running through a number of local workers, including managerial workers, that the border troops apparently don't allow them to work a large area of land which lies along the state border line and that we, with our installations there, apparently prevent them from doing so. But things are not quite like that. Above all, it has to be said that all countries in the world have a special quarantine protection strip [veterinarnaya-zashchitnaya polosa] which separates the territory of states in order to prevent the possible spread of contagious diseases. That is why, in accordance with a decision of governments, including the Azerbaijani government, a 500-meter strip has been set up in this sector where it is forbidden to lead cattle. As far as other kinds of agricultural production are concerned, neither we nor the local bodies have introduced any prohibitions. In this sector a good deal of all kinds of work is carried out. There are state enterprises here, fishing goes on, there are fishing teams.

It's quite another matter that all this is carried out according to a set regime. Of course, now—and we are reviewing all this and making our own proposals in order to simplify this regime—we are replacing the barbed-wire entanglement with a large number of through roads to prevent difficulties of movement and access to agricultural sites and other work is being simplified.

All this is being done. But as far as contacts with relatives on the other side is concerned, a state procedure has been laid down by treaties between neighboring countries and no one is permitted to violate it. In this instance, what is happening at the present time when large groups of individuals are trying to go beyond the state border line and make contacts with citizens of a kindred state, this affects the interests not only of our country but also of interstate relations. There have been statements on this question by border commissars, expressing dissatisfaction that such things are happening on our border.

Official Explains Events on Iranian Border

*LD0601185390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1608 GMT 6 Jan 90*

[Text] Millions of people are anxious over the events in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic and on the Soviet-Iranian border. As you know, unprecedented occurrences have been going on there or—to be more precise—excesses have been perpetrated by the local populace. Party officials, USSR people's deputies, and Azerbaijani leaders have been sent there. Among them was Rafik Nishanovich Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, who has been interviewed by Leonid Lazarevich, our special correspondent. Listen to a tape which we have only just received:

[Begin recording] [Nishanov] First and foremost, I would like to observe that the situation generally—both

in the Nakhichevan republic and on that section of the Soviet-Iranian border—is now calm. My impression from all my numerous meetings is that people generally correctly understand that such excesses, particularly on the border, are intolerable; they condemn the incidents that have occurred. Now the border guards and the local populace are maintaining absolutely normal, business-like relations and are maintaining contacts. But what has happened is distressing. Certain people guilty of these excesses are under investigation. There were, of course, certain motives behind these actions. But the form of the actions—these excesses—of course deserves condemnation. That said, these motives and reasons had built up over the years, and of course...

[Lazarevich] If not decades.

[Nishanov] Yes, over decades, and it must be recognized that the people had endured this and waited for these issues to be resolved. In Dzhufinskiy Rayon, for example, we visited the Golestan monument after visiting the frontier post. So what if people want to visit this monument? But the monument is in a fenced-off zone within the border zone. And each time anyone wants to visit it he has to apply for a pass and for permission.

Or, then again, at a nearby frontier post there was a cemetery on the territory occupied by the border strip. People had to take their dead relatives dozens of kilometers to bury them in other places. And then there are Azerbaijanis on the territory of Iran: people who moved there in perhaps 1918 or 1937. There have always been ties here, and a railway passes through Dzhulf. And as for relatives—to visit relatives one has to go through a very complicated application process. One woman, for example, complained to us that she had spent a whole month going from one organization to another getting her pass in order.

Meanwhile, in the world at large we are pursuing a very energetic policy to ensure human contacts; to ensure that there are reciprocal ties; to ensure that people can make friends with one another and share their impressions with one another; so that they might jointly build our happy and bright world, as we say. And yet here, in order just to visit your relatives you need quite a long time to get the documents in order. We have spoken to the USSR Foreign Ministry, and Deputy Foreign Minister Comrade Valentin Mikhaylovich Nikiforov came here. Of course, the issue is not one-sided. There must be talks with the Iranian side. Here, too, we feel that there are ways of tackling these issues.

I would like to assure our Soviet listeners that at the present moment the situation is calm and there are no trends toward a further exacerbation. [end recording]

Analysis of Nakhichevan Events Underway

LD0501203690 Moscow TASS in English 2015 GMT
5 Jan 90

[Text] Nakhichevan January 5 TASS—By TASS special correspondent Anatoliy Aladinskiy:

Is it possible to advance towards democracy while breaking law? Can a rule-of-law state be formed, if all the sacred rules and precepts are being violated?

These questions were posed during the analysis of the events that took place in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in the first days of the new year. Party and government bodies and people of the autonomous republic now analyse these events.

The area of the Soviet-Iranian border edging several districts of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic has a ravaged look. Structures, guard towers and security alarms have been smashed....

People in Baku, Nakhichevan, in districts and villages say that the main cause of the disturbances was the fact that questions related to Nagorno-Karabakh and refugees from Armenia remain unsolved.

People held rallies again and again to express the wish for the development of cultural contacts with Iran, ties with relatives across the border, trade with Iran, as well as freer use of border districts as pasture lands and for other agricultural needs.

These wishes, demands and hopes are largely justifiable. A specific discussion showed that they can be granted without special decrees by supreme bodies of state authority. These questions can be decided gradually at the republican or departmental level.

Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Andrey Girenko, chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet Rafik Nishanov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Abdul-Rakhman Vezirov today had a meeting with representatives of party and government bodies, frontier troops, work collectives and leaders of informal organisations from various regions of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic.

This meeting and spontaneous conversations with people in the streets showed convincingly again that there is a need for permanent interested and trusting dialogue between representatives of the authorities and people.

A meeting of party functionaries and economic managers of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic with Girenko, Nishanov and Vezirov took place in Nakhichevan in the evening. The meeting discussed the necessary measures for the normalisation of the situation in the republic's frontier districts.

Nakhichevan Demands 'Largely Justified'

PM0701153390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 6 Jan 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "On Events in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic"]

[Text] Nakhichevan, 5 Jan—Is it possible to advance toward democracy while breaking the law? Is it possible to create a rule-of-law state if all our sacred rules and precepts are being flouted? These questions arose in all their poignancy during the analysis today of the events which took place in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR] in the first days of the new year, in the course of their assessment by party and soviet organs and the public of the autonomous republic.

Frankly speaking, the zone of the USSR state border, or rather its Soviet-Iranian section which skirts a number of rayons of Azerbaijan's Nakhichevan ASSR, presents an unsightly picture. Knocked-down engineering and technical installations, cut wire, disrupted signal and communication lines, burned-down watch-towers....

"For a time the situation was such that we practically lost control on the border," Colonel V. Dyugayev from the Transcaucasian Border District told a TASS correspondent. "People who welcome any destabilization of the situation did not fail to avail themselves of this opportunity."

How was it possible for this to happen? How could people, wanting to do something for the good of the nation, raise their hands against the holy of holies of any state—the border which is created to preserve the interests of that very nation?

"Of course, we older ones find it painful to watch all that has happened," Asad Dzhabbar ogly Aliyev, Meritorious Teacher of the Azerbaijan SSR, said at a meeting of Babekskiy Rayon elders with the personnel of one Nakhichevan border guard detachment post. "But you must understand and forgive people. When passions are running high, people who spent a long time asking for justice to be restored simply lose their tempers."

Everyone you talk to in Baku, Nakhichevan, and the rayons and villages cites the delays in resolving the issues connected with Nagorno-Karabakh and the refugees from Armenia as the main cause of what has happened. Among the key problems which are causing concern among people and make them attend rally after rally is the desire to develop cross-border cultural and family ties and also trade with Iran and to have freer use of the border zone for livestock grazing and other agricultural needs.

The wishes, demands, and hopes expressed were largely justified. And, as emerged in the course of a concrete analysis, entirely feasible without recourse to special resolutions from the country's supreme organs of power, but soluble gradually at republic or departmental level.

The meetings of A.N. Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, and A.Kh. Vezirov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, with representatives of

party and soviet organs, border troops, and labor collectives and leaders of informal organizations held 5 January in various rayons of the Nakhichevan ASSR, and spontaneous conversations with people in the streets showed once again convincingly that what is needed is a constant and committed dialogue, based on trust, between representatives of the authorities and the people. At the root of the current cataclysms which are rocking society, be it in Nakhichevan, or Moldavia, or the Kuzbass, is, as a rule, someone's departmental indifference, red tape, or irresponsibility.

The causes of what has happened are clear, and the problems which gave rise to them will, we hope, be resolved in the near future. However, can they justify the unlawful actions that have been committed? Is it possible to conduct perestroyka in the country or the republic by such extreme measures, ignoring the law? Every inhabitant of the republic must answer these questions today, no matter how difficult that is.

In the evening a meeting between the Nakhichevan ASSR party and economic aktiv and A.N. Girenko, R.N. Nishanov, and A.Kh. Vezirov was held in Nakhichevan, at which the measures necessary to normalize the situation in the republic's border rayons were discussed.

Nishanov Views Nakhichevan Border Problems

PM0701184890 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 7 Jan 90 Second Edition p 6

[TASS correspondent A. Aladinskiy dispatch: "On Events in Nakhichevan. Through Wisdom and Patience"]

[Text] Nakhichevan, Baku—"Sons, we, the elders of this region, ask you to cable your families right away today and tell them that you are in no danger here from anyone or anything. Let what has happened be a bitter memory only for us." With these words Agil Sattar ogly Mekhtiyev, Meritorious Physician of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], as it were summed up a discussion between border guards at one of the border posts and representatives of the Nakhichevan public who had gathered there. Such meetings are currently taking place everywhere, in all the rayons of this autonomous republic.

As reported earlier, A.N. Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, A.Kh. Vezirov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, and other senior CPSU Central Committee officials toured Nakhichevan city and the Ilichevskiy, Dzhulfinskiy, Babekskiy, and Ordubadskiy Rayons of the republic 5 January and visited enterprises, collective farms, and border posts. What are the impressions from these meetings? How do the people with whom they met assess what has happened? Your TASS correspondent put these questions to R.N. Nishanov. This is what he said:

[Nishanov] Traditionally in our country relations between the inhabitants of border villages and settlements and border guards have been good. This also applies to the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR]. Local inhabitants have always assisted in the protection of the border. And in turn, border guards have helped the local population with construction work and other economic problems. And suddenly....

Many of those to whom we talked understand that such actions are intolerable, especially on the border. They condemn violations of the law, no matter what the reasons are. An investigation is under way.

At the same time, to speak of cause and effect, it has to be admitted that problems here have built up over years and even decades. People waited patiently for these problems to be resolved. Unfortunately, there are still too many obsolete instructions in our country. Judge for yourself: In Dzulfinskiy rayon there is a monument to Gyulistan, the national hero. People are drawn to their national heritage, but they run into all kind of formalistic obstacles. Every time they want to visit the memorial, which many consider sacred, they have to apply for a special permit.

Or another example: In another area an old cemetery is located in the border zone. People are forced to go from pillar to post to request permission to visit the graves of relatives or to bury their dead at the cemetery, which is located many kilometers from their homes.

A major problem is the use of the flood-lands of the Araks river which are also located in the border zone. People have raised these questions many times, but to no avail.

Meetings between relatives separated by the border have also grown into a major problem. In order to organize such a meeting cumbersome procedures have to be followed. One woman told us that she spent a month doing the rounds of various institutions before obtaining a pass.

Sad though it is, we have to admit that it has become a rule in our country to adopt necessary decisions to eliminate specific problems only after a conflict situation has arisen. This is felt particularly acutely in interethnic relations. I believe that this is a consequence of the fact that locally, and also at the center, issues which require urgent solutions are discussed at great length, dragging on for months and sometimes years. And forces which stand to gain from destabilization in society frequently plant seeds of lawlessness in this fertile ground. Most unfortunately, ultimately it is the people and their vital interests that suffer. [Nishanov ends]

Here is what I was told at the Azerbaijan Council of Ministers:

"The Council of Ministers has condemned the actions which resulted in crude violations of the USSR Law 'On

the USSR State Border.' The Nakhichevan ASSR Council of Ministers has been instructed, together with organizations which have an interest in this, to examine the demands of the border rayon inhabitants without delay. They must resolve some of the questions themselves, and some of the questions with the assistance of the Azerbaijan SSR Government. The Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry is already examining problems connected with the regulation of reciprocal cross-border visits by relatives living on either side of the border."

A blanket of snow, long expected in these parts, has covered the churned-up border control and tracking strip. Only the grim faces of the border guards and their heightened alertness are reminders of what has happened on the border a few days ago. And possibly the voice of the border post commander as he issues the order—"Take up your posts to defend the USSR state border!"—sounds a bit more hollow as a result of the inordinate tension of the past few days.

Girenko, Nishanov Visit to Nakhichevan Described LD0501220590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1800 GMT on 5 January, in its regular "Vremya" newscast, carries a 4-minute video report by Television Correspondent M. Mamedov from Azerbaijan.

Mamedov begins the report by saying: "Today there is little here which recalls a state border. Tens of kilometers of engineering and technical structures, communications lines, and electronic instruments have been totally destroyed, yet the border troops are continuing to carry out their difficult duty in guarding the state border." The video pans felled barbed wire fences, border guards standing around, and smashed electrical equipment.

V.K. Zhukov, chief of the Nakhichevan border detachment, says in an interview with Mamedov that the situation remains tense with regard to completely guarding the border. Zhukov asserts that, despite press reports, the crowd was not drunk.

Mamedov then says: "Today Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, and Vezirov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party, are in Nakhichevan." The video shows Vazirov, Girenko, and Nishanov walking through a factory together.

At the enterprises which they went to, Mamedov says there was a frank talk on the events which have taken place at Nakhichevan and also on the problems of this autonomous republic. The video shows Girenko talking to a seamstress, Vazirov talking to Girenko and Nishanov, and Girenko talking to a crowd of people with Nishanov watching at his side.

Girenko says: "Now, analyzing these events and trying to sort out what happened—both causes and reasons, where the roots are—we must of course stress that here there is

a whole interwoven bundle of various issues. As regards communication with relatives living beyond the border on Iranian territory, then here, evidently there is one way. This is by negotiations with the Iranian side via the foreign ministries in order to find a way to simplify such contacts. I have just talked to a whole number of people, both on the station square and here at the factory. The majority of people understand that the difficulties which have arisen are difficulties which can and must be overcome, that everyone unanimously, practically everyone, is expressing support for the policy of perestroika, which is being pursued by our party, and supports those practical steps which are being taken during perestroika. This leaves a very pleasant impression. People are convinced and sure that jointly, all together, we will end up adopting the necessary correct decisions which correspond to people's interests."

Volskiy Urges Armenia-Azerbaijan Direct Negotiations

*LD0501121190 Moscow in English to North America
2300 GMT 4 Jan 90*

[Text] Chairman of the special committee for Nagorno-Karabakh, Arkadiy Volskiy, said he does not hope for the speedy solution to the problem of that autonomous region in Transcaucasia, where the conflict continues between Armenians and Azerbaijanians. Hundreds of innocent people have died and over 300,000 have become refugees. In this complicated situation, Volskiy said, Moscow cannot give a helpful recipe. Therefore the two sides should negotiate for a way out.

Groups Gathering in Shusha, Azeri Villages

*NC0501152490 Yerevan International Service
in Armenian 1630 GMT 4 Jan 90*

[Text] The ARMENPRES correspondent in Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, NKAO] reports that the first day of 1990 passed in relative calm and people breathed easily, thanking God for a peaceful celebration of the new year. However, a black cloud descended on Artsakh on 2 January. Five buses full of passengers suddenly appeared in Pavlov Street in broad daylight. A group of Stepanakert youths, hearing that the vehicles came from Agdam and were going to Shusha, wanted to stop and inspect the buses. This led to an incident which ended with bloodshed when the soldiers escorting the buses opened fire for ½ hour. One person was killed and three were seriously wounded.

A representative of the Azerbaijan National Front had declared at the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet session 3 months ago that the Armenians are our enemies and must be eliminated from our path. Today that declaration has become the banner of those who are infected with chauvinistic poison. Not a day goes by without the illegal and [word indistinct] Shusha television broadcasting calls to fight against the Armenians and to uproot the people of Artsakh from their native land.

At a time when the blockade of the oblast is continuing, when Shusha has virtually become the second center of the Azerbaijan National Front after Baku, and when groups wearing militia uniforms are gathering in Shusha and a number of Azerbaijan villages, were there any grounds for believing that hundreds of Azerbaijanis in five buses going from Agdam to Shusha would have been seen off from Stepanakert with good wishes? Would the residents not have demanded that the buses be inspected? We note with amazement and dismay that the commanders deployed in the oblast, and even the new military commandant of the special district, (Yuriy Kosolabov), not only do not usually take the necessary measures against the actions of the Azeri chauvinists and provocateurs, but also at times go along with them or assume a pacifist stance.

Yes, the blockade of Artsakh is compounded by active hostile elements, murder, oppression, and other illegal acts. There is one aim: to force the people of Artsakh to abandon their native hearth, or, at the least, to check the process of reunification with Armenia, the foundation of which was laid by the decision of the joint session of the Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet and NKAO National Council. Such attempts are in vain. The people of Artsakh will never succumb to the barbarians, says the report.

Soviet Azeris Continue 'Peaceful' Gatherings

*LD0801114190 Tehran IRNA in English 0940 GMT
8 Jan 90*

[Text] Jolfa, W. Azerbaijan Prov., Jan. 8, IRNA—Some 300 Soviet Azeris held a peaceful gathering in front of Sanam-Boulaghi region, on the other side of the Aras (Araks) border River despite intensive cold Sunday, chanting "Allah-U-Akbar" (God is the Greatest) and sending messages in Azeri to their relatives in Iran.

Meanwhile head of the border guards of the Nakhichevan region and a group of his colleagues in military uniforms watched the four-hour peaceful gathering of the Muslim Soviet Azeris.

There were women and children among the demonstrators who were walking along the river and splashing the water as a sign of victory and joy.

A Soviet cargo train passing the region stopped and blew its horn for five minutes, pledging solidarity with the crowd.

The mild attitude of Soviet border guards towards tearing down of border installations in the northern Aras river, taking place after 70 years of restrictions by the former Soviet Administration including a ban to approach the river banks, as well as the possibility for the Soviet Muslims to communicate with Iranian Azeris, have been effective in checking the overexcitement of the Muslim Soviet Azeris.

The slogans the Soviet Azeris chanted Sunday included: "God's blood is in our vein, nothing can prevent us from gathering along the Aras River", "we fear no one, no one can prevent our gathering", and "we are Muslims and want to have contact with other Muslims".

They also addressed the Iranian border guards and said: "Tell your people to come along the Aras River. May God bless (Imam) Khomeyni".

The demonstrators had hired more than 30 heavy vehicles, mostly belonging to the public sector services as well as some 20 private cars, to come to the snow-covered area in a temperature of 10 degrees below zero centigrade.

In another development 12 Soviet Muslim Azeris swam across the border river Aras to the Iranian side of the river bank some landing in the border town of Jolfa and others in Poldasht during the past few days and were warmly received by the Iranians this side of the river bank who welcomed them by the shouts of "Allah-U-Akbar".

The river has formed a natural boundary between the Azerbaijan province of Iran and the Soviet Union since 1828.

Five of the group who had arrived in Poldasht stayed with their relatives and friends for three days, two of them jumped into the same river Sunday to swim back to the Soviet side of the river bank as they were cheered by a group of about 200 people from the town of Nakhichevan across the river. The other three decided to postpone their swim-back across the river due to very cold weather.

Local officials in Poldasht told the Soviet Azeris that they would make an effort to facilitate the trip to this side of the border of the Soviet nationals by official means and within the framework of cultural and economic agreements between the two countries.

Iranian Azeris, the common designation for native Iranians of East and West Azerbaijan, the two northernmost provinces of Iran neighboring the Soviet Republic of Armenia and Azerbaijan, have expressed pleasure at the Soviet easing of hitherto tight security regulations for preventing unauthorized border crossing to Iran.

2 Soviet Youths Swim Border

LD0601201390 Tehran IRNA in English 1825 GMT
6 Jan 90

[Text] Pol Dasht, Azarbayjan-e Bakhtari Prov., Jan 6, IRNA—Two persons from Shakhtakhty, a small border town in Azerbaijan of the Soviet Union swam across the border river Aras (Araks) to the Iranian side of the river braving the cold weather and were warmly received by local people on the Iranian bank of the river Friday.

The river forms a natural border between Azarbayjan Province of Iran and a Soviet republic of the same name

with a predominantly Muslim population part of which Iran ceded to the Czarist Russia in 1813 and again in the wake of a Soviet invasion of Iran in 1828 making the River Aras (Araks) the border between Iran and Soviet Union.

The people of Azarbayjan Province of Iran and its corresponding Soviet republic speak the same language and share the same religion and culture.

As the two youths arrived this side of the river bank the Iranians this side of the border were bidding godspeed to another young Soviet named Panah [name as received] preparing to swim back home across the same river.

Meanwhile, a group of Muslims from Pol Dasht and several other border spots of the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan gathered at the northern bank of the Aras River Friday and backed unity of the Muslims by chanting 'Allah-U-Akbar (God is the Greatest)' and other Islamic slogans.

During the demonstration, held despite intensive cold weather, the Muslims hailed the status of the leader of the Islamic Revolution Imam Khomeyni. A group of hijab-wearing women also participated in the demonstration.

Meanwhile, chief of the Soviet border officers in Azerbaijan region told Baku television that border obstacles would be removed in order that regional people could have 'easier access' to the Aras River.

Speaking to the demonstrators one of the Muslims called for the removal of the barbed wires between the two countries, as well as for political, economic and cultural links with the Iranian Muslims.

The unrest in the Soviet border is likely to subside due to the heavy storm and increasing cold of the regional weather.

Exchange Islamic Slogans

LD0701183490 Tehran IRNA in English 1707 GMT
7 Jan 90

[Text] Jolfa, Azarbayjan-e Bakhtari Prov., Jan. 7, IRNA—Some 1,000 Muslims of the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan gathered on the northern bank of the Aras River for two hours today and continued chanting Islamic slogans.

Iranian border residents also gathered on the southern bank of the river and responded to the enthusiasm of the Soviet Muslims.

During the gathering Majlis (parliament) deputy from the northwestern city of Marand Karim Shafe'i told the Soviet Muslims through a loudspeaker that Iranian people want to have relations with them within the regulations.

He called on the Soviet Muslims to safeguard the security of the border lines.

He said gathering along the Aras River would be fruitless and that Soviet Muslims can talk to their officials to prepare the grounds for their visit to Iran.

Border officers of the two countries were present during the gathering.

A similar gathering was also held in Siyakh-Rud region of Jolfa this afternoon.

Azerbaijan Raykom First Secretaries Replaced

NC0601182190 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
0440 GMT 6 Jan 90

[From Republican Press Review]

[Text] The Pushkinskiy Rayon Party Committee [raykom] has held a plenum to examine organizational matters. The plenum relieved Zeynalov of his responsibilities as raykom first secretary because of his appointment to other work within the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee apparatus. The plenum thanked Zeynalov for his fruitful work in the rayon party organization. The plenum elected Khamiyatov, chairman of the rayon people's control committee, first secretary of Pushkinskiy Raykom by secret ballot.

The Agdamski Raykom also held a plenum to examine organizational matters. Kuliyeu was relieved of his responsibilities as raykom first secretary because of his appointment to another post. The plenum elected Verdiyev, chairman of the people's deputies soviet executive committee of Agdamski Rayon, first secretary of Agdamski Raykom by secret ballot.

The Aksuski Raykom also examined organizational matters at a plenum. (?Bakhtirov) was relieved of his responsibilities as raykom first secretary because of his appointment to another post. Four candidates were proposed as the new raykom first secretary: Mirzaliyev, secretary of the raykom; Nabiyeu, chairman of the Aksuski Rayon Soviet Executive Committee; Mamedov, chief of the Aksuski Rayon Organizational Party Work Department; and Mamedov [as heard], director of the Nizami collective farm. Mamedov, chief of the Aksuski Rayon Organizational Party Work Department, was unanimously elected raykom first secretary by secret ballot.

Nakhichevan First Secretary Reportedly Ousted

LD0601090290 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian
0230 GMT 6 Jan 90

[Text] Following recent events in Soviet Azerbaijan, the Nakhichevan Communist Party's head was sacked. According to the Central News Unit report from London, the reason for the sacking of Nakhichevan's Communist Party head has been announced as sickness, but according to the party's spokesman, the real reason is the current unrest in Soviet Azerbaijan.

According to the same report, since yesterday morning the entrance of foreigners, in particular reporters, to Baku, the center of Soviet Azerbaijan, has been prohibited.

Baku Reports Mutalibov's Arrival in Turkey

NC0601165990 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
0440 GMT 6 Jan 90

[From Republican Press Review]

[Text] Newspapers today carry front-page reports on the arrival of a delegation from the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] in Turkey. Correspondent Dzhikhangirov reports that the delegation headed by Ayaz Mutalibov, chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers Presidium, is visiting Turkey at the invitation of Finance and Customs Minister Ekrem Pakdemirli.

After warmly welcoming the delegation, Ekrem Pakdemirli said that the visit will be fruitful and contribute toward establishing continuous relations with the Azerbaijan SSR.

In a statement to the press, Mutalibov said that the establishment of uninterrupted trade, economic, scientific, and cultural relations between Turkey and the Azerbaijan SSR will contribute to the further broadening and deepening of Turkish-Soviet bilateral relations.

Meets With Yilmaz

NC0701120790 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
0440 GMT 7 Jan 90

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] KOMMUNIST reports that Ayaz Mutalibov, chairman of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers Presidium, held talks with Mesut Yilmaz, the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, in Istanbul on 6 January. The two parties noted during their meeting that the reconstruction process in the Soviet Union and the new political way of thinking of the Soviet leaders in the foreign affairs domain constitute an important basis for enhancing peace and improving fruitful international cooperation.

The improvement of mutual relations between the Azerbaijan SSR and Turkey were examined in an advanced and businesslike atmosphere. The meeting was also attended by the members of the government delegation from the Azerbaijan SSR, USSR ambassador in Turkey Albert Chernychev, a number of deputies of the Turkish Parliament, and other officials. Yilmaz and Mutalibov addressed a morning [word indistinct] which the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave in honor of the guests.

Baku's Shaumyan District Renamed

NC0601165890 Baku Domestic Service in Armenian
0440 GMT 6 Jan 90

[From Republican Press Review]

[Text] The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium has examined the (?suggestion) put forward by the Baku City people's deputies soviet executive committee and changed the name of Baku's Shaumyan district to Khataya district. The Supreme Soviet's decree on the change was published in today's newspapers.

Baku Reports Approval of State Plan, Budget

NC0301122490 *Baku Domestic Service in Azeri*
0440 GMT 3 Jan 90

[From Republican Press Review]

[Text] The documents [senedler] of the 11th session of the 11th convocation of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet are published in today's newspapers.

The decision adopted on the state plan for Azerbaijan SSR's economic and social development in 1990 states that the realization of the plan for 1990 should be an important step for the fulfillment of the decision adopted by the congress of the USSR people's and foreign policies and prevent an increase in the negative trends in the economic field.

The Supreme Soviet decided that the state plan for economic and social development in 1990, which has been drawn up by the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers, be approved in the light of the proposals put forward by the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Plan and Budget Commission and by the other permanent commissions.

The newspapers also published the decision adopted by the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet to approve the way the state plan for Azerbaijan SSR's economic and social development in 1989 is being realized.

The 11th session of the 11th convocation of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet also passed a law on the republic's state budget for 1990. The law, which was published in the newspapers today, says that the realization of Azerbaijan SSR's state budget for 1990 must provide for the fulfillment of the decisions adopted by the congress of the USSR people's deputies on the main directions of the Soviet Union's domestic and foreign policies, the fulfillment of the decisions adopted by the extraordinary 10th session of the 11th convocation of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, and the stabilization of the republic's financial situation.

The Supreme Soviet established the (?overall) state budget for 1990 at R4,121,712,000 [words indistinct].

Today's newspapers also published the decision adopted by the Supreme Soviet for the approval of the report on the realization of the Azerbaijan SSR state budget for 1988.

Nagorno Commission Chairman Profiled

LD0501130890 *Moscow Tass in English* 1240 GMT
5 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 5 TASS - Vladimir Foteyev, 54, was endorsed by the presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet as chairman of the Union Control and Observation Commission on the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region.

Foteyev, who is an aircraft-building engineer, started work at one of the factories in Kuibyshev, the middle Volga, in 1958. From 1963 to mid-1989 he held various posts in the party. He served as the first secretary of the Checheno-Ingush Regional Party Committee during the past few years. He was elected a member of the Central Committee at the 27th CPSU Congress in 1986.

Last year he was elected USSR people's deputy. The first Congress of USSR People's Deputies elected him a member of the Supreme Soviet, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Glasnost, Rights and Public Grievances. He serves in the same capacity on the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

The USSR Supreme Soviet decided to set up the Union Control and Observation Commission on Nagorno-Karabakh last November. It is directly subordinate to the country's parliament. Its functions include control and assistance in carrying out measures to stabilize the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, where extreme inter-ethnic tensions have been running high for too long a time. The commission has under its authority interior troops of the USSR Interior Ministry. The Supreme Soviet deemed it inexpedient to retain the special regional administration that had been in place since January 1989 and restored the activity of elected bodies of local power—the Soviet of People's Deputies of Nagorno-Karabakh and its executive committee.

Georgian Deputy Premier Appointed

NC0501130190 *Tbilisi Domestic Service in Russian*
1430 GMT 4 Jan 90

[Text] A decree issued by the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium appoints comrade Beglar Dmitriyevich Makharashvili as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Georgian SSR.

Elections Under Way in Turkmenia

LD0801040990 *Moscow Domestic Service in Russian*
0000 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Elections are under way in Turkmenia. Their distinguishing feature is the choice of candidates: 526 people are making contending for the 175 places in the republic's Supreme Soviet. In 125 constituencies, moreover, from three to ten candidates are being balloted. The greater part of them are workers and collective

farmers, with quite a few representatives of the intelligentsia. There are members of cooperatives and members of staff of the bodies of law and order and religious and party figures. More than 70 percent of all those nominated are communists.

Kazakhstan Central Committee Plenum Opens 5 Jan

*LD0501120790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1100 GMT 5 Jan 90*

[Text] A plenum of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee began its work in Alma-Ata today. The agenda includes several issues, but the main issue to be discussed is the forthcoming elections.

Discusses Separatist Decisions

*LD0501150490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1300 GMT 5 Jan 90*

[Text] A plenum of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee took place today. Readiness to actively confront attempts to undermine the unity of the CPSU and to separate it into national compartments was expressed. Participants stressed that separatist decisions are fraught with serious losses for perestroika and for the processes being conducted by the party; courage in admitting to mistakes which have been committed should not be transformed among communists into some morbid guilt complex. It is through unification, not separation, that the Kazakhstan residents seek to surmount the economic, political, social and interethnic problems, which have accumulated. In linking great hopes with the extension of the republics' rights to independently manage their economies they intend to strive not just for their own good, but also for benefit for the whole socialist federation.

The matter of the submission of candidates for Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic people's deputies from the Kazakhstan Communist Party in accordance with the law on elections adopted in the republic, was discussed. A list of 26 candidates, formed from 2,464 candidatures proposed by party organizations, was approved. The election of 17 deputies will be conducted at a plenum of the Central Committee on 16 March.

Nazarbayev, first secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee, spoke at the plenum.

Appoints Official; Ends Work

*LD0501170590 Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Kazakh
1500 GMT 5 Jan 90*

[Excerpts] An information report on a plenum of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee: The 18th plenum of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee was held on 5 January 1990. The plenum examined matters on the submission of candidates for Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] People's deputies from the Communist Party of Kazakhstan; on setting dates for elections of Kazakh SSR people's

deputies from the Communist Party of Kazakhstan; and on progress in implementing the resolutions on providing people with foodstuffs adopted at the fourth, sixth, and 13th plenums of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee.

A report on the first two issues of the agenda was delivered by Nursultan Abish-ogly Nazarbayev, first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee. [passage omitted—other speakers]

The plenum examined an organizational issue. The plenum approved Comrade Abdikarimov as head of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee Organizational Party and Cadre Work Department. Thereupon the plenum ended its work.

Kazakhs Publish Lists of Rehabilitated Persons

*LD0501152890 Moscow TASS in English 1508 GMT
5 Jan 90*

[Text] Alma-Ata January 5 TASS—By TASS Correspondent Raisa Ioffe:

Regional newspapers of Soviet Kazakhstan have begun to publish lists of rehabilitated persons that were convicted in the 1930s, 1940s and early in the 1950s on political charges, according to a decision made by the Alma-Ata regional committee of the Kazakh Communist Party.

Head of the Alma-Ata branch of the Kazakh State Security Committee Department Anatoliy Stroikin said that rehabilitation and the revocation of decisions made by non-court bodies—the so-called "three-judge panels" and "special sessions"—have been practically completed.

The branch considered 1,271 criminal cases and rehabilitated 1,293 residents of the Alma-Ata region, which previously included some neighbouring areas.

He noted that the overwhelming majority of the repressed were charged with disseminating propaganda that called to overthrow, undermine or weaken the Soviet power.

The charges were substantiated by showing dissatisfaction with living conditions, disagreement with the governmental policy of collective farms and sympathy with prominent party figures and officials who had been proclaimed "enemies of the people."

The indictments did not contain any factual evidence of guilt but predetermined the verdicts of the "special sessions."

"It was established that all these cases were falsified and were carried out with gross violations of socialist legality. The decisions of the 'three-judge panels' and 'special sessions' were revoked," he said.

Moscow Radio Describes New RSFSR Program

LD0701161990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0500 GMT on 7 January broadcasts the following:

"Today central television begins transmission of a new Sovetskaya Rossiya channel. Comrade Vorotnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, will address the viewers. He will congratulate everyone watching the new program today on this long awaited and big event in the political and cultural life of the republic.

"The first edition of the new television channel will commence at 1430 [1130 GMT] on the second All-Union program. The program is not very long today—only 2 and ½ hours. SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA newspaper contains details of the program's schedule: USSR Peoples' Deputies from Chechen-Ingush ASSR, Chuvash ASSR, Leningrad, and Nizhny Tagil will take part in the program. Undoubtedly, 'Monologue of Russia' by people's artist Ilya Glazunov will arouse interest as well. He is drawing attention to the fact that the spiritual potential of the Russian people is indeed inexhaustible.

"Revival of the national spirit is the task that art and culture personalities in the RSFSR are called upon to resolve. Customs, traditions, and ceremonies of the Russian people, which are associated with the new year festivities, are the topic of 'Yantar [Amber] in Koloman-skoye.' The program will also tell us about the first All-Russian amateur film festival that took place in Volgogradsk.

"That's what the premiere will be like, and subsequent editions are already being prepared. In the future it is planned to extend the television program to a 4-hour daily edition. It will contain news, telebridges, stories on science achievements, and feature and educational programs."

Vorotnikov Opens Program

LD0701172190 Moscow TASS in English 1704 GMT
7 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 7 TASS—A new television programme was launched today on Channel Two of Soviet National Television—"Soviet Russia Goes on the Air". It was introduced by President Vitaliy Vorotnikov of the Russian Federation. [RSFSR].

He described the start of the new television channel as "a big event in the republic's political and cultural life".

Another omission in inter-ethnic relations has been rectified—the largest Soviet republic, with nearly half of the country's population and 50 per cent of the country's economic potential, has had no television channel of its own. Soon Russia will have other mass media at its disposal too. This will enable a more extensive coverage of the life of its numerous nationalities and ethnic

groups, and a better reflection of perestroika issues, including preparations for the transition of Russia's economy to independence from 1991.

The nature of the new channel was illustrated by the its first programme on the air. January 7 is Christmas Day in Russia and the programme included a colourful report on ancient customs, traditions and rituals connected with the celebrations.

People's deputies told viewers about their concepts of Russia's future. Historians presented Russian maps and atlases from the 16th century up to date. Painter Ilya Glazunov, whose pictures often depict episodes from Russian history, spoke about the Russian people's spiritual potential and the need to revive its national spirit.

The programme included polemics and critical remarks, especially during the discussion of the preparation for the elections to the republican parliament and local soviets.

The first programmes are planned to last two and a half hours, but the Chief Directorate for Television Programmes for the Russian Federation, specially established recently, hopes to produce 4-hour daily programmes soon. They will include news, reports, television bridges, stories about scientific achievements, educational and artistic shows.

President Vitaliy Vorotnikov told viewers in his opening address that the new channel will cover the activity of the recently established Russian Bureau of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and its direct links with party organisations in territories, regions and autonomous republics of Russia.

The television channel will report on the bureau's meetings and decisions.

Leningrad Informals on Political Situation

90UN0409A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA
PANORAMA in Russian No 11, Nov 89 pp 4-6

[Leningrad public organization representatives answer journal's questions: "Positions and Prospects"]

[Text] The LENINGRADSKAYA PANORAMA editors endeavor to familiarize their readers regularly with the positions, opinions, and views of the people's deputies and candidates for people's deputy. As the elections to the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and the local soviets approach, the further development of the pluralism of opinions and the consolidation of public forces in various formal and informal associations insistently demand a serious study of the processes occurring in the public consciousness. Today we make space for the city's public associations which have manifested the greatest social activity, whose representatives the editors asked to answer a number of questions brought about by the present state of the social situation.

1. A multiparty system—is it practicable from the social, ideological, and legal aspects under today's conditions?

2. How to ensure the people's true influence on the processes occurring in the country?

3. Do you consider necessary the formation at the Second Congress of People's Deputies and in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the RSFSR and also at the Leningrad City Soviet level of various organizationally structured factions at the present time?

4. Does the current development of perestroika ensure the rights and possibilities of Leningraders and inhabitants of the RSFSR in the realization of regional economic accountability compared with the Baltic republics? What are your proposals in this area.

5. Will the work-force councils be capable of securing the workers' rights—will not group egotism prevail over the broader interests of the city, the region, and the republic?

6. Your thoughts on the policy of pricing, incomes and financial regulation of the level of consumption?

7. What part is the CPSU playing at the present stage of perestroika and what part will it play in the future?

8. Is it possible while remaining within the framework of Marxism-Leninism to formulate a concept of the desired future society conforming to modern ideas? Does the concept created 150 years ago correspond to the present level of science, technology, and social consciousness?

9. Your ideas about the urgent tasks confronting the country today and the ways of tackling them?

10. Your attitude toward other formal and informal associations. Your allies and opponents.

Marina Yevgenyevna Salye, member of the Board and Coordinating Council of the Leningrad People's Front:

1. I believe that it is realistic inasmuch as it is in fact emerging. We cannot as yet, of course, speak of large truly structured parties but the existing movements are merely by virtue of their heterogeneity expressing different interests. Parties also may subsequently grow out of them, from the people's fronts specifically.

Concerning the legal base, it is essential to strive for the repeal of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution and the enshrinement of the equality of all public organizations. Unless the communists themselves uphold this position, they will never head the process of perestroika, more, the CPSU could vanish from the pages of history.

2. Only by means of an expansion of the activity of the mass democratic movements because otherwise everything will develop in very a protracted and contradictory manner. I believe that the Leningrad People's Front is currently the sole organization that is practically opposed to the apparatus. But nor does the Leningrad People's Front have that much strength as yet, and for

this reason the main task now is getting as many genuinely democratic candidates elected as possible.

3. Undoubtedly, yes. Because if we are speaking of democracy, it is simply impossible without factions since without the diversity of opinions and groups and without legal safeguards for the expression of these opinions democracy becomes a hollow sound. In particular, there are both radicals and a center in the Inter-Regional Group of deputies, which is apparent even now. And the position of the center is very dangerous: What is to be feared now is not action but inaction.

4. We are in this respect practically at zero. Only the first steps are being taken here. The Leningrad People's Front will put forward its concept of regional economic accountability, not produced in dilettante fashion, what is more, but at the level of economists—the specialists on this issue. This concept is being currently elaborated. It should be practicable and constructive and drawn up not only in general but in detail also.

5. It is not, I believe, a question of group egotism. It is a question of something else: Were the workers to be afforded the freedom to nominate candidates, there would be more workers among the congress deputies also. So the problem lies elsewhere—at the enterprises the workers are fettered by a multitude of shackles. They are very dependent on both the party and the trade union organizations, on the work-force councils and on management in the purely material plane—money, living space, and so forth. I am sure that our workers, except for the elite, understand full well the overall mood in the country and share the concerns of the whole people. I do not believe that we have purely specific "workers' interests" here—the problems confronting the country are of a general nature. It is these interests which are today at the forefront, and other interests will be defined against their background. The proposals of the OFT [United Workers Front] concerning the elections of deputies per production okrugs, although not contrary to the USSR Constitution, would in fact fetter the initiative of those same workers.

6. It is difficult for me to answer this question, I am not a specialist in economics. But the main thing here is, of course, a change in the forms of ownership and the creation of a multistructure economy, and everything else is more or less secondary. Of course, any control of prices "from above" is impossible and harmful, and as far, however, as financial reform is concerned, about which much is being said, I may say that it is possible, but not now but after a certain period of time.

Were financial reform to be implemented now, I fear that absolutely everything would, upon its announcement, vanish from the stores, as was the case in 1947—I remember this well, even though I was still young.

7. The party as such is, on the whole, performing the same role as the people—there are various currents therein, but the party masses are not yet exerting great influence on the apparatus. Here in Leningrad, the

change of first secretary of the oblast party committee occurred in accordance with instructions from above. And as far as the role of the party apparatus, of what is now called the "partocracy," is concerned, it is undoubtedly negative. It has become trite saying that the processes of democratization in the party lag behind the democratization of society, but this is not, in my view, fortuitous. I believe that the party will be unable to restructure itself. The division of the CPSU in the form in which it exists today and the elimination of its "monolithic character" are a necessity, more so in that this monolithic character is only apparent. Otherwise it is hard to believe that the party will really be capable of marching in the vanguard of perestroika.

8. The newspaper of the Turbine Blade Plant, SLAVA TRUDU, published the theses of the Leningrad Gorkom [City Party Committee] for the upcoming Leningrad party conference (this was the sole paper to publish them—no one else any longer dared do so). So, to be blunt, astounding definitions were given there. For example, it was written that socialism is a humane society. I immediately ask myself: Is the society in Sweden, say, not humane? And there are many such things in these theses.

I believe that a split will occur in the attempts to define such key concepts. Marxism-Leninism needs to be approached as it itself demands—dialectically. K. Marx's teaching on surplus value undoubtedly requires radical reassessment and reinterpretation—it is far removed from today's ideas.

Developing throughout recent decades, capitalism has taken into account much of what has been offered by the socialists and communists. Specifically, the program of production planning, but has adopted these principles within reasonable limits—this has been particularly noticeable since the war. And Japan, say, has adopted our brigade contract, and with them it is producing excellent results, what is more, but with us.... [sentence as published] It is all a matter of property relationships, but the party apparatus is unwilling to change them because for it the current situation and its preservation are the sole method of retaining power.

9. This is essentially a continuation of the previous question. Inasmuch as it is a question of forms of ownership, this is a question about power inasmuch as a change in the first is impossible without a change in the structure of power. The edict on leasing which has been issued is absolutely useless because it implies sale to the people of their property. If it is said: The factories to the workers, they should be given to the workers, and let that be the end of the matter. It is essential to firmly enshrine in the USSR Constitution the fact that all property located on the territory of the soviets (except for a very small number of enterprises of all-state significance and jurisdiction) should belong to the soviets, and no one else—and the soviets will lease it. I am not against private property but this question needs further discussion by specialists.

10. Our friends are Memorial and such informal associations as the Perestroika Club, Vakhta Mira and the Friends of OGONEK Club. We absolutely do not share the positions of Pamyat and Fatherland. In general, we have little in common with the OFT, although we are seeking ways of cooperating with this organization.

Mikhail Vasilyevich Popov, member of the coordinating council of the United Workers Front:

1. There already is a multiparty system with us at this time. The DS [Democratic Union], for instance—they have an organization, a program, a system of party training even. True, the numbers are small, but this is, after all, only the beginning, nor is it known what kind of numbers a party should have. Who supports the DS? I myself have seen at a mass meeting a touching alliance between the DS and the People's Front. We have the feeling that we are faced with a complex formation: The DS speaks openly about its antisocialist program, then comes a broader organization—the People's Front—whose members, according to them, do not use the word "socialism" since they do not know what this is, and, finally, a nonparty organization—an association of the electorate which gravitates toward the first two—is emerging. I am for a multiparty system if, say, there are to be several workers parties, but the intention here is the creation in fact of bourgeois parties and a revival of capitalism and private ownership. Under these political conditions the multiparty system slogan performs a negative role. As far as Article 6 of the USSR Constitution is concerned, it should be changed: The CPSU does not now express the interests of the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia, and for this reason does not have a right to the leading role.

2. It is necessary for this to elect enterprise deputies by general, direct, and secret ballot. The deputies will then represent organized outfits, and not a crowd. But there are many people who would like the deputies to express the interests and sentiments of the crowd or petty bourgeois anarchy.

Should management exert pressure on the candidates, we advocate the registration of all candidates, and given a secret ballot, the candidate "of management" would not get elected. The main task of the deputies elected in this way would be to monitor where and how the resources released upward by the enterprises are spent. Only such deputies, with an interest in their work, could practicably ensure the people's supervision of the processes occurring in the country and they would also enlist in the work representatives of the intelligentsia who really express the people's interests inasmuch as the working class without the intelligentsia could alone achieve nothing worthwhile. The organizational form for such an alliance already exists—the OFT, both the Leningrad OFT and the all-union OFT which has now been formed.

3. Yes, it is possible. Currently we see that some deputies are occupying no position. Unification around particular

programs will help reveal the actual alignment of forces. Polarization is occurring within the party also—Bolshevik and Menshevik wings are separating out therein, I would say.

4. I believe that what is called the regional economic accountability of the Baltic republics is a screen concealing aspirations to economic separation from the USSR, which is impossible without the seizure and actual appropriation of all that has been created by the labor of all our country's working people on the territory of the Baltic republics. If we take this route, we will essentially be doing away with all the advantages of public ownership and will not be gaining any because the progressive trends of the development of the capitalist society are geared precisely to the socialization of the means of production. We should not be breaking things down into tiny private stores which would subsequently be amalgamated in a monopoly but rather use the state monopoly for the good of the people and putting it under the supervision of all the working people—I have already mentioned this. Currently shadowy forces are endeavoring to distance from power the enterprise outfits—the sole force capable of resisting them—in order to establish their diktat. Our proposal is putting a plan-based organized economy under the supervision of the working people.

5. Group egotism is engendered and maintained by the economic system which has existed in our country since 1961—when the principal indicator of economic efficiency became the profit of the individual enterprise, which thereby came to counterpose itself to others, and not satisfy public needs. The enterprises and cooperatives which are not engaged in serious production, which do not need the investment therein of large resources with a slow return time, benefit here. The state thereby actually legitimizes buying up for resale and profiteering and is itself at best a form of racketeer who with the aid of enormous taxes robs the cooperative worker, but thereby legitimizes what is left at his disposal. If someone makes R3 million, R1.5 million is taken away from him, but R1.5 million will be legalized. The workers must take the business of supervision into their own hands.

6. The system of financial violations has assumed gigantic proportions right now, and we should be writing off nothing to the past. The root thereof lies in the orientation toward profit. Profit needs to be removed from the number of fund-forming indicators altogether. It would in itself remain, but would not then influence anything. A bonus should be paid for a reduction in the cost of a product, and this should be done by the enterprise itself. An entire social stratum of people living more free and easy than has ever been the case in our country's history has taken shape in our country with the aid of unearned income. The current Cooperative System Act is essentially a law legalizing unearned income. Under the present system people are afforded an opportunity to work, but are not afforded an opportunity to monitor where the fruit of their labor goes.

7. The CPSU today is in political crisis. It has lost its bearings and lost its political character. Having been proclaimed, contrary, I would say, to the decisions of the 27th congress, the proposition concerning perestroika—a restructuring in no direction (nothing was said about the goals of perestroika)—the CPSU, in the person of its leaders, has disoriented the communists, and for this reason the party is today an organization all of whose members are dispersing in various directions. Whence the decline in the authority of the party, which has detached itself from the people and is failing to perceive their interests. Making a judgment about the future is difficult—the CPSU will either really express the interests of the working class or, if it leaves this path, it will undoubtedly lose the role of governing party and will disintegrate as a party altogether.

8. Of course, only within a framework of Marxism-Leninism is this possible. However, there remain in our personnel system very few people who have assimilated Marxism-Leninism. Socialism was seen by its founders not as a condition but as a movement, as struggle. This idea has been lost both in the ranks of social scientists and in the party. Our aim is clear: We wish to do away with social inequality. The process now has gone into reverse—social inequality in our country is increasing, we have now already entered the transition period and are heading toward capitalism.

9. The first task is establishment of the power of the working people. Today, when our official authorities are inactive and indulging all the mafia forces, it is essential for the working people to organize, establish their power, and organize squads for upholding public order. Neither at the Congress nor in the Supreme Soviet do I see any forces which could lead us out of the crisis situation—these places are talking-shops, and people have already had enough of it. It is essential to elect active, concerned people who can really defend the working people's interests—and not in the elective bodies—and who are capable of creating their own public body which would monitor all actions of the authorities. A situation similar to that which prevailed in 1917—when the decisions of the Provisional Government were fulfilled only following the establishment of the soviets—cannot be ruled out. I advocate the creation of primary cells of soviet power, which are lacking currently. The second task is ensuring material interest at work. For this it is necessary to have a greater amount of free time thanks to increased productivity, which was the case here until 1961. This is not the case now since a substantial part of the manufactured product goes to keep people whose activity no one needs. I am a supporter of monetary reform, which would at least reduce the amount of unearned income. It would then be necessary to put the cooperatives and the state enterprises on an equal footing.

10. We are presenting a clear program for securing the working people's interests, and from this viewpoint the People's Front seems to us to be an organization wittingly or unwittingly expressing the demands of various pseudo-cooperative workers. I would distinguish among

our allies such an association as Fatherland. Any patriotic association, if it is not chauvinistic and if it adheres to the principles of proletarian internationalism, is our ally. I have also been struck by the fact that the People's Front is so active in its opposition to the principles of patriotism. On many important questions People's Front documents say absolutely nothing, which forces one to wonder whether or not this organization has a false bottom, although there are many incidental people there, of course.

Vyacheslav Fedorovich Ryabov, chairman of the central council of the Leningrad Fatherland Russian patriotic movement:

1. The multiparty system which is being offered us today by supporters of the DS and the Leningrad People's Front is unwarranted and unrealistic for their versions are based on the experience of countries which differ sharply both geographically and socially from our country. Effecting such a mechanical transfer without consideration of the people's national experience is impossible.

The measures proposed by the supporters of a multiparty system (increased prices, the "introduction" of unemployment, the sale of land and so forth) are aimed at turning our country into a colony, which has already been openly declared on television. We can support the groupings which are for the integrity of the state and its prosperity and for restoration of the status of the indigenous population of Russia, which is demeaned currently. But such parties will greatly resemble one another. Consequently, there is once again no need for a multiparty system. We are opposed to it.

2. The real influence of the people on the processes occurring in the country may be ensured only when there is a break with the system whereby narrow clan groupings have an opportunity to speak on behalf of the people. This applies primarily to the social groups which are far removed from the interests of the people. To rectify this situation it is necessary, first, to remove the possibility of the nomination of candidates from these groups until their interests have been brought into line with the interests of the region's multinational population. Second, it is essential to admit the people to the mass media, freeing them from the influence of pernicious cliquism. Third, it is essential on all the most important questions to conduct nation-wide referenda. Fourth, to put under nation-wide supervision the process of the formation and functioning of the mechanism of state power, which should in essence, and not formally, reflect and express the people's cherished aspirations. We need for this direct elections not only the group of deputies but also the main leaders of the machinery of the local and republic ispolkoms [executive committees]. In addition, the ispolkom sectoral administrations should be formed by the pertinent standing deputy commissions. Subsequently it will be necessary to legislatively secure the electorate's full knowledgeability of

the activity not only of the deputies but of the entire machinery of administration also.

3. I consider the formation of factions realistic. Even if, first, a diversity of opinion predominates, truth is born in argument. Second, the true colors of each deputy will be displayed clearly, and the electorate will see in practice to which god it is praying. So I am for factions for the purpose of ascertaining the deputies' true political colors.

4. No, it does not, even less in Leningrad—an industrial center in which there are many unique works of central jurisdiction. Leningrad should not and may not, of course, permit itself to put local interests higher than state interests, as is being done in Estonia. We are not indifferent to the fate of the state but nor should it be forgotten that the interests of the RSFSR should not constantly be infringed upon to the "benefit" of other regions by means of financial aid and subsidies. For example, Leningrad's contribution to the union "purse" is many times greater than the present beggarly budget for the development of the region.

5. No, some will certainly not be able to, particularly at first. Economic and legal mechanisms of mutual regulation ensuring interest and responsibility are needed. We need to interest people in what is needed by others and demand accountability for the disruption of supplies.

6. Present policy in this sphere is of a secretive nature and is utterly incomprehensible to the people and should be changed in the spirit of glasnost. The "projects" of Abalkin, Aganbegyan, Bunich, Zaslavskaya, and others have brought us to where we are now. Abalkin is already calling for a retreat—to strict planning. The position of M.Ya. Lemeshev and M.F. Antonov is closer to us.

Common sense suggests that people who have already compromised themselves by their former plans cannot head the process of economic restructuring. The elementary standards of decency call upon us to listen to the opposite side also, but once again a monopolism brooking no objections triumphs on these issues with us, as on many others!

7. Perestroyka began on the initiative of the CPSU leadership, but the party itself proved unready for it and in the course of perestroyka ceded the initiative to clan groupings....

If the party wishes to preserve the role of leading force in society, more vigorous restructuring in the ranks of the party itself, which needs to purge its ranks from top to bottom and bar the way into the party of opportunists and political rogues, is essential.

8. It is necessary to specify right away what is meant by the "framework" of Marxism. If it is a question of world outlook, dialectical and historical materialism is an undoubted conquest of philosophical thought. The trouble is that dialectics have never been held in esteem in our country—this applies to both the socioeconomic

and spiritual processes of our society, the building of which was usurped here by semiliterate volunteers. To what this has led may now be observed distinctly and clearly.

If, however, the "framework" of Marxism implies the revolutionary ideas born in the middle of the last century (in the works of Russian philosophers and thinkers included), it would be naive to consider these ideas eternal verities. Any idea is a product of its era. We, however, have in our policy and economics abided not by the dialectics of development but the metaphysics of the semi-educated, reducing to the absurd such concepts as "class," "national" and "international," and the "law of value".

It is not Marxism and the dialectics of thought and action which are to blame for us having arrived at this point but our inability and, at times, reluctance to trouble ourselves with in-depth philosophy and the creative work of thought. This applies also to the teaching of the "bright future," in which metaphysics and illiteracy prevailed as well.

9. Realizing the slogans which have not been implemented in the more than 70-year period of our "revolutionary" transformations: "Power to the soviets!;" "Land to the peasants!;" and "Plants and factories to the workers!;" Reviving the national cultures of the Russian peoples and returning to society the spirituality and humanism lost in this time. Raising the prestige of the upbringing of the individual in the family, creating for this the necessary economic and social conditions.

10. We have a positive attitude toward all formal and informal associations which are urging a revival of the national self-awareness, culture, and historical values of Russia. The movements, on the other hand, which are opposed to this are our ideological adversaries.

We deem it necessary also to notify your readers that delegations of the Leningrad Fatherland Russian patriotic movement and Leningrad United Workers Front participated in the constituent congress of the United Council of Russia which was held in Moscow on 9 September 1989.

From the editors: The editorial office deems it possible to present to the readers these extreme and resounding opinions, although it does not in all respects share their authors' position. Specifically, it should not be forgotten that it was the CPSU which initiated perestroika in our society and that its revolutionary renewal implies the party's active role. At the present time the editorial office is preparing for publication material which will make an integral analysis of the role and influence of the public movements in our city.

Vlasov Visits Kaliningrad Oblast

LD0601135190 Moscow TASS in English 1808 GMT
5 Jan 89

[Text] Kaliningrad January 5 TASS—By TASS correspondent Valeriy Biryukov:

Plans of the creation of a special economic zone in the westernmost part of the Russian Federation were discussed during a visit to Kaliningrad of Aleksandr Vlasov, alternate member of the Politbureau of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation.

"I should like to make it clear from the beginning that it will not be a free enterprise zone, but a new form of the region's economic independence", he told TASS. "There are many factors that are making it imperative to develop a special economic model for this region. Specifically, Kaliningrad is far away from other regions of the Russian Federation, which makes it more difficult for them to maintain economic relations. Traditional partners of the region—Lithuania and the other soviet Baltic republics—are now operating in conditions of full economic independence, which created certain difficulties with the supply of goods for the Kaliningrad region. Restrictions were introduced in those republics on a number of goods and materials and in some cases prices were increased. Thus, the problem of supplying the Kaliningrad region with many consumer goods and materials became acute in new conditions of economic management".

Vlasov believes that the Kaliningrad region is quite capable of being economically independent. "A powerful industrial and agroindustrial potential was created there in the post-war years. Towns and villages were built whose total population is now 800,000. The region accounts for 10 per cent of the country's fishing and fish processing. The output of livestock-breeding products, grain and vegetables is growing. Many industrial enterprises are being retooled with the participation of foreign firms. Negotiations are being held with some Western countries on the creation of joint enterprises in the region", he recalled.

Vlasov was shown a map published in Lithuania which features the Kaliningrad region as part of the Lithuanian Republic which is called "Smaller Lithuania". Concern was also expressed over the establishment last December of a special council for "Smaller Lithuania" under the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania.

"I know about these territorial claims", Vlasov said. "It is deplorable, because it does not promote the strengthening of relations between republics. The Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and the Soviet Government are unanimous in their opinion that there must be no reshaping of borders in our union state. In the practical field, we are going to develop relations with our neighbours on the basis of parity and mutual advantage.

This is why it is planned to give the Kaliningrad region the status of a special economic zone of Russia".

On Kaliningrad Economic Zone

LD0601174690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1630 GMT 6 Jan 90

[Text] Vlasov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee politburo and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, has visited Kaliningrad Oblast. Issues of organizing the fulfillment of decisions of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies and of the plans for economic and social development of the oblast in 1990 were examined. A great deal of attention was paid to ensuring the reliable functioning of the region under the new conditions of economic management.

These subjects were discussed at virtually all the meetings held on 3 and 6 January. It was stressed that under contemporary conditions it is of fundamental importance to develop the kind of model of economic sovereignty of the region which would ensure its stable self-development. In this context it is necessary to take into account the specific nature of the territory and its place and role in the republic's national economy.

For Kaliningrad Oblast, such a feature is its remoteness from other RSFSR regions. The necessity of giving it greater independence is also dictated by the new economic elements of economic ties with the neighboring Baltic republics. The trend toward curtailment of a range of formerly stable economic ties and toward restriction of the traditional commodity exchange which has taken shape give rise to concern.

In connection with the transition of the Russian Federation to self-financing from 1991, the problem of independently providing many consumer goods and food-stuffs, as well as construction materials is facing the region in an urgent manner. The chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers considers that the oblast has a fairly good starting position for the transition to self-government and self-financing. However, for many long years its budget was formed without taking the region's specific feature's into account. For this reason it is necessary to give the oblast assistance.

Summing up the results at a meeting of the party, soviet, and economic aktiv of Kaliningrad Oblast, Comrade Vlasov set specific tasks for accelerating and deepening the economic reform in the region, improving the financial position, and completing the development of an extensive program of transition to self-management, self-financing, and maximum self-sufficiency.

The chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers visited a number of industrial and agricultural enterprises, construction sites, stores, and workers' canteens, and met sailors of the "Red Banner" Baltic Fleet.

Stoyev Visits Pskov, Novgorod Oblasts

LD0701211190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1900 GMT 7 Jan 90

[Text] Topical problems relating to the renewal of villages in the Russian Non-Chernozem Zone were the main topics of the trip made by Stoyev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, who was in Pskov and Novgorod Oblasts 4-7 January. During numerous meetings and conversations with working people of the neighboring oblasts, there were frank discussions of ways to speed up realization of the food program, of new forms of labor organization, and of the social restructuring of the villages in the ancient Russian region.

There were frank conversations about the role of communists in the period of perestroika, about their lofty purpose, and about the continuation of the best traditions of party members, convinced fighters for the cause of the working class and the entire people.

Comrade Stoyev had meetings with members of the Bureau of the Pskov and Novgorod Oblast Party Committee, and members of the oblast executive committees, at which there was discussion of improving supplies of food produce, especially meat and milk, to the population, and of the ways successfully to implement the decisions of the March plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

Chernovtsy Obkom Plenum Fires First Secretary

LD0501200190 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1800 GMT 5 Jan 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A plenum of the Chernovtsy Party Oblast Committee [obkom] was held today to consider an organizational matter. The plenum released Nivalov from his duties as first secretary of the party obkom for serious failings in leading the obkom bureau and violating the norms of party ethics, thereby inflicting great damage on the authority of the oblast party organization. The plenum broke off its work to consider and discuss candidates for the post of first secretary of the party obkom in the oblast's party organizations.

Ryzhkov, Abalkin Write on Economic Reorientation

LD0601185690 Moscow TASS in English 1818 GMT
6 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 6 TASS—The latest issue of "PRAVITELSTVENNY VESTNIK" (GOVERNMENT HERALD) offered its pages for members of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers to comment on the programme to normalise the country's economy worked out by the government and approved by the Second Congress of People's Deputies.

One of the signs that the process of formation of new, truly socialist and hence truly democratic forms of government is proceeding in the right direction is the

separation of rights and duties between different authorities, first of all between the legislative and the executive branches of power. This is Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov's opinion. He stressed the importance of responsibility for decisions made.

Summing up the principal tasks set forth by the government programme, First Deputy Premier Lev Voronin stressed the need to reach the watershed in the normalisation of the consumer market—to fully meet the population's demand for foodstuffs and industrial goods. There is a basis for this—consumer goods production is to go up by 66 billion roubles in 1990 as against the average annual 17 billion roubles over the past four years. It is planned to alleviate tensions caused by acute shortages of every day consumer goods.

The need to satiate the market with foodstuffs is pointed out by chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers' State Commission for Foodstuffs and Procurement Vladilen Nikitin. He deals with problems of rural life and noted that the principal task to be accomplished in this area is to grant farmers real independence in making decisions and disposing of the goods they produce.

According to chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee Yuriy Maslyukov, the volume, range and social significance of work envisaged by the government decisions already taken are so immense that it is impossible to agree with some people's deputies who rebuke the government for indecision, marking time and being unassertive in implementing reform. Some deputies said the programme itself was not radical enough. Maslyukov disagrees with these opinions as well as with the proposal by some deputies at the congress to take more rigorous measures, including an immediate monetary reform, the introduction of the market and new prices as well as encroachments on the country's gold stock.

"I am convinced of the radical nature of the government programme" Maslyukov stresses. "Its single aim is the development of democratic principles in Soviet society and in the national economy. The process will be controllable by the state, which means not 'pushing' the economy onto the market but the conscientious use of market relations in shaping the new image of the economy and the state regulation".

Organization is the main issue of today, chairman of the government Commission for Economic Reform Leonid Abalkin says. To help the country overcome the deep social and economic crisis three conditions are needed—first, a clear-cut programme and a working plan of changes with directions and terms well-coordinated, second, the approval of, and support for this programme by legislators and society as a whole, third, political will and organizational skills to implement it. There is a programme of this kind. It became clear during the congress that no one could offer an alternative programme.

According to chairman of the Government Commission for Military- Industrial Matters Igor Belousov, conversion of the military industry will make a considerable contribution to the implementation of the government programme. It will release considerable financial resources and facilities for peaceful production. At present the working out of a state programme of conversion for 1991-1995 is nearing completion. There are many difficulties to overcome before it is implemented but the programme is feasible. The plan for 1990 envisages that nearly 50 per cent of the volume of the military industrial complex will be oriented towards the output of peaceful products. In 1995, this volume will amount to 60 per cent. All will be done, Belousov stresses to ensure unconditional sufficiency of the country's defence potential while directing considerable scientific potential towards the solution of the most promising tasks in the national economy.

The social orientation of the programme was also noted by Aleksandra Biryukova, chairwoman of the Government Bureau for Social Development. "Until a deep social re-orientation takes place in thinking, psyche and approaches by our personnel in soviet and economic management bodies, the social re-orientation of the economy advocated at the Congress of People's Deputies will not occur," Biryukova stressed.

TRUD Readers Respond to Ryzhkov Speech

904A0102A Moscow TRUD in Russian
15 Dec 89 p 2

[Article by Yu. Medvedskiy: "There Are No Simple Solutions"]

[Text] Yesterday the "Direct Line" literally was overloaded. Now and again two cities would get through at the same time. But in a situation like this those who called were polite, they did not try to speak over one another and did not hang up, not, I think, because they were afraid to hear a busy signal when they tried again. Probably, they were curious to hear what people from other cities were saying. So, some conversations had "witnesses" to them.

Those who managed to read N.I. Ryzhkov's report yesterday showed different reactions to the measures that the government proposed with the view to revive the economy.

"We, of course, did not expect to have it easy," says an engineer from Dzerzhinsk, N. Kiyko, "but we are not too happy with such remote perspectives. The problem is that the past four years were wasted in talking or in incompetent actions. Now again we are creating a breeding ground for unrestrained action. Whatever measures aim at putting an end to the aberrations in the economy, they are quite legitimate and do not arouse any doubts. But it seems to me that the proposed measures could be realized in shorter periods of time."

"I think that the government should resign," was a categorical statement by V. Minayev from Moscow. "Why so? Because the economy should be expanded and instead they freeze it. What is this food rationing, money reform, 6-day weeks...."

"But you are naming alternative proposals with which the government has disagreed. Do you have the newspaper? In your hands? Let us read together the previous paragraph which says it."

We found these words but our caller kept grumbling: Today the government disagrees and tomorrow they will change their mind....

It must be mentioned that there were more doubts expressed in the success of the measures proposed by the government. And it was not because they are inefficient. "The bureaucrats have dug in," says L. Bezmen from Minsk, "and they know how to put up a show of active work and how to bury deep the best of intentions. But they do not forget themselves in the process. Now the MAZ [Minsk automobile factory] is allocated hard currency for their exports. A good entrepreneur would use the money to buy a small plant to produce soap and detergent as we do not have enough. But we spend gold rubles on fleeting needs and even set up "VIP- only" distribution centers. So shall we continue to waste the few things we have instead of investing them with a view to future?"

A participant of the Great Patriotic War, I. Lyashenko, from the village of Pavlovskaya of Krasnodarskiy kray, also thinks that the bureaucracy is the main obstacle in putting the government measures into practice.

"Only a democratic election to the local soviets can enable active and competent people to come to power," he says. "For such people the measures proposed by the government would become a source of initiatives and of decisive actions for the benefit of the people, instead of remaining a dogma."

The readers of our paper used the "Direct Line" to talk about many problems that, in our opinion, were not closely connected with N.I. Ryzhkov's report. For instance, a fitter-adjuster from the Slavyanskiy Experimental Packaging Factory of the Krasnodarskiy kray, STK [technical supervisory service] Chairman G. Akulshin, told us that his factory has been idle since 5 December. They do not have timber. "We went everywhere and we couldn't even get promises. What should we do? Auction off the factory?" he asked. "And how are we going to solve the food problem? We produce 8.5 million crates for cherries, berries, plums, and grapes. The new economic laws that we are approaching with so much trouble should become effective as soon as possible. We are tired of going places begging for raw materials, machines, and financing. Every normal enterprise should have all of this if there exists a public demand for its production."

The deputies, members of the Supreme Soviet, say that they have worked out a sufficient number of laws. They become effective and give rise to initiatives when applied to the area of production. They provide an opportunity to act independently, not waiting for the authorities' word. But yet not all the regulatory acts work as planned. For that reason our callers on the "Direct Line" asked us to tell the Congress that people's deputies have to be more demanding, more meticulous, more persistent when new laws are being approved and that they should not yield to the temptation to pass the laws too hastily. "Let this take more time," says A. Stetsenko from the city of Sumy, "but we all need mature decisions that have been double-checked, ones that do not need revising as we do all the time. When can we go on?" "We were too hasty about the cooperatives," says A. Kozlov, an electrician at the Oonezhskiy Tractor Factory, from the city of Petrozavodsk, "that was why they victimized us. The prices for their production are three to four times higher than the state-set prices. And very often they cheat and resell things produced at state enterprises and not by them." "The cooperatives manufacture anonymous products," adds Z. Leonova who works in the fashion center "Lyuks", "their boxes with cakes, pastries, cookies, and other sweets have no markings. And that makes us suspicious that they buy state-produced goods and put them in anonymous boxes. But the prices that they set are totally out of reach."

When our readers discuss the report they are primarily looking for the connection between the report's basic provisions and their personal interests as well as the solution of social problems that concern everyone. And isn't that the goal of the measures on reviving the economy that were proposed by the government? One can certainly accept all of this without paying too much attention, as it used to be done before, and then say: "Now—to work!". By the way, many of our callers said exactly that and then added: "Time to stop talking!" But I liked the appeal of the majority of those I talked to: "Let us think!"

Politburo Consoles Ryzhkov on Mother's Death

LD0501210290 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 5 Jan 90

[Text] The Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee has expressed deep condolences to the Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov over the passing away of his mother Aleksandra Ryzhkov.

Supreme Soviet's Nishanov Reviews Past Year

PM0501170190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Dec 90 Second Edition p 1

[Interview with R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet of Nationalities, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Kosarev under the rubric "Interview Just Before the New Year": "We Are Going Through Difficult Times"—date, place of interview not given]

[Text] [Kosarev] Rafik Nishanovich, we are meeting with you just before the New Year, and so the questions will be the traditional New Year's Eve ones. What was the past year like for you, what do you find most memorable about it?

[Nishanov] The outgoing year was notable in many respects. On the one hand—the pace of perestroika quickened. On the other hand—it ran into incredible difficulties. To a certain degree these difficulties were connected with resistance from conservative forces and—this also has to be said—with the urging-on from leftist elements, who in their turn have strengthened the position of the former. In the economic sphere the country is faced with very serious problems connected primarily with the imbalance of the economic mechanism. Conflicts arose because of interethnic relations. All these defects were building up for years, we concealed them, hiding them behind fine-sounding slogans. They built up, figuratively speaking, [the pressure from] water boiling in a saucepan, and, if we had not taken the lid off, there would have been an explosion. So we took the lid off and let out the steam. For the time being that steam is billowing all over the place, and this is our difficulty.

The Congress of USSR People's Deputies managed to work out ways to solve the immediate tasks, and determined the political course and guidelines for advance. We have enormous potential—industrial and intellectual. Unfortunately, we often waste it. We talk a lot, we appeal to each other, but no one is getting properly down to business and taking responsibility for this matter. We must as quickly as possible apply the laws and new economic mechanisms which have been worked out, and these will bring our enormous forces into operation.

While still on the subject of last year, then it is also worth saying this. I am very upset that attacks on the Army have increased. Yes, in the Army, just as in the whole of society, there are shortcomings—in some places discipline has broken down, there are instances of "bullying," and wastefulness. This is all very upsetting. But the Army's merits must not be forgotten. The Army is a school of nurture, a school of courage. We should recall the Constitution's words that the country's defense is our sacred duty. Unfortunately, we are still not guaranteed complete security or guaranteed that the threat of war no longer exists. So we must look after our Army, reinforce it with economic power, with technical power, and reinforce it with our young people. Now in some places this is what happens: In every makhallya [word as transliterated; means district in Uzbek] people want to set up their own army. Why do we need to set up an army in the makhallya? We need to have one army, but a reliable one in all respects.

In the new year I would wish all Soviet servicemen—officers, generals, soldiers, sergeants, and warrant officers—excellent health, prosperity, and fine service. Now the Supreme Soviet is making decisions in connection with cutting the Armed Forces. This is a natural process. But at the local level we must receive all those discharged

from the Army and Navy with fatherly concern—provide work and housing, and be responsible for making arrangements for their families. We must do everything so that not a single serviceman suffers from the army cuts.

[Kosarev] Rafik Nishanovich, I would like to know what hopes you are pinning on the coming year, and what do you expect from it?

[Nishanov] I am expecting a breakthrough in the new year, first and foremost in the economy. I expect that we will switch from words to deeds. We are now going through a difficult time. I have the feeling that we have moved away from one state of society, but we have not moved into another, we are on the way. Hence the difficulties. But, I stress once again that we have a goal, and we are moving on the path toward it. I am sure that this coming year we will get significantly closer to this goal.

I would also like to talk about interethnic relations, or more precisely, about the problems connected with the development of national languages—this past year this process has gathered strength, and it, of course, will continue this coming year. Why am I talking about this. Each language is a nation. A nation does not exist without a language. That is, the free development of each language, even the language of a small nation, should be ensured. Former mistakes, when we clamped down on some languages, and gave free range to others, should be rectified. But fresh mistakes should not be permitted—while developing national languages and creating a legal foundation for them, we should not belittle the significance of the Russian language. We are a multinational state, 130 nations and nationalities live in our country. A common state language is needed so that they can communicate. The Russian language has become such a language both *je jure* and *de facto*. It must remain so.

We in the Soviet of Nationalities have formulated a law on the free development of all languages of the USSR peoples and we registered as one of the provisions that the Russian language is the common state language of the USSR and is used for interstate and interethnic contact. This is objective, this will not hinder the development of other languages. We in our country cannot use the great English language for contact among Uzbeks and Kazakhs or Tatars. Our Russian language has always served and will serve this purpose. So, I am sure, the national languages should also be developed and be given a legal foundation, and the Russian language needs to be developed and also given a legal foundation in precisely the same way. All languages must be equal.

Kryuchkov Cited on Democratizing KGB

LD0701003990 Moscow World Service in English
2300 GMT 6 Jan 90

[Text] The chief of the State Security Committee, the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, says perestroika is under way within his agency aimed at greater democracy and

glasnost in its work. He said the trend was in step with the overall spirit of democratic reform in the country. On the current international processes, Kryuchkov said the society needed unity as a key condition for stabilization. Unity by progressiveness, he said, is of particular importance at a time when worries are increasing over the state of the economy, ethnic relations and the moral of the society going through the painful transition stage.

Lukyanov Reviews 1989 People's Congress Results

LD0601224990 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 6 Jan 90

[Text] First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Anatoliy Lukyanov has, in a review of last year's results, said that a new generation of politicians, active and capable of producing new ideas, has emerged on the political scene—a reference to People's Deputies of the USSR named in the country's first free and contested elections. Lukyanov said in an interview for the press that the first two Congresses of People's Deputies last year made remarkable progress in terms of political reform. A specific government program for an economic upturn has been adopted. Lukyanov pointed out that democracy must be combined with productive work. He called for ruling out obstructionist attitudes.

Kharkov First Secretary Mysnichenko Replaced

LD0501205390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 5 Jan 90

[Text] An expanded plenum of the oblast committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, which examined an organizational matter, took place in Kharkov today. The plenum relieved Comrade Vladislav Petrovich Mysnichenko of the duties of first secretary of the oblast party committee and member of the bureau of the oblast committee, in connection with his retirement on pension, and elected to the post (Anatoliy Konstantinovich Myalitsa), who had worked as general director of the Kharkov Aviation Works production association.

Evidence of the democratic nature of the election is the fact that 43 alternative candidatures for the post of leader of the Kharkov oblast CPSU [as heard] committee were submitted by the oblast's communists during the preparations for the plenum.

Vladimir Antonovich Ivashko, member of the CPSU Politburo Central Committee and first secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee, participated in the plenum's work.

'Iron Fist' Polemics Viewed by Officials

90UN0564A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 52, 27 Dec 89 p 10

[Set of articles under headline: "We Will Do Without 'Iron Fist'"]

[Text] On 16 August of this year, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA published an interview with I. Klyamkin and A. Migranyan by the newspaper's commentator G. Tselms entitled "Is an 'Iron Fist' Needed?" This is how a discussion on the issues of the current period of transition began.

L. Batkin (No 38); A. Kron, V. Vilchek, and A. Pushkov (No 42); and our readers (No 39) took part in the discussion. Several hundred responses were received by the editorial office. The debate was carried on by other publications at home and abroad—in Rome and Paris.

The discussion spilled over from the pages of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA to auditoriums. Here are just a few examples: Moscow "Cinema Center," the Moscow State University, the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the Leningrad Concert Hall.... Even in Rome, at a meeting of specialists on East European countries, much time was allotted to the issues raised by participants in the polemics.

This time, in summation, we give "the last word" to the initiators of the discussion, as well as to Ye. Ambartsumov whose article appears to us to be a logical completion of the conversation.

Igor Klyamkin:

Ten Questions for the Opponents and for Myself

While reading critical responses on the pages of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA and other publications and familiarizing myself with letters from the readers, I gradually arrived at the conclusion that my position (and differences between it and the point of view of A. Migranyan) was not understood. It appears that the insufficiently complete and clear presentation of it in the newspaper was not the only reason. I think that the complexity and novelty of the problems discussed that are barely emerging in our life is the main reason. Therefore, I see the main result of the discussion in the fact that it provided an opportunity to specify and dwell on the issues themselves, for the participants in the discussion as well, rather than in the fact that some generally convincing answers to the questions raised were set forth. I would like to offer some of those more specific questions to both the readers and myself.

Most of the participants in the discussion and many authors of letters noticed that, unlike Migranyan, I do not call for establishing an authoritarian system but merely observe that thus far it has been exactly authoritarian rather than democratic regimes that operated in periods when nationwide markets were formed, and that quite possibly this will also befall us. However, nobody viewed this difference as essential. Why does our thinking fail to grasp the difference in principle between pointing out the recurrence of authoritarianism in the past (and thus its regular character) and a call to establish it? Is this not due to the fact that we are still under the ideological spell of Stalin, being unaware that the rule may be not only good but also bad, and that it is not at

all necessary for us to like it for this reason? Is this not due to our familiarity solely with regularities (for example, "communist construction") which demand blind obedience to themselves rather than one grasping what the decisive prerequisite for freedom is, including freedom from illusions?

2. It is frequently stated in the articles and letters published that we will be able to switch to a market economy by enhancing democracy. However, is a developed democracy possible without the market? If so, then what does it amount to and how is it different from the "democracy of a superior type" which we know well? If it is not so, where is democracy to come from before the market?

3. The uniqueness of our history and our current problems is close to being the favorite thought of participants in the discussion. Supposedly, nobody who has ever had totalitarianism has started to move to democracy from it, whereas this is exactly what lies ahead for us. Therefore, the experience of others does not apply to us. It is meant in the process that it will be more difficult for us than for the others, whereas it is maintained that it will be easier, and that we will be able to accomplish what others have failed to accomplish—switching to the market economy and democracy without authoritarianism. Why? By virtue of what peculiarities and features? Could it be due to the failure to renounce the recent belief that the closer we are to the bright future, the more hopeless our present day is?

4. Many people say that authoritarianism is not a threat to us because we have already cleared that station on the road from totalitarianism to democracy having stopped there for 10 years under Khrushchev and almost 20 years under Brezhnev. However, at issue here is an authoritarian system corresponding to a transition to a market economy. Is it possible to believe that Khrushchev or Brezhnev made this their goal? If not, how does the desire to relegate our current and future difficulties to the past arise in our consciousness?

5. The readers write that the people have already awakened, that the scope of the democratic movement is widening, and that this, supposedly, is the primary and insurmountable obstacle in the path of authoritarianism. However, does this movement, highly heterogeneous at that, strive to establish market relations? What is to be done if a majority speaks up against them, as most of the participants in the 1988 Polish referendum came out against enhancing the economic reform?

6. Many people refer to the experience of Poland and Hungary in trying to prove that a shortage of democracy is exactly the main barrier in the way of the emerging market, and this is why democracy in these countries has attained the stage of a multiparty system even before the ultimate victory of market relations. However, didn't Poland and Hungary advance to this point through the totalitarian regimes of Kadar and Jaruzelski? After all, these regimes, having succeeded in taking their countries

in the direction of the market economy considerably further than we have, failed to ensure the ultimate transition to it. Could this possibly indicate that there is a certain line which the authoritarianism of a particular historic type is incapable of transcending, that is, authoritarianism based on the party monopoly on power, and not at all that authoritarianism can be avoided?

7. Can we maintain with complete confidence that totalitarianism is a matter of the past for Hungary and Poland, as many people have done? Can this be maintained in view of the fact that the transfer of governmental power in, say, Poland to the former opposition has not eliminated or alleviated any of the problems that the communists were unable to solve (except for the problem of confidence in the authorities which, obviously, is not granted for all time to come)? Can this be maintained in view of the fact that, in order to take resolute steps in the direction of a market economy, the Mazowiecki government should bring itself to get into a conflict with numerous strata of the working class, including those adhering to Solidarity, which do not want to shoulder the burden of the transition to a market economy? Will a fledgling democracy withstand the tension of problems? Is it just a matter of chance that the word "dictatorship" is beginning to find its way into the political vocabulary of some Solidarity functionaries?

8. Apparently, when the authors and readers of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA come out against replicating on our soil the world experience of transition to a market economy and against the authoritarianism which has so far accompanied it, it is assumed that we have not yet begun to replicate this experience. I am inclined to ask: Doesn't the combination of three key positions—the general secretary, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and chairman of the Defense Council—represent a step toward a particular variety of authoritarianism which strives to base the conduct of reforms not only on the apparatus but also on the institutes of people's representation? Is this not what Academician Sakharov talked about at the Congress of People's Deputies?

9. If it is so, then perhaps the current issue is not whether to opt for authoritarianism or democracy, but rather what the democrats are to do in a situation whereby authoritarianism is not a prediction but, to some degree, a fact. Could it be that our undivided attention should be given to the thought that switching from totalitarianism to democracy involves not only demolition, but also a replacement which thus far is not around? Could it be that the task of democratic forces is primarily to facilitate the emergence and development of civilized democratic institutions and "apparatuses" at the grass-roots level, that is, the emergence and development of social structures in the absence of which even the most progressive authoritarianism will never evolve into democracy but may become an instrument of the conservatives?

10. Some readers write that authoritarianism should not be discussed publicly because this is tantamount to preparing our public opinion for the establishment of a

dictatorship. Does this mean that the cause of democracy will triumph sooner if we look at the entire experience of the world and our own reality with our eyes closed? If it is so, does this not mean, as a consequence, that for the benefit of progress we still prefer to live in an illusory world of endlessly alternating intoxicating hopes and disappointments which fail to sober us?

Andranik Migranyan:

Concerning Historical Analogies....

Frankly, letters from LITERATURNAYA GAZETA readers and responses to the interview in other newspapers and magazines have left a sad impression. An overwhelming majority has simply failed to understand what the issue was. Two-dimensional, black-and-white thinking dominated the emotional denunciations of "the defenders of democracy."

While unable to respond to all remarks by my critics due to the limited newspaper space, I believe that dwelling specifically on the issue of historical analogies is necessary because many people have tried to question their legitimacy. These analogies were needed in order to prove three theses. The first thesis says that the road to democracy was long and tormenting even for the most enlightened peoples of Europe; hence, the example of France. However, I did not at all call for extending our transition to 200 years, as some of my opponents have understood. Secondly, historical analogies were needed in order to show that in principle and in theory a transition from authoritarianism to democracy is possible. Consequently, if we succeed in our transition to authoritarianism, there will definitely be a light at the end of the tunnel. This is exactly why Spain, Latin American countries, and South Korea were used as examples. My opponents correctly observed that European societies proceeded to democracy from absolutism, and not at all from totalitarianism, and that these two systems are completely different. Proceeding from this, they believed the analogies proposed to be incorrect. However, nobody noticed that in this instance I was setting up an entirely different sequence of comparisons. While qualitatively different, totalitarian and traditional societies nonetheless have much in common. This statement gave one of my critics an opportunity to "flog" me for failing to know things as elementary as the fact that poverty, illiteracy, and a low level of development of productive forces go with a traditional society whereas computers and nuclear missiles go with a totalitarian society. These differences are obvious even for a schoolboy. Meanwhile, similarities proved impossible to grasp even for some doctors of sciences. Traditional and totalitarian societies alike are restricted and one-dimensional. All spheres of activity in the life of these societies are regimented. In a traditional society, they are prescribed and rigidly regimented by customs, traditions, and religious beliefs, whereas in a totalitarian society—by a rationally designed abstract pattern.

In the course of transformation of traditional societies into industrial societies, along with the development of the market and the emergence of a multitude of various interests due to the destruction of traditional ties, a transition occurs in these countries from a single dimension and regimentation to many dimensions and spontaneity, from stagnation and uniformity to dynamism and variety. A clash of varied and conflicting interests in the absence of a consensus on fundamental values of the new society and a mechanism for settling these conflicts bring about the fact that virtually not a single state that has embarked on the path of industrial development has avoided a more or less protracted authoritarian period in its development, within the framework of which the process of integration of the most significant antisystemic forces has occurred. It is exactly this aspect of the development of traditional societies that makes it possible to draw an analogy with our eventual modernization because a transition from a one-dimensional and prescribed-regimented society to a multidimensional and spontaneous one is also in store for us. On the way toward it, we will encounter still more complicated problems. After all, in addition to everything else, we will have to carry out on the move a most complex process of the renunciation of property by the state, unlike traditional societies and on a scale inconceivable in their case.

In summary, I would like to share one curious observation. Many of our current "professional democrats," who are enthusiastic admirers of authors from the "Landmarks" collection, speak at the current stage of development of our country from the position of Bolsheviks calling for "being realistic and demanding the impossible." Indeed, the thought that everything in this country repeats itself may drive one to despair. However, if it is so, it seems to me that the warning addressed by S. Bulgakov in 1908 to the Russian intelligentsia and not heard by it deserves to be recalled once again for our radical intellectuals.

"A struggle of the good and evil, life-giving and deadly, creative and destructive elements in Russia proceeds in the hearts and minds of the Russian intelligentsia...the comprehension (by the intelligentsia—note by Andranik Migranyan) of its historic mission and its significance should boost the sense of responsibility for one's actions tenfold. After all, nowhere else does this situation exist: A great people, helpless and spiritually defenseless as a child, with its educational level close to that of the era of St. Vladimir, and the intelligentsia which brings in the enlightenment of the West, mostly with various latest words.... Two electric currents: When they come together, what will they generate—beneficial light and heat or destructive and incinerating lightning?"

Many millions of people have answered this question paying the price with their shattered lives. Meanwhile, since then the "child" has not become either older or wiser. Moreover, after more than 70 years of following the guide while being blindfolded, he even lost what skill

of independent thinking and activity he had once. It is dangerous to forget about this.

Yevgeniy Ambartsumov:

Don't Be Nervous!

It looks like I. Klyamkin and A. Migranyan have incurred the wrath of many people. However, doesn't this show that the issue they have raised is a timely one?

As I see it, what are they right about? Firstly, about a working, noncontradictory mechanism for a period of transition being urgently needed. Secondly, about the fact that a civic society, thus far undeveloped in our country, should become the foundation and the backbone for this period. Thirdly—and this is the main point—Klyamkin and Migranyan are right to conclude that a strong central authority is necessary in order to carry out the very perestroika it has itself conceived and initiated.

I like their aspiration to evaluate the situation objectively no matter how saddening it is. Still, I will take issue with my friends and colleagues.

Migranyan believes that we are closer to the "so-called traditional societies," i.e. "Third World" countries. Unfortunately, it is so as far as some of the most important statistics are concerned, such as the standard of consumption or infant mortality rate. However, this is not the case with important systemic attributes, such as cultural and ethical traditions which have been infringed upon but have still survived, or the intellectual potential which, of course, should not be confused with the actually low standard of technology and labor productivity in our country. Besides, there are regions in our country (the Baltic area, Transcaucasia, and maybe others) where the roots of the civic society have survived and have not been ultimately trampled down, and where they are sprouting at present, be it in the sphere of services, as is the case in the Baltic area, or in crafts, as in the case of Armenia. And what about the formation of peasant and cooperative unions at a rate almost as high as under the NEP [New Economic Policy], and also of a thousand informal organizations, which was not the case under the NEP? Therefore, on this point both Klyamkin who believes that "not one new structure capable of replacing the old ones has evolved" and Migranyan who denies any wisdom in the course of our post-revolutionary development are wrong.

Indeed, our path in the thirties through the eighties turned out to be a dead end in many respects; it led us away from the highway of world civilization to which we will have to return. However, as a result of Stalinist-Brezhnevite and contemporary development, something has emerged that combines the attributes of backwardness and development, of totalitarianism and democracy, rather than a copy of "the traditional societies." This is why I believe that to predict our development proceeding from totalitarianism alone is incorrect.

Our authors ascribe a rigid sequence to history: Economic reforms come first, and political reforms later; God forbid if they are carried out simultaneously. However, society is not an obedient first-grader; besides, our history has taken a different turn. During the course of the great reforms in the 1860's, which the authors rightfully compare with our perestroika, the emancipation of peasants (a socio-political act) and the emergence of a free peasantry (economics), local administration, judicial, and military reforms (all of them political) became intertwined into a single entity. Migranyan rebukes the Chinese for being late with political reforms. However, where is his logic? After all, in China the economic reform had not yet managed to really spread in depth, and Deng Xiaoping planned to carry out the political reform in the next century, as if in keeping with the recommendation of our authors. However, the people of China, or more precisely, their advanced segment, did not want to wait. In general, people do not live and act in keeping with the plans of politicians and political scientists, and frustrate their plans and schedules.

I understood the desirability of a sequence whereby economic reforms come first, and political reforms come next due to my experience as a historian, and, finally, at a rational level. However, following the shooting of students in Tiananmen Square in Beijing which has set the Chinese reform back many years, I prefer simultaneous reforms under Gorbachev, all of the idle runs and insufficient efficiency notwithstanding.

On top of everything, a fatalistic position—supposedly, nothing will work out anyway—appears immoral, a sort of cold, detached look without compassion which is so important for our society. Let me recall that in 1940, after the defeat of France, Albert Camus in his "Myth of Sisyphus"—which now has been translated for the first time in our country—sang the praises due to this tragic hero who rolled the stone uphill again and again despite the futility of his effort. It was exactly the spiritual background of the "Myth of Sisyphus" that the French anti-fascist resistance grew from which initially had no chance to win at all. We have a better chance to begin with, I believe that a political prediction should take into account attendant ethical and emotional elements. Difficult as our current situation might be, we should not instill the feeling of hopelessness.

Migranyan himself refers to a factor such as the external environment of the world community. Its influence has never been as great as it is now. Therefore, how can we conceive under such circumstances of shutting off the democratizing influence of the external environment? I am convinced that the world community is interested in overcoming our crisis rather than promoting it because chaos leads to unpredictability, instability, and danger.

Indeed, authoritarianism is necessary whereas Gorbachev is not sufficiently authoritarian. I have already had to note: The main shortcoming of our central authorities that advance correct concepts is in the fact

that they do not ensure their swift and comprehensive implementation. Examples are easy to find: Leasing, cooperatives, independence of enterprises, and changes in the functions of the party. This may be tied to the fact that Gorbachev refuses to curtail democratization which Migranyan interprets as virtually the main shortcoming of the central authorities. On the contrary, I think that the orientation of our leader toward democratization is his strong point which, to be sure, does not materialize completely, but rather verbally. After all, to this end one needs to "exercise power," for example, in Transcaucasia where the intention to bring to naught the decision of the center on self-government in the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] is not being extinguished.

In general, I think that a situation has now emerged whereby a consistent course toward market relations will have to be combined for some time with firm administrative measures; it is not a matter of chance that the latter are proposed by the "market" economists Abalkin and Latsis. At issue are measures against slob and saboteurs from the service sphere who hoard goods, honest rationing of goods in short supply, and so on. In this manner, perestroika can affirm its orientation toward social justice. However, certainty and resoluteness are required for this.

Migranyan sees a key to a strong central authority in endowing it with unrestricted powers. Technically, the problem does exist—unlike the American President, ours does not have a right to impose a state of emergency. However, are his real rights and opportunities small?

It appears that M.S. Gorbachev counts on shifts in the party, on renewing its leading cadres in the course of the reports and elections campaign while preparing for the congress. It is worthwhile to hope and support this because the potential and energy of the party have been preserved, as long as a recurrence of the apparatus schemes which prevailed before the party conference is not allowed to happen. A clear distancing of the leader from conservative apparatus-party groups which have lost their bond with the people and are driven solely by egoistic and protective interests would not mean a split in the party; on the contrary, an overwhelming majority of its members would rally around the leader on a perestroika platform.

Meanwhile, counting on the consolidation of all forces, including conservative, is rather a path toward repeating the situation in Poland where the party has lost its prestige and support of the people for this very reason, despite the reform-minded leadership.

The idea of Migranyan that the optimal path for us leads through "a democratic dictatorship" of the perestroika leader is interesting (despite the inappropriate Robespierre-like phraseology like "the Committee of National Salvation," as well as, incidentally, the very word "dictatorship"). However, the "democratic dictatorship" is

absolutely incompatible with a proposal by Migranyan himself to reinforce the power of the leader in "an apparatus manner." Incidentally, the reforms of Kadar and Deng Xiaoping developed for as long as these leaders drew support from the people, from the civic society, no matter how underdeveloped it was; when they changed their orientation to the apparatus, their reforms started spinning their wheels and came to a halt.

Strong presidential power along with a strong parliament is the optimal and, to my mind, realistic form of "democratic dictatorship" in our country. Judging by the statements by M.S. Gorbachev, the institution of the presidency is not to his liking. However, he does not rule out the possibility of reconsidering his opinion. Besides, judging by the surveys published on the same page of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA as the Migranyan and Klyamkin interview, 94 percent of the populace come out in favor of electing their own leaders directly; that is, essentially, for a presidential republic.

However, let us repeat that it should have a strong parliament which bolsters and balances the power of the president, as, for example, in the United States and France where, incidentally, the ruling party does not have an opportunity to pressure its own president and government. This kind of pressure, which rendered them ineffective, permeated the political life of the Third and Fourth French Republics and brought about their demise.

All the imperfection of our parliamentary system notwithstanding, our voters will hardly agree with the assertion that, supposedly, it was not worthwhile at all to convene the congress. Certainly, Migranyan's and, even before him, Zhvanetskiy's criticism of its poor efficiency is correct. However, such inefficiency is the result of—once again—the operation of apparatus forces rather than spontaneity. It was exactly the spontaneous element that imparted to the congress its unpredictability which frightens the apparatus whose true colors the congress exposed time and again. The congress was of little use from the standpoint of pure pragmatism; however, it was beautiful as a show (a pragmatist might ask "What use is the theater?"), as a happening in which all of us participated, as the first act of our liberation. Besides, the French Revolution did not begin with the capture of the Bastille but rather before this, with the performance of "The Marriage of Figaro." This emotional feeling of liberation is not an illusion but an integral part of our political life.

At present, the Supreme Soviets, including those elected even before perestroika, are wising up right before our eyes. After all, they have rejected, though not everywhere, the antidemocratic filters such as district meetings and elections in public organizations.

This is a reflection of the position of our people which cannot at all be considered conservative, as they have interpreted Migranyan in the West. It is no accident that one of his Western interviewers proclaimed him to be a

herald of "golpe" (a coup d'état by generals like in Latin America). The label is unjust, but one should not provide a pretext for this either. It is true that our people lack political culture. However, a dictatorship is not the way to foster it. Besides, the people are more intelligent than they may seem: Thus, judging by the surveys, most people support cooperatives despite "the fronts of toilers" attempting to give the opposite impression.

As far as the instability which the congress has, supposedly, reinforced is concerned, I prefer it over the stagnation of the apparatus because this instability overflows with the vigor of life which bears fruit quite quickly whereas the stagnation of the apparatus is fruitless or, more precisely, fraught with the danger of neo-Stalinism. Migranyan believes that the dictatorship of the apparatus is better than a civil war. Actually, the dictatorship of the apparatus would ultimately bring about this very war. Therefore, I interpret Migranyan's words of praise for the dictatorship as baiting by a political scientist who staunchly defends his design which is correct in principle but not in our specific situation.

Stagnation and the dominance of the apparatus accompanied by corruption and provocative social injustice may become unbearable, and the people may go out into the streets, as it has happened in Beijing and in our mining centers. However, in our country the leadership understood that the demands of demonstrators were justified whereas in China it responded with the force of arms. However, we should not think that calm has prevailed over there. No, this is a delay in the resolution of contradictions which can later erupt with even greater force.

I am compelled to agree concerning the danger of the usurpation of power which, incidentally, should not necessarily assume a "classical," Bonapartist form. A dictator arrived in this form from the outside, from military structures which were more independent than ours. However, in the twenties, a Bonapart in our country donned a party field jacket rather than a general's uniform. At present, he may appear in an entirely civilian outfit. Let us recall a curious discussion in the mid-twenties between the leader of the "Change of Direction" people Ustryalov and Bukharin. Ustryalov predicted the usurping of Soviet power by a future dictator; for his part, Bukharin who at the time was at the peak of his influence mercilessly scoffed at his opponent. He exclaimed that this was a manifestation of class narrow-mindedness because this could not happen in a proletarian state. Poor Nikolay Ivanovich reveled in the depth of his Marxist knowledge while bringing the dictator closer to absolute power through his personal efforts while also being unaware that it would be off with his intelligent head, too!

Is it proper to chart the course toward supporting such a dictator? The "Change of Direction" group went for it in the name of a unified and inseparable Russia on the altar of which they sacrificed their own lives and those of

others. Antonio Gramsci called this a "Soviet fascism." I think that our generation will no longer be enticed by such dangerous myths.

Therefore, what is to be done? In this matter, I agree with the conclusions of my colleagues which, fortunately, run counter to their authoritarian maximalism—to bolster the leader of perestroika from the left, getting involved in a discussion with him but supporting him on the main point—the course toward reforms, development of the civic society, and democratization. I would like to caution against a distortion which functionaries from among "the left radicals" have allowed to occur lately. I mean unfounded and unnecessary attacks against the leader of perestroika and attempts to question this leadership. It is true that by biting a horse a gadfly sort of spurs him on, but it is still the horse that pulls the load. Calls for any kind of strikes are altogether indiscreet. L. Batkin was correct in writing that we are walking along the edge of an abyss, and as of now we are not at all holding hands! Why should we push away the hand of the guide at this dangerous edge? The warning of Arvid Kron to figure out one's own "hold" appeals so that blood would not be shed sounds even more timely at present than it did in October. However, I would also like to warn against the opposite response. Mutual attacks and tripping up each other may only bring about undermining the authority of both sides and the disorientation of people who are quite radically minded. Incidentally, recently M.S. Gorbachev himself mentioned a wise piece of advice he had received—don't be nervous. Let us follow this advice!

The mission of the progressive intelligentsia which is personified by both our authors and their interviewer is to curtail a populist retreat and once again close ranks with the leader of perestroika, support him in order to make his hand firm and resolute. However, his hand truly does not have to be an iron one for this purpose.

[Note by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] So, we are closing the discussion. Life itself will carry it forth. We are certain that it will refute the hopeless dilemma—either "an iron fist" or anarchy—better than any opponent.

Society for 'Defense of Stalin' Set Up in Georgia

AU0801115090 Paris AFP in English 1039 GMT
8 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, Jan 8 (AFP)—A society for "the defence of Stalin" has recently been set up in Gori, the dictator's home town, in Soviet Georgia, the local MALADIOJ GRUZI newspaper reported.

The society held its inaugural meeting on December 21, the 110th anniversary of Stalin's birth, in the presence of "representatives" from other Soviet cities, the paper said, giving no details of the numbers involved.

It published a picture showing a group of army veterans, their chests barred with medals, and another of society members kissing a bust of the dictator.

"Every society gets the gods it deserves," the paper wrote.

Stalin, who died in 1953, is now officially vilified for his crimes. A group of Russian nationalists, belonging to the Pamyat society, however layed a wreath by his Kremlin wall shrine, in Moscow, on December 21.

Asked why they did so, one of their spokesmen said: "Because he belongs to Russian history, like Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great".

Environmental Protection, Consumer Interests Viewed
*LD0501211390 Moscow TASS in English 1946 GMT
5 Jan 90*

[Text] Riga January 5 TASS—By TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina:

Special paper for printing magazines and textbooks for the blind is no longer made in the Soviet Union. It used to be produced at the Sloka paper mill in the resort city of Jurmala in Latvia. But first deputies of the city council and then the republican parliament pointed to the incompatibility of the enterprise with the resort. The loss of pine trees and the pollution of the waters and the air were blamed on the mill.

The production of pulp was expected to stop before January 1, but it is still going on as the administration decided to use up its stock of chemical substances. However, the authorities can shut down the mill any time and 500 workers will have to leave. So far no one has talked to them about new job placements. The only thing they know is that they will retain their average monthly pay for three months after the mill is closed.

Hundreds of buyers of the sort of paper intended for making punch cards, printed matter for the blind and paper cups for soft drinks already appealed to the arbiter court, which, however, declared the enterprise not responsible for breaking long-term contracts. It is not clear yet who is to pay compensation to the customers.

Concern over the state of the environment and care for people's health motivated the Latvian parliament's decision to ban the transportation of nitrilacrylic acid via the Ventspils port on the Baltic Sea. It was the only port in the Soviet Union from which 45,000 tonnes of the acid were taken annually by tankers to many European countries. Since January 1, loading has been stopped. The supplier factory in Saratov was told that its product would no longer be received in Ventspils. The factory understood that it meant the closing down of a joint Soviet-Turkish enterprise that comprised two organisations from Latvia. The republic expected the first shipment of the joint enterprise's products—nitrilacrylic plates for making sanitary equipment and other things—to arrive in February.

The cost of damage caused by the loss of supplies amounts to 60 million roubles. Estimated 30 million dollars will have to be paid in compensation for cutting supplies of the acid. Ventspils's budget will lose nearly 1.2 million dollars. Imports to Latvia of raw and other materials, including artificial fibres made of the nitrilacrylic acid, are expected to be curtailed, too. As a result, the output of consumer goods will be reduced.

Medical Cooperative's Activities Exposed

*PM0801142790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
4 Jan 90 Second Edition p 2*

[L. Ivchenko report under rubric "Returning to Printed Article": "They Returned What Was Not Theirs"]

[Text] The story of the many months' battle for state interests and social justice related in the article "Grimaces of 'Treatment and Consultation [LiK]'" (PRAVDA No. 273, 1989) has finally come to an end. An act has been signed on the restoration of the hospital on the Entuziastov Highway in Moscow to its previous legal owner—the city Administration for Economically Accountable Medical Institutions.

As the reader may remember, this luxurious new seven-storey building, fully equipped and belonging to the economically accountable homeopathic polyclinic, housed the "LiK" medical cooperative, which provided medical assistance at frankly extortionate prices. Huge personal incomes were drawn from state funds and resources. This became possible through the sponsorship of the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee [Gorispolkom] Main Administration for Health [GUZM]. This sponsorship was not accidental: The main administration and "LiK" founded a joint enterprise that guaranteed that the "partner" could obtain equipment in short supply to the detriment of state medical institutions.

And so "LiK" has handed over its keys. This was preceded by a serious examination, in addition to the PRAVDA article, carried out by the USSR People's Control Committee and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Ministry of Finance Control and Auditing Administration, which exposed so many gross violations and abuses in "LiK's" activities that the list took up 35 pages of typed text. The USSR State Committee on Prices fined the cooperative a sum of over R1.5 million. The auditing materials were sent to the investigation organs. The Moscow Gorispolkom, in its decision of 28 November of last year, instructed V.P. Zaytsev, chairman of the capital's Leningradskiy Rayon Soviet Ispolkom, where "LiK" was registered, "to immediately examine the question of the "LiK" cooperative, which is suspending its activities because of gross violations of financial discipline and involvement in forbidden activities... Together with the Frunzenskiy, Gagarinskiy, and Krasnopresnenskiy rayon soviet ispokoms, to suspend the work of the "LiK" cooperative's branches, created in medical institutions in these rayons... Moscow's Leningradskiy branch of the USSR

Bank for Housing and Municipal Services and Social Development is to suspend all financial operations with the "LiK" cooperative as of 28 November 1989."

Well, and what about all those people with whose blessing and connivance all these outrages were perpetrated? To be honest, there were quite a few misgivings, in readers' letters too, that the culprits would extricate themselves and avoid due liability. They did not. Although not without effort from the injured party—the Economically Accountable Medical Institutions' Administration. Its representatives, who were not invited to the ispolkom's session, literally "burst in" and demanded that things be sorted out properly. Because the campaign to rescue the culprits had already begun.

So as to present a better picture of what kind of a man the protectors were planning to leave at the head of the city's health service, let us quote an extract from an RSFSR Ministry of Finance Control and Auditing Administration act: "There were cases of expensive medical equipment, including imported equipment, being transferred **free of charge** on the instructions of the GUZM... from the assets of the city institutions to the assets of the joint enterprise. Thus, on the instructions of R.G. Anufriyev, deputy head of the main administration, K-2 anesthetic equipment (a complete set) produced in Hungary and with an original value of R7,708, 'Polinarkon-2' anesthetic equipment with an original value of R1,179, and a 'DSK-4-1' monitoring system for four patients with an original value of R25,410, were transferred to 'LiK's' assets from the city's No. 7 children's hospital on 19 September 1988. In the same way, on R.G. Anufriyev's instructions 'Polynarkon-4-F' anesthetic equipment and an 'RO-2' respirator worth a total of R4,955, were transferred from the assets of the city's No.9 children's hospital to 'LiK's' assets on 14 September 1988. On the request of Anufriyev again, a Japanese 16-channel encephalograph was sold to the 'LiK' cooperative to assist in practical health care for R120 (the agreed price)..."

By the way, part of the equipment bought by 'LiK' has not been used at all. For example, complete sets of items for clinical laboratories at rural medical institutions (which villages missed out on them?)—are not in plentiful supply. The cooperative removed this whole collection of equipment in very short supply, acquired at preferential prices, leaving the state medical institution with bare and sometimes broken-down walls. The Moscow health service is now faced with the task of how to equip it again. This is another direction the main administration leaders' activities took, with the help of Yu. Belyakov, first deputy chairman of the Moscow Gorispolkom.

By a decision of the Moscow Gorispolkom, Comrade A.M. Lukashev, chief of the health sector of the Moscow Gorispolkom department for the development of the social sphere, was severely reprimanded for the absence of sufficient supervision of the Main Administration for Health. The chief of the Main Administration for

Health, Comrade A.M. Moskvichev, USSR deputy minister of health, was reprimanded for his failure to take timely measures and the unfounded renewal of the contract with 'LiK' in July of last year. It was decided that Comrade R.G. Anufriyev, first deputy chief of GUZM, would be released from the post he holds.

Medical consultations will begin in literally a few days, after disinfection and urgent repair had been carried out in the returned building. Surgical operations will also begin again—at prices five to ten times cheaper than in the cooperative.

Orthodox Christmas Services 'Very Crowded'

LD0701114890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2310 GMT 6 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 7 Jan (TASS)—TASS correspondent Anna Grigoryeva writes:

Christmas services at all Russian Orthodox churches, which mark this festival on 7 January (25 December old style), were very crowded. It is noticeable that there are many more churches this year. It is also common knowledge that since April 1988 over 3,000 parish churches have been returned to the Russian Church. Over the same period about 20 Orthodox monasteries have been reopened in the territory of the USSR.

As ever, many churchgoers were drawn to the service at the Patriarchal Cathedral of the Epiphany in Moscow. The congregation, both native Muscovites and guests in the Soviet capital—diplomats, tourists and foreign students attending Moscow's higher educational establishments—were full of admiration for the singing of the wonderful choir. The icon-lamps and candles formed thousands of small shining lights. These were reflected with particular brightness in the gilt of the recently restored carved columns and in the frames of the cathedral's iconostasis.

Moscow believers were summoned to the services by the bells of the Danilov Holy Monastery, the Church of the Assumption standing within the grounds of the Novodevichye Monastery and the churches of the missions of the Antioch, Bulgarian and Jerusalem patriarchates.

After the service a Christmas message was read out from Pimen, patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. It had been sent in advance by him to all Orthodox eparchies, both inside the country and abroad.

Greetings believers on the occasion of the Christmas festival Patriarch Pimen in his message called on them to perform works of charity, to aid the sick, the helpless and the lonely and to zealously participate in the prayers being raised to God in every church. The document emphasized the need for believers by their honest toil to promote changes directed at revitalizing the spiritual, moral, cultural and all other aspects of people's lives.

Many voices responded in unison with "Save us Lord" to the concluding words of the patriarch's message: "Let

us pray to God that the year we have now entered upon will be a year of blessings and prosperity and a year of peace throughout the world for all peoples."

In accordance with tradition the patriarch's message will be read out every day of the festive services.

Lithuanian Ideology Chief Views Political Changes

LD1212144489 Vilnius GIMTASIS KRASTAS
in *Lithuanian No 45*, 10-15 Nov 89 p 3

[Commentary by Justas Vincas Paleckis, chief of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Ideology Section, in "The Week" column]

[Text] Immediately following All Souls' Day [1 November], deputies assembled for the 14th Lithuanian SSR's [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Session. Perhaps the mood of concentrated seriousness prevailing at the session was influenced by that day. True, a mixture of activities took place at the session; however, the overall results were considerable. We finally have acquired laws on citizenship and referendums that have been matured by time and the existing situation. Strong steps were taken toward creating a Lithuanian state. The news concerning the possibility of elections to soviet councils taking place as early as February is important.

Academician V. Statulevicius' proposals at the session are noteworthy and deserve further scrutiny. Are we ready for a parliament comprised only of professionals? Do we have a sufficient number of politicians? The brightly-lit parliament hall is hardly a suitable "hot-house" for raising politicians to a sufficiently mature state. What if a certain number of future deputies also were to work at the Supreme Soviet, participating in the most important decision making without relinquishing their basic responsibilities? The circle of those aspiring to the positions would expand immediately, and we would obviously elect a parliament that would be stronger and more capable of thought. The proposal for direct election of the Supreme Soviet chairman (and possibly, president) is also worthy of consideration. Arguments exist pro and con. In my opinion, a direct national mandate not for the "nation's leader," but for a first citizen of the republic—one who is democratic, competent, sincere and experienced—would grant him more weight and confidence in the labyrinths of the approaching difficult negotiations and in general would lend the republic more stability.

Only 5 weeks remain until the Lithuanian Communist Party's 20th Congress. New program and statute drafts have been announced and new delegates are being elected. The Lithuanian Communist Party is the first and, for the time being, the only union republic communist party that is determined to legalize the independence it has already achieved, and to proceed. Many are those in Lithuania and the vast USSR, and even in more distant states who view this unrestrainable process with suspicion and opposition, wishing failure and total fiasco

upon this congress. That is why this type of finale should not be allowed to develop: there should be neither a further split, nor uproar or scandal, nor the raising of the sum total of our demands to a level that currently is unattainable for us.

Failure would have a painful affect, not only upon the restructuring of the Communist Party. It would greatly complicate Lithuania's progress toward real statehood, independence, and democracy. In addition, the progressive forces of other communist parties, who are not sufficiently independent to call a congress, are looking to Vilnius with sincere wishes of success. What form could it take? The establishment of a democratic, moral, and reasoning Communist Party that seeks a socialism imbued with Lithuanian colors and which is prepared to cooperate on an equal basis with the CPSU and the communist parties of other union republics and the communists, social democrats, socialists, and representatives of other parties of all countries.

The "Great Coalition"—a dialog between various political forces—is especially significant in current Lithuania. A regularly-scheduled, quite constructive dialog between the Lithuanian Communist Party and Sajudis, held at the Central Committee, was intentionally supplemented with representatives of various emerging movements and parties. Every political force currently has its own program and goals (often they coincide), and proposes various means of attaining them.

This is natural and logical in a multiparty system that is emerging after a 63-year interruption. One must not imagine, however, that someone has discovered a patent for infallibility and that those who turn away from it risk finding themselves included in the ranks of "enemies of the people". Categorical sermons and slogans of "all or nothing," or "he who is not with us, is against us," and "today or never" have all been pulled out from the past. Unfortunately, they were characteristic of the old Lithuanian Communist Party, which was a composite part of the Stalinist and Brezhnevist CPSU. But the new Lithuanian Communist Party decisively rejected this view in October of 1988. What about the others? Arvydas Juozaitis is right in stating: "Even if we establish an independent but totalitarian Lithuania, Lithuania will exist no longer...."

For the first time, since 1950, light tanks rolled down Gediminas Prospect (not Stalin's and not Lenin's street) on 7 November. To put it delicately, they did not arouse enthusiasm among the majority of the Vilnius people. That is why the October Anniversary commemoration at the Hall of Artists was different—chamber music in the tradition of Gruodis and Naujalis and Vivaldi and Bach. Professor E. Janciauskas' idea came to mind: there is no alternative to the initiation of market precepts. Now we are entering the accumulation of capital stage, but those endowed with money are neither the most gentle nor most moral. History has demonstrated how cruel and

merciless this stage can be. Restrictions are unavoidable—the people, strict measures, and reality will demand them, and moreover, with the added suffix “-orship.”

The difficult past is still alive, and keeps on biting us slyly and dragging and hurling us back. In the words of K. Marx, the corpse grabs hold of the living.

Democracy thus remains the only, all-healing drug. I have in mind not just its mechanism alone. It also includes humanism and self-respect, a composite of patience and doubt, escorted by a feeling of eternal guilt.

I shall never forget Andrey Tarkovskiy's “Solarius,” in which some cosmonauts behold the reflection of their most secret sufferings, transgressions, and frightening sinister specters in the waters of a strange planet. Alfonsas Maldonis put it like this: “Every one of us has his own private hell inside him. The living and the dead burn there and those whom you judged, without being a judge, and also those you deserted along the way without standing by them.”

Those who are incapable of sensing the hell inside themselves manage to “organize” a hell in some Earthly location or another. Worse yet: a possible and total hell on the planet. Moreover, it does not really matter whether its gates are opened by nuclear, ecological, or moral catastrophe, or by contradictions existing between the affluent North and the poverty-stricken South.

Since only 10 heavy-as-stone years remain until the 21st Century, disquieting thoughts engulf one concerning the decisive limit. What will be gained if Lithuania is reborn and stands up, but later dies with the rest of the world? Or if it is the other way around?

Perhaps I am mistaken, but I would reason this way: In order for everything to develop well within that little patch of earth along the Baltic Sea, many favorable conditions are required. Not only should Lithuania become more democratic and wiser, but also the USSR, Eastern Europe, all of Europe and finally, the entire world.

Any break in this chain—so similar to that “Baltic Road” chain, that has just been extended throughout the entire world—will pass up this unique chance in our history; it will be analogous to the chance in 1918—true, a very conditional analogy, for the chance then came about as a result of the world war, while currently, a war is unthinkable.

I believe human wisdom and patience will not be lacking in the East and the West and in the North and the South. I believe the chain will remain strong and the opportunity will be seized.

Sajudis Head Reacts to Critical Article

LD0812142489 Vilnius KOMJAUNIMO TIESA in Lithuanian 24 Nov 89 p 3

[Article by USSR People's Deputy Vitautas Landsbergis, entitled “Idea and Logic,” reacting to article by Sajudis Seimas Council member Arvydas Juozaitis]

[Text] The two concepts that appear in A. Juozaitis' article, “Democracy—Is Not Just Sajudis,” (7 November 89) are not totally compatible. Democracy that is barely starting to dawn, as it is now in Lithuania, indeed needs to be cherished and defended in advance, even in one's dreams.

This fragile democracy does not lack ill-wishers who can be easily spotted among all types and various ages of the “old guard” (A. Juozaitis' term) members. It is also permissible to spot a certain danger to democracy in the lost public traditions which, in truth, even 70 or so years ago existed in Lithuania only briefly. True, “an opponent in a democracy is not an enemy” (A. Juozaitis), but a sort of necessary partner in political oppositions that are struggling, criticizing, and sometimes cooperating with one another. Democracy is the desire to win public opinion and greater trust of the voters. The desire to destroy an opponent (“enemy”) is totalitarianism. Do we know how to value an opponent in Lithuania? That is the essence of the question. Moreover, it so happens that Sajudis is teaching the government and the public, following a period of several decades, that an opponent and an opposition are necessary characteristics of democratization.

Thus, in warning the nation, A. Juozaitis fails to identify and analyze some of those well-accredited antidemocracy forces that still threaten. Perhaps he thinks everything is clear. His objective does not center on “those who exercise governmental power,” but “those who seek it.” One will not discover anything concrete here. Since the article begins and ends with Sajudis, many people will conclude that these radical “independence-seekers,” singled out by A. Juozaitis in too simplistic a fashion such as “certain ones, many of them,” are from Sajudis or speak for Sajudis.

Their rallying cry supposedly is “elect only those who are committed to vote for independence, but no others.” These others, according to A. Juozaitis, are scientists and lecturers. I fail to comprehend why they cannot also be committed to voting for independence or why this type of committal (if anyone does have it) should deserve condemnation and why these should be artificially pitted against each other.

“Independence-seekers” (states A. Juozaitis, in quotes, excusing himself, quite fittingly) may even prohibit “all others” (lecturers? nonindependence seekers?); they are convinced anticommunists who consider every government official a traitor. There are only a few activists among them, however. Even among that number, one can already perceive a model of totalitarianism. It is

fortunate indeed that democracy is forcing its way "through other windows (not necessarily those of Sajudis)...."

I would not wish to argue. Sajudis is greater than some of those unnamed individuals and so forth. I also detect a certain lack of logic in the case where mistrust of Sajudis is expressed ahead of time (God forbid should one of Sajudis' members become part of government), but a vote of confidence is granted the Lithuanian Communist Party which so far is only partially in favor of restructuring. Apparently, A. Juozaitis regards the party as already having committed itself to independence, already "becoming a normal party" that is supported by reason and responsibility. Alas, in today's somber present, things exist thus only if socialist realism becomes one of the possible tendencies or bright future visions.

A critical and realistic appraisal of the Lithuanian Communist Party's current portrait would indicate something different, not yet so Christmassy. Shown on our own TV screens are leaders' lips saying, "enough of democracy playacting" and hands raised without prohibiting further destruction of the archives. Perhaps my colleague did not hear or see these things and therefore is mistaken. Democracy—we can't deny it—is not only Sajudis, but for the time being, it can mostly be found in Sajudis.

Implications of Multiparty System Viewed

LD0501142390 Vilnius KOMJAUNIMO TIESA
in Lithuanian 28 Nov 89 pp 1, 2

[Article by Special Correspondent Edmundas Ganusauskas, entitled "Will Only Daughter Share Her Dowry?"]

[Excerpt] The Party and politics are related and not simply because both begin with the same letter. It is as if the party's reason for being involves creating some sort of policy, since today we live not by bread alone, but also by politics. This is not surprising—some type of phenomenon had to spring up following a prolonged period of general agreement. Here is something else we are not accustomed to. It seems the word "politics" does not necessarily require a plural connotation; the party on the other hand, has long recognized us generally in the singular only. It can not be said that it is easy for it to renounce its only daughter's merits, even currently. At the next, the 16th, Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Session, we are again going to discuss in some fashion the leading and driving force behind Soviet society by will of its deputies. The existing paradox was demonstrated by votes to postpone resolution of this nearly ancient question. One might venture to guess that these votes were cast by parliamentarians for whom the Sixth Article of the Constitution will hold very little meaning after the elections.

So many similar opinions, concerning the Lithuanian Communist Party, have been expressed in the Party press and on official television, that it was truly strange

to hear at the session the words by Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party Secretary, S. Gedraitis, who said: "I think we will be correct in allowing congress delegates, who will widely represent the Communist Party, to express their opinion concerning this paragraph." Republic Military Commissar A. Vysoskis thinks that following our Bureau's visit to Moscow, a Politburo decision should already have reached Lithuania. There remains the task of acquainting every communist with it and they will present their opinions. However, Academician V. Statulevicius noted, a meeting does not pass without decisions on the sixth paragraph being taken. "We are starting to harm ourselves. People think this paragraph prevents registration of other parties."

In spite of this, membership in parties is on the increase in Lithuania. New or restored parties are more than compensating for Communist Party losses. For instance, the social democrats are already preparing for their 14th Congress. True, 58 years have passed since their last, the 13th Congress. As to its beginning? The ideals of national rebirth and social justice were clearly detailed in VARPAS by Vincas Kudirka, a hundred years ago. Two socialist movement currents were forming in Lithuania, at that time; social democrats had tied their goals to the urban areas and social nationalists were attempting to speak out more on behalf of the Lithuanian peasantry. The social democrats proclaimed themselves a party in 1896. The LSDP [Lithuanian Social Democratic Party] contributions to Lithuanian independence are indisputable. Social democrats opposed the Antanas Smetona regime following the 1926 upheaval. Enlightened individuals such as the brothers Birzizka [Vaclovas and Mykolas], Andrius Domasevicius, Antanas Zvironas, and Vincas Cepinskis were to be found among social democratic activists.

Several weeks ago I came across a not too impressive small newspaper, a new issue of LITHUANIA'S SOCIAL DEMOCRAT. A corner ad states: "LSDP Headquarters." Apparently, the party's head office has found shelter in the central lecture hall of the "Zinija" Association. Someone is on duty there two hours per day. One can stop in and obtain some literature. One can also obtain a bit of information. A telephone is available on the premises.

Having arrived at the Vilnius Area LSDP Conference, I was immediately able to surmise that members of the party, themselves in the process of being restored, are not subject to any grand illusions. People view parties with mistrust. Even the new and restored ones are viewed with mistrust. For some, worthy party goals are blanked out by the word "socialism." A third group of people has no idea what social democracy represents.

Thus, LSDP envisions no great designs in the political arena. On the other hand, there had been a period in the history of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party in 1936 when the A. Smetona Government put an end to

activities of other parties, except for those of the nationalist party, and many social democrats became active through social work. They became involved in matters of social security, cooperation, disability funds, professional associations, education and culture. As I understand this, acquisition of governing power will not be its primary goal even this time. An idea put into words and of course, an action directed against social hurts exert an influence upon the political existence of a society. For instance, 40 thousand Vilniusites are without apartments. It was easy to sense, in the course of the discussions, that the principle of social justice was especially respected in this auditorium.

There are 163 LDSP members in Vilnius currently. Many of them are concentrated in groups at: the University, the Academy of Sciences, "Fermentas," "Venta" and the Television and Radio Committee. There exists, so to speak, an intellectual nucleus of—24 scientists, 14 jurists and 11 each, economists and medical doctors. Deputies Juozas Olekas, Kazimieras Antanavicius, Zita Slicyte and Kazimieras Uoka—comprise what amounts to a social democratic faction at the USSR Parliament. "What We Seek,"—was a program article published, six months ago, in the first issue of the LITHUANIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRAT. The goals are as beautiful as they are far removed and difficult to attain. Social democrats, although aware of our present situation, believe they are capable nevertheless of creating a society wherein freedom, justice and solidarity will reign supreme. [passage omitted]

Meeting With Razumovskiy Discussed

LD2812143989 Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian
24 Nov 89 p 3

[Interview with Mindaugas Stakvilevicius, first secretary of Siauliai City Party Committee and Deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet, by Sigitas Bleda: "Bravery Is Not Enough—Wisdom Is Also Required."—date and place not given]

[Text] First secretaries of Siauliai City and Mazeikiai and Silute Rayon Party Committees [raykoms] met in Moscow with G. Razumovskiy, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The first secretary of Siauliai City Party Committee [gorkom], M. Stakvilevisius, reports on their conversation.

The recent discussion between CPSU Politburo members and members and candidate members of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party is truly an extraordinary occurrence. Lithuanian communists and the public are holding lively discussions on information concerning this given in the press, radio, and television. Moscow's image as the "strong center" is slowly fading, irrespective of future decisions by the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party. Fewer and fewer commands and directions emanate from there and more frequent discussions and consultations of

other opinions are taking place. Is this perhaps the start of future ties of cooperation, independence, and equal partnership?

We are discussing this subject with Mindaugas Stakvilevicius, the first secretary of Siauliai Gorkom and USSR Supreme Soviet deputy. The reason for this conversation is also important: Recently, a group of first secretaries of Lithuania's western border raykoms sent a letter to M. Gorbachev. Elected representatives took this letter to Moscow and gave it to Georgiy Razumovskiy, CPSU Politburo candidate member and CPSU Central Committee Secretary, and discussed it with him.

[Bleda] Tell us please, why has the necessity arisen to write such a letter and to send it to the General Secretary of the CPSU? What were the goals of the letter's authors—the first secretaries of 17 rayons?

[Stakvilevicius] I would say this group of secretaries was united by the general concern among communists and the responsibility for Lithuanian Communist Party's future. I have no doubt that the Lithuanian Communist Party's independence will be announced at the 20th Congress. To proclaim does not mean to become independent. Thus, in my opinion, not only should the program and the party law be adopted at the meeting, but also several other documents that would define the actual mechanism for the creation of the Lithuanian Communist Party, as well as its independence. This raises many questions; but after all, the success of independence depends greatly on how much good will the CPSU Central Committee shows us, or at least understanding of our goals. Finally, the degree of the Lithuanian Communist Party's independence will, no doubt, be affected by restructuring within the CPSU Central Committee itself, and much will depend on how much progress it makes. All this needs clarification before the Lithuanian Party Congress.

We discussed these topics to a considerable extent at our Mazeikiai meeting. Although there were some differences of opinion, we reached a conclusion that the document on cooperation between the Lithuanian Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union can be and must be founded upon dialogue. Then the idea arose to write the letter and to take it to the Kremlin. Without entertaining any hopes that we might be received by M. Gorbachev personally, we decided to address our letter to G. Razumovskiy, who we know concerns himself with Party matters. Three of us carried out the mission of presenting the letter: The first secretaries of Mazeikiai and Silute Rayons, R. Songaila and V. Sturys, and me.

[Bleda] Please comment on the letter's contents.

[Stakvilevicius] The letter explains concisely the political situation, that has evolved in Lithuania and the fact that ideas of state sovereignty and economic independence have become finally embedded within the consciousness of Republic communists. Various political movements are active and the Lithuanian Communist Party is forced

to work under complicated conditions. We stressed—good relations with the Union and the CPSU are vital for us in our course toward political and economic independence. New forms of Party relations should be sought for that reason. In the letter addressed to the General Secretary we stated what, in our estimation, are important problematic questions that require a dialog: That comprises preparation of a CPSU restructuring concept in facing the 28th Congress, the establishment of a mechanism for new relations cooperation among the union republic communist parties, and other. We expressed our hope in the letter that CPSU will agree with the idea of Lithuanian Communist Party's restructuring and will support its goal of working independently.

[Bleda] It would be interesting to hear how your trip succeeded and with whom you met at the Central Committee of the CPSU.

[Stakvilevicius]—We spent two days in Moscow. When we called G. Razumovskiy's office prior to our departure, we were told we could be received by his assistant only. Thus, on our way there we did not entertain very high hopes. We did have an opportunity to meet with several responsible CC CPSU officials, however, we could not initiate a dialog with them: There can be no federalism within the Communist Party and everything has been thus ordered by Lenin. Thus, what is well understood in Lithuania by all of us appears quite shocking to some apparatchiks especially when one views life through the windows of the gigantic Central Committee Building. We had to demonstrate a great deal of stubbornness before we were received by G. Razumovskiy. A half hour was allotted for this audience; however, it lasted three hours....

[Bleda] It would be really difficult to give a concise account of what transpired during this long conversation. Give it a try, however....

[Stakvilevicius] During the course of the conversation we pointed out the motives behind the Lithuanian Communist Party's independence—a nation seeking statehood also requires an independent party to represent it. We said the CPSU is hopelessly falling behind dynamic political changes that are especially evident in Lithuania, that our communists cannot wait until the massive party center finally starts moving, that now is the time to think about how our party is going to associate with the CPSU, and later with the Communist Parties of other republics. We pointed out that the closer will our cooperation be, the better will it be for Lithuania and the country.

When one of us pointed out the processes taking place in Lithuania would, undoubtedly, have an impact on the communist parties of other republics, G. Razumovskiy interrupted us with: "Don't decide for the other Republics." Tension was released when we touched upon economic independence. The CC CPSU secretary noted,

as a shortcoming the fact, Lithuania's leading economists often change the concept of economic independence. He expressed interest in the status of openness and democracy, the level of pluralism and the role played by mass information media in the Republic's restructuring. Concurrently, he voiced some concern over the situation in its Party organization and analyzed documents prepared for Lithuanian CP's Congress.

[Bleda] Did this conversation indicate that Moscow is prepared to understand Lithuanian Communists' goals?

[Stakvilevicius] The Secretary stressed the necessity for a unified CPSU, noting that by staying within its structure we will enjoy wider prospects, and talked about unity within a new concept in preparing for the 28th Congress of the CPSU—the new laws that will comprise legalization of political, structural, and organizational independence of union republic communist parties. Unfortunately, however, these laws will be announced only at the beginning of next year. Even so, republic communist parties will be mentioned there as CPSU subunits. At the same time, he noted the Lithuanian CP has its independence currently since the center does not meddle in its affairs. That is why he asked: What other additional independence do you desire? The Secretary of the CC CPSU especially stressed the importance of Party unity.

[Bleda] Recently I had the opportunity to participate in the Siauliai City Party Conference where a large number of communists stated they would recognize only such CPSU restructuring, as would tend toward instituting an association of union republic communist parties. Does this idea exist within the Kremlin offices?

[Stakvilevicius] Perhaps it does exist; however, we did not sense this. It appeared to us, that of all the people we spoke to, G. Razumovskiy is perhaps the closest to comprehending that the CPSU principles contain not only old postulations, but also frozen dogmas. We did hold lively discussions on the subject. Perhaps he came to doubt the dogma about the rejection of federalism; however he did not show this—understanding politicians is not that simple. But it was good to talk with him since one could follow the live reaction and sense the thought's and especially the concern's progress. I think we did understand Razumovskiy's position, and he ours.

[Bleda] You have returned home and your impressions have had time to settle, as they say. It is now possible to ask yourself—was the trip to Moscow worth it and did anything useful come of it?

[Stakvilevicius] There exists only one answer—it was necessary to go there. We were at the Kremlin 10-15 November, while the discussions of the CC Lithuanian CP members at the CC CPSU Politburo took place four days later. I think our visit has had a positive significance for this meeting and has served to make it successful. The Lithuanian Communist Party is sufficiently mature for independence and there is no other way. During our stay at the Kremlin, we sensed the great concern of the CC CPSU's leadership—since our political

and economic recovery will be much more difficult if we do not get along and hold ourselves aloof from one another. Fears exist that if the republic communist parties become isolated, the country's evolution might turn into an accidental process and might drift uncontrollably further away from democracy. I, too, feel the cold of such a danger; it forces one to reconsider prior to taking such a decisive step. In other words, bravery alone does not suffice especially for those leading—wisdom is also required.

The success of the Lithuanian Communist Party's extraordinary congress and the unity and rallying of the Republic Party Organization ranks will depend on how party restructuring is going to develop. No decent communist is desirous of a split within the Lithuanian Communist Party. A democratic and independent Lithuania is everyone's goal. The problem, however, rests in how to accomplish this: With one big splash or daily, painstakingly difficult work? Frankly speaking, that which is written in the Lithuanian CP Draft Statute is unsatisfactory. Words of action, rather than an abundance of words, are needed. We all have reason to consult and to ponder to improve things for all of us. Let us work relying on reason, conscience, and great responsibility, rather than on preferences and aversions.

[Bleida] Thank you for the interview.

Correction to Laanem Address on Estonian Komsomol
90UN0509A

The following correction pertains to the item entitled "Laanem Addresses Estonian Komsomol Congress" published on page 76 of the 4 January DAILY REPORT: page 76, column two, sourceline should read: 90UN0509A Tallinn MOLODIZH ESTONII in Russian 25 Nov 89 pp 1,2 (correcting publication name).

Correction to Estonian Komsomol Resolutions
90UN0507A

The following correction pertains to the item entitled "Estonian Komsomol Congress Resolutions" published on page 82 of the 4 January DAILY REPORT: page 82, column one, sourceline should read: 90UN0507A Tallinn MOLODIZH ESTONII in Russian 29 Nov 89 p 1 (correcting publication name).

Economic

Government Considers Development of Kemerovo
LD0301183390 Moscow TASS in English 1811 GMT
3 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 3 TASS—A conference at the USSR Council of Ministers on January 2-3 focused on questions of converting the Kemerovo Region to operation on the pay-your-own-way principles and the region's socio-economic development.

Lev Voronin, first deputy prime minister of the USSR, who chaired the conference, said that in the next few days the last clarifications would be introduced in a program to recover the economy and switch this powerful industrial region of the country to the profit-and-loss accounting system.

Senior executives of ministries and departments answered questions by representatives of the working people. It became clear during the conference that several basic issues have already been solved and agreement was soon to be reached on part of them. These include labour remuneration, currency deductions from foreign economic activity, allotting funds for comprehensive ecological examination, financing social programs, supply and other issues.

The conference noted that the working people's impatience and their desire to expedite the solution of vital problems was understandable. However, each issue was to be harmonised with the specific ministry and department, brought into correlation with the general plans for the country's development, and measured up with the decisions of the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. There are no hurdles now to implementing what was planned and the program for Kuzbass will soon be adopted.

In the next few days representatives of the working people of Kuzbass will meet senior executives and specialists of several ministries and departments to harmonise and clarify some figures and indicators for a final endorsement of the programme for the socio-economic development of the region.

Commentary on Government Economic Program
LD0401140690 Moscow World Service in English
1210 GMT 4 Jan 90

[Yuriy Rogachev commentary]

[Text] Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov has published comments on the new economic program in the latest issue of the government bulletin PRAVITEL-STVENNIY VESTNIK, expressing confidence that the measures to improve the economic situation will yield positive results in the economy and social sphere. He emphasized that the program had won a vote of confidence at the second Congress of Peoples' Deputies. The congress backed the government's policy of stage-by-stage economic reform. Our commentator Yuriy Rogachev reminds us what stages the program includes.

It will cover 6 years (?in) three steps. The first is this year given to emergency measures, overhauling finances, and curbing inflation. The budget deficit of R120 billion early last year is to be halved by the end of this year. The next stage is to span 1991-92, stabilizing the economy and raising the purchasing power of the ruble. Beginning with 1993 we are to start gradually boosting the economic growth in the conditions of a free socialist market. The crucial feature of the government's program is

consistent action to solve social problems, and the saturation of the consumer market as soon as possible. Already next year the consumer goods production is to be raised by a third. Defense industries are to contribute to that process. Over 100 defense plants are to be converted this year. About 50 percent of the defense industry capacities are to work for peaceful purposes, supplying civilian populations, and by 1995 this (?figure) is further to rise to 60 percent.

Great importance is attached in the program to food supply. Stress is laid on cutting down losses. So far we have been losing in transporting, storing, and processing, more food than we import from abroad. Storage and processing facilities are to be considerably increased in the coming years.

The government program was sharply criticized at the second Congress of Peoples' Deputies. Many speakers found it not radical enough. Still it was adopted by (?an) absolute majority of the congress, though with certain amendments. The government succeeded in convincing the legislators that it was the most realistic program in the history of the Soviet state. The government intends to act resolutely, but keeping each new step in line with the country's real potential. While backing the government program, the congress authorized the Supreme Soviet to facilitate the passage of the fundamental economic laws on ownership, on land, on socialist enterprises, on taxes, and other acts, accelerating the economic reform, and giving the Soviet economy the character of plurality in the methods of production.

Ideological Objections to Ownership Refuted

904A0099A Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 12 Dec 89 p 2

[Report on interview with Yaroslav Kuzminov, candidate of economic sciences, senior scientific associate at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics, by Ye. Leontyeva: "We Discuss the Draft Law on Ownership. To Strengthen Stability Against Misfortune?"; date and place not given]

[Text] It is tempting to discuss drafts in an interview with venerable persons. This is how it has most often been. But the interesting thing is that the young economists have reacted more rapidly and energetically to the draft legislation submitted for discussion. Today we carry on the pages of our newspaper an interview by our correspondent with candidate of economic sciences, senior associate at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics Yaroslav Kuzminov. Some of our author's thoughts may be controversial and ambiguous but his original and clearly devised system of views on the problem under discussion will undoubtedly be of interest.

[Leontyeva] Yaroslav Ivanovich, you will agree that the drafts of the law that should be key in the life of our society have not evoked an instantaneous and stormy outburst of opinions in the press. Are we stirring only

slowly? For this is precisely a case in which no stirring is required: Every editorial office has always received mail about ownership, and still does....

[Kuzminov] In the larger sense a national debate on this particular law makes no sense. You ask me why? In my opinion, for two reasons. When discussing ownership, the Soviet person today still does not have any idea of the essential nature of the problem. For example, that very important question of who owns the land and the main means of production—the republic or the center?—has no economic meaning. The answer will depend on the society in which it is inscribed—a narrow national society or a broader one.

The fact that we are totally unable to move away from the phrases in the circle in which it has become customary to move also hampers the examination of the essential nature of drafts. For many people the concept of private ownership seems to be the word "exploitation," and behind this the shadow of the capitalist. This triple coupling leads to a state of stupor that leaves no room for other logic. For what, they say, were we fighting in 1917? And no matter how many times it is repeated that the objective level of exploitation here is much higher than in any European country where private ownership flourishes, this thought cannot be drummed into their heads. So it turns out that a person is guided not by economic criteria. Not even by social criteria.

Frankly, I am waiting for the only effect that will be felt from discussion of these draft laws, namely, that the people will begin little by little to become accustomed to unfamiliar, unusual words. They are not so strange.

[Leontyeva] Well fine, discussion is one thing, the adoption of a law another. Let us consider what we want and what we can achieve by passing a law on ownership.

[Kuzminov] First, most people already want to destroy the depersonalization and neutralization of ownership and democratize it. This is equalizing the rights of its various kinds of subjects and allowing competition between them. It seems to me that this is the point where an overwhelming majority of those taking part in this present discussion meet. Both the parliamentary discussion and the one that, although inconsistent, is taking place in the mass media.

In what do they differ? First of all in terms of ideological motives. There are two central points of disagreement. First there is the dilemma between all-union and republic ownership. But it seems to me that discussion here will produce little. Why? Because essentially it is a question of the form of our state rather than ownership. Here, in my opinion, it is quite unimportant who will carry out the function of commander stemming from economics—the center or the republic.

Why am I so categorical about this? In all civilized countries where they manage without state ownership (except for land) the sovereignty of any part of the state from a county or a state to the central government is

regulated beautifully by the right of that part to impose those taxes on economic activity that the leadership of the state and the federal leadership deem necessary.

The experience gained in world economics proves very well that state ownership and ownership by the state or the province of production enterprises are inefficient and burdensome forms of economic activity for the society.

The second ideological theme in which there are major disagreements is whether or not there should be private ownership. If we take a sober look at our economic life today then we see, first, that even according to Marx private ownership does exist here. It exists in the form of the cooperatives, because they are nothing other than collective private enterprises that are obviously oriented on maximizing profit. This is the only normal market enterprise that we have allowed ourselves.

[Leontyeva] Well, and what about exploitation here?

[Kuzminov] I have thought a great deal about what it is now. The simplest, deliberate case is that a person does not work and exploits others who work for him. But no normal capitalist, with the exception of a very narrow stratum of rentiers, who have now been reduced to a minimum in the countries of the West, can boast that he does not work. He very often works with greater effort and more efficiently than his employees. Where, then, are the criteria? How does this capitalist develop at the expense of others. It is not by chance that the concept of exploitation had practically disappeared from economic thinking in the West by the second half of the 20th century.

Is there not in this some reflection of the great social shifts that have taken place in the structure of society? Evidently there is. Of the old relations of exploitation only a few symptoms remain that remind us of it. So is it not better for us to embrace the viewpoint of the normal, qualified jurist, who even at the level of understanding Roman law at the VUZ level has understood what private ownership is. It is indivisible and limited by nothing except the will of the owner; the property, whose owner enjoys the right of doing with it anything that he deems necessary, barring only infringing on the interests of other people and not interfering in the sphere of their private property.

This is independent ownership that cannot be taken from a person. A thief may take it, but not an official.

If you do not like the expression "private property" call it something else. But at the same time I am confident that if the true concepts of ownership are explained consistently and calmly to each person, appealing not to ideological postulates but to the senses and the interests, then it will "get through" to him.

For does not everyone of us want to keep what he has worked for and built for his children. For now there is quite serious discussion of the question of introducing an

inheritance tax of 20 percent to 50 percent so that, God forbid, the heirs should not live on the earned income of their own fathers. It turns out that a person must move out of his own family home after selling it if he is not rich, and cannot redeem that home after the death of his parents.

Who of us wants what his own production collective has worked for to be taken away? This is what we should be talking about. The enthusiasm in the discussion of the future law on ownership must be turned precisely in this direction. In the direction that emerges at the problem of economic activity, which directly or indirectly determines whether or not a person will be interested in increasing the property that has come to hand. Or he will simply unscrew the nut that it needs and throw everything else away as useless.

For some reason we persistently talk about how many kinds and subjects of ownership we have. I even got tired of striking them out of the basic draft of the law. The impression is created that the authors want to provide for every contingency in life. But you cannot provide for everything. Some forms will necessarily come into being. What then, change the law?

We often limit ourselves to declaration instead of research. So, for example, what is the main kind of ownership in our country, where virtually no one can be an owner? It is interesting that here we have a unique form of ownership that also defines the effect on people's motivation in labor and in economic activity in general. This is ownership of the work place.

Let us look at this in greater detail. Wages, orders, waiting lists for housing, for a car, for a garden plot.... In general there are many things that a worker in a free market cannot acquire because he wants to keep a work place for himself where he can obtain all this. It is better to move higher in the system. We all know that the iron ring into which a person fears to fall is not one of production but of distribution.

Here we have ownership of the work place—it perhaps forms the most rigid framework of our economic system because all rational, well-considered economic activity revolves around it. What does any owner try to do? He tries to maximize the effect from it available to him. Let me give an example. A plant has the chance of purchasing for R1 million or \$1 million a line that it needs. It would seem quite obvious that the first version is preferable. But no. Many choose the version involving a million in foreign exchange rubles. There is an obvious economic marasmus, if you will pardon the expression. Why select the worse version? Are the plant leaders not crazy men? Yes and no. The fact is that the director and the group of people close to him will each get two or three trips to see their contract partner abroad. That is, they maximize the usefulness of their work place.

I disagree with the assertion that as a class the bureaucracy is virtually the owner of public property. If they really did own, for example, this million convertible

rubles then the bureaucrat would not throw it to the wind, but would be thinking of his children's future. In the scheme of things this million is nothing; what counts is what becomes available for a person through the million—the trips, the little gifts from the company, being able to purchase things abroad....

So where does the situation with ownership at the work place lead? To a situation in which a person loses all incentive to work better than others. Very vital stereotypes of the public awareness operate here. For example, comparative principles. The hormones of being a community develop randomly in a collective, particularly if it is not burdened, and this very often happens. In general any attempt to alter something or single it out, even something that does not require anything from anyone, costs the individual too much. Even more any attempt to force others to alter something in their activity.

On the other hand it is not difficult to preserve one's own work place with its boons without particular effort. So we need to rid ourselves of ownership of the work place as a determining economic phenomenon.

[Leontyeva] The thought of the work place as property is an interesting one. But there is another, which a person regards as the highest degree of freedom. This is his personal property.

[Kuzminov] Here there are many illusions. Personal property here is, let us be candid, in a half-strangled state even though everyone says something such as what is gained through labor should be inalienable. Labor is an integral element of a person's property. Nevertheless, in practice we encounter, to put it mildly, a hostile attitude from state organs toward the owners of personal property. We recall the ban on building underground garages beneath orchard buildings, or on building a second story. Or it was not allowed to put stoves in them. There were such crazes.

What is the rational economic thought in all of this? In my opinion, there is only one: To strengthen in a person his ability to stand up to misfortunes, as one of Saltykov-Shchedrin's heroes said. If, they say, you see one of the denizens eating gruel with butter, take it away and give it to the dogs. Otherwise the ability to deal with misfortune will disappear. Let a person always feel that even in his own home he is nevertheless not a full owner.

Where am I leading? Well, to the fact that personal property is the last refuge of people who want to work for something more palpable than communist horizons—this has been choked and weakened. Because of this, the motivation for labor has also been weakened.

[Leontyeva] How can we extricate ourselves from this serious situation, which is complicated by the fact that there is nothing for a person to buy and nowhere to put his money, and as a result the incentive for labor has

fallen even lower? A number of economists are suggesting that apartments and land and dachas be put up for sale. Let them become personal property....

[Kuzminov] The worker here has already been dispossessed so many times: In 1918 and 1929, and after the war in accordance with the well-known decree of the extremes in kolkhoz ownership. Nikita Sergeyevich dispossessed him at the end of his rule, when he wanted to whip us on to communism. He had little faith in personal ownership and transmission through legacy. This is the danger. But we must sell land all the same if we want to revive personal property and belief in it. Why do I declaim precisely for land? It is there, and besides it is "worthless," and you get nothing if you sell it. The apartments still have to be built. We see no rapid rates of construction. But if we sell what there is the people will go on strike. I understand very well a man who has worked for 25 years at an enterprise and lived with his family in some cramped quarters, and suddenly they say to him: "You are excused, but you have no money for an apartment...." So we must now sell only what is dead-weight.

[Leontyeva] But a person will buy even land only if we create in society an atmosphere of inviolability of personal property.

[Kuzminov] Yes, this is the main issue. In this sense the draft Law on Ownership is declarative. If only it could include a system of public explanation of the proposition that ownership is independent, that it cannot be encroached upon.

[Leontyeva] It is also probably necessary, is it not, to outline more clearly and fully those articles in the drafts that provide guarantees against alienation of property?

[Kuzminov] Most unfortunately, except perhaps for the draft from the ecologists, I have not seen any guarantees about the inviolability of ownership in any of the drafts submitted, no matter what the language used for the presentation. Moreover, in the final section of the main draft it talks about the impermissibility of alienation thus: Property cannot be alienated from the owner except in cases when such alienation occurs on the bases of and under procedure established by legislative enactments of the USSR and union republics in state or public interests, with compensation paid for the damage done by the alienation.

What does this mean? It means that at any moment in the future they may take from you everything that you have earned just by invoking the procedure in an appropriate decision. For example, a decision by a rayon soviet that is in accordance with a USSR legislative enactment. Within that enactment it is quite possible to be motivated by the thought that in this case the alienation of your property will be for the good of the rest.

[Leontyeva] For example, they might take away your dacha and pay you just pennies for it, or give you a piece of wild land two hundred kilometers away.

[Kuzminov] Yes, does this kind of guarantee for your property please you? It is simply a mockery. I fear that this paragraph of the law may be the last straw in eliminating those residues of rational economic motivation that the state has left to us.

[Leontyeva] In this regard I would be more pleased with the draft submitted by the ecologists. That draft states that "property may not be alienated from its owner except as a sentence imposed by the courts." You will agree that the sentence of a court and a decision by a rayon executive committee are different things.

[Kuzminov] Of course they are. Although I am still not about to place any great hopes in our courts. We also need guarantees of a different kind. We need legislative reinforcement for the corresponding taxes. Two limits must be set on fiscal robbery of property. The first limit is that it should not be possible to impose inheritance tax if it is the only property that a person owns. These are fundamental civilized measures that are implemented in all normal countries. Second, we should clearly describe the limit of taxes on property (including income).

[Leontyeva] Thus you are calling not for amendments to be made to the drafts, but changes in the ideology of the law, with the emphasis on guarantees and protection of property in general. Is this so?

[Kuzminov] Yes, we must consistently instill into the awareness of the public respect for property. Moreover, I emphasize that we should do this not only in theory, not only on the pages of the newspapers, but in practice. To this end it is essential to include all state mechanisms, the court, the militia, and the procuracy.

I also think that we are indulging in a certain euphoria about the collective forms of ownership. Or, more accurately, about combining ownership and the worker. Even in the preamble to the future law it is written that ownership is incompatible with alienation of the worker from the means of production. This means that the worker must work using his own means of production. Fine if this is a laboring peasant farm. But what about a plant? Does it mean that all plants must be transferred to the collective ownership of the workers?

A dangerous trend. The discussion goes on as if there were no Yugoslavia in the world, whose economy has shown the major inefficiency of the so-called production democracy and ownership by labor collectives.

Let us take the following model of the situation: A man works and at the same time he is the owner of the enterprise. It would seem that he will care for his own enterprise and obtain part of the profits. But what is decisive in his behavior—his interests as a worker or as an owner? I think that in this case (if we look at a normal situation rather than gambling in stocks and shares involving superprofits) his income as a worker is greater than his income as an owner. Here his interest as a worker enables him to suppress the other interest. Can such a man permit himself to be made redundant in

order to reorganize production? No, he will seek out the version that preserves his own usual labor function. This acts as a brake on technical progress, a brake on the transfer of capital into progressive sectors.

[Leontyeva] But in the initial draft law on ownership where it talks about its stockholder form, the interest of the stockholder and the interest of the worker are, as it were, spelled out. A worker can be a stockholder in another enterprise.

[Kuzminov] Yes, a situation in which ownership is dissipated and when there is no obvious owner who has suppressed all others makes it possible to avoid the complications of which I was speaking. That is, those complications into which ownership by the labor collectives may lead us. It is possible that what I am saying is not of absolute importance, but when we approach this concept of alienation in ignorance it disturbs me. Combining master and worker in one person (the economist Chayanov showed this) has a certain limit of economic effectiveness. Chayanov was one of the first to apply the theory of marginal utility to labor and the labor economy. Do we now have a market that would force a person to work at maximum efficiency? We do not. Without pressure from the market the labor motivation for collective ownership amounts only to what we call egotistical interests—work less, sell at higher prices.

[Leontyeva] Incidentally, much is now being said about the outbursts of group egotism. But what is unexpected about this? For 70 years we have been trying to build an economic system with altruistic interests based on the premise that a person will work not out of fear but out of conscience, sacrificing his own immediate interests for the sake of a bright future. But a person does also have his "own" interests. That is, to put it simply, "me." And this is now spilling over.

[Kuzminov] I agree. If an enterprise is permitted to set a price it will market its output by pursuing rationally understood interests. So why resort to throwing up the hands and threatening heaven or the enterprise because it has set prices too high? It is clear that only a free market can reduce them.

We now have a struggle between two ideologies. This can be seen from the drafts being discussed. The one is mixed up with the principle of Adam Smith's economic man. For a long time we eschewed it. Economic man is understood approximately thus: He is an absolute egotist who at any moment may sell his own grandmother. The only reason that he does not do it is that no one will offer him the right price. In fact, the concept of the economic man implies that each person acting in the economic sphere proceeds on the basis of his own interests and acts rationally. This is a normal situation for any system. It is on this basis that we have started to build the reform. But at the same time, there are the residual waves of our old altruism, and the socialization of everyone and everything. We talk about the egotistical interests of the

miners, the egotistical interests of enterprises objectively placed in the position of monopolists. This disorients public opinion.

It seems to me that with one hand we are trying to bring into play the normal economic laws based on rational behavior, while with the other we wave angrily at people who have started to act within the framework of these new laws. But once the particular interests of the particular owner have been liberated, then we should not just wave our hands but create competition for him. If we fail to cope with this task it means that it would have been better not to have started it. And we are coping poorly. As a result of the clumsy implementation of the economic reform these past 5 years we have produced a wave of hostility toward perestroika. This is the price of our inconsistency. It means that we must do everything possible to have the law on ownership help in dealing with this.

Aircraft Designer on Conversion, Aircraft Industry
90UM0170A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
14 Dec 89 Second Edition p 4

[Speech by G.V. Novozhilov: "Speech at Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies"]

[Text] Dear Comrades! An aircraft designer did not appear at this rostrum accidentally. Comparisons affecting aviation were heard repeatedly from it from the mouths of economists, politicians, and public figures: What will happen, they ask, if an aircraft takes off with a crew that does not know where to fly when its course system stops operating, and what will happen when the engines fail, and at which airfield will it land?

Today we are examining a very serious question. A large package of measures was outlined in N.I. Ryzhkov's report that, in the relatively short and complex period of our history, should bring our country out of the crisis in which it finds itself. Industry plays the decisive role in the resolution of difficult economic problems that confront the state in the saturation of the market with consumer goods. But, unfortunately, it is not working in the best way yet. At present, it has failed to supply products in the sum of R8 billion. Billions! But it happens that a large plant that creates complicated and expensive articles interrupts their production because of the lack of parts that cost kopecks, and that were not received in time from one of the numerous suppliers.

Labor discipline in our country has obviously weakened, and, as a result, the discipline of fulfilling contracts as well. More and more difficulties arise during their signing. To start with, many suppliers—and this is not only my opinion, but also that of plant directors with whom I have dealings—are asking absurd prices for replacement parts and units.

But this is something that can be haggled over. What is worse is that the signing of a contract is almost always cluttered with specific additional conditions. Suppliers,

especially monopoly suppliers, referring to the need for fulfilling their social programs and the demands of the soviets of labor collectives and trade unions, kind of politely but strictly dictate: You, then, please, in the account of payment, supply a rail car of lumber, two rail cars of cement, such and such a number of blueprints.... We are compelled in concluding the contract to enter into this kind of a natural exchange.

I fully support proposals that, in today's transition period, we should toughen our demands on enterprises and reinforce their responsibility for concluding and fulfilling contractual obligations.

After considering what N.I. Ryzhkov proposed today, and after adopting the pertinent decision of the congress, we should give the government the time to pursue a specific course, and only afterwards to ask it for specific results. But not to rush from one extreme to another, which interferes with the normal process of production and does not permit the realization of all of the potential of our industry, which it has at the present time.

Conversion has been called on to play a major role in the resolution of economic problems. This is a very complicated phenomenon. The defense branches of industry, first and foremost, are called on to guarantee an appropriate defense for our country. It must also be based today on the most advanced and most modern equipment needed to ensure the sufficiency of our armed forces in accordance with defense doctrine. Together with this, the defense branches should quickly and significantly—by several times!—increase the output of equipment for the light and food industry, agriculture, and goods directly for the population. For example, our design bureau, which makes aircraft, now simultaneously creates equipment for dressing furs and hides, and for manufacturing shoes. We are also developing a line for packaging macaroni, and we manufactured an automatic packaging unit.

All of this, of course, is good and in the interests of the people. But I must say outright that there were many difficulties here. For the time being the defense elements are not coping with it always. Not everything that we do corresponds to an advanced level. The Minlegpishchemash [Ministry of Machine Building for the Light and Food Industry and Household Appliances], which was eliminated, left us blueprints which our designers today have to change drastically. Taking the specifics of aviation plants into account, we have to change technology and materials. Frankly, nobody is concerned seriously about how much one or another machine will cost. It is, in general, naïve to think that, let us say, an aviation designer, who knows how to make aircraft well, but who at best has a rather hazy idea about the light or food industry, will be able immediately to begin the creation for them of highly productive machines and equipment whose price at the same time is acceptable.

I will cite one example. The designers and plants of the aviation industry, while fulfilling tasks with difficulty nonetheless created a mini-plant cannery, and put it into operation.

They invited the chairmen of kolkhozes [collective farms] to see what this "mini-thing" was. They said: "No, you see, this is a 'mini' for you, but for us it is a 'maxi'." But they said: "And if, perhaps, we take it, then only a part." And so we are forced again to expend resources, and to develop a new test model.... Precise specialization is required to achieve successful conversion.

I read in the newspaper yesterday that the plant "Barrikady" developed a washing machine with 37 programs. One asks: "Who needs it?" Our housekeeper uses four, and a maximum of six, and it is impossible to sell this machine on the foreign market, because it does not conform to Western models. There is an article, if you please, in the newspaper PRAVDA. It talks about how we are carrying out foreign economic functions today, in particular, in England. It should happen that way here.

It is also troubling that there is no general client in this country. What does this mean? We are producing an automatic package-making unit. It produces a large number of packages, ecologically pure, made of natural wrapping paper (God grant that it exists and that there will be something to pour into these packages). The Ministry of the Aviation Industry is assigned the task of bringing the output of the automatic units to 1,000 by 1995. We made 90 units, but more buyers could not be found. But the money has been expended on this. Therefore, I believe: In order that we implement conversion of the defense industry efficiently, it is necessary to treat this question very seriously.

I have talked enough about apprehensions in connection with conversion, and now I will move to my own professional concerns. I will express my anxiety with respect to other work in which we are engaged today. We are developing a new generation of passenger aircraft. This is the long-range main route Il-96300 aircraft, which can fly from Moscow to New York without landing and which is to replace the Il-62 and the Il-86. We are making the Il-114 aircraft for local air lines instead of the An-24. The Tupolev Design Bureau is developing the medium range Tu-204 aircraft, and development has started on the aircraft which is supposed to replace the Tu-134. The Yakovlev Design Bureau is doing work on the YaK-42M aircraft. They will replace Aeroflot's obsolete aircraft park, which has been subject to a lot of criticism here.

All of you, probably, are passengers without exception, and you know very well the difficulties that are associated with the acquisition of tickets. At a minimum, 15 million, and even 20 million potential passengers in our huge country today cannot take advantage of the services of air transport.

I must tell you, unfortunately, that the development of the indicated aircraft is proceeding with lags in the

planned periods. It would seem that the reduction in military orders should sharply raise our ability to accelerate and increase the output of new aircraft. But this is not happening. Thank you, Nikolay Ivanovich, you at least said something today here from the rostrum. Because during work in the Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Defense Questions and State Security, we discussed this question specially, and there we defined the needs of civil aviation that were paramount in the conversion of the Ministry of the Aviation Industry. But this was not corroborated in even one subsequent document.

If I as a designer talk about aircraft, then I also have to talk about Aeroflot, because, together, we guarantee the same thing—flight safety. But at present, Aeroflot, which will have to put all of these new aircraft into operation, about which I am reporting to you, is furnished with ground facilities of just 60% of the norm, aviation equipment service facilities of 34% of the norm, and hangars of only 19 percent of the norm. We also are not dealing properly with flight crews, with our test pilots, with those who fly in Aeroflot, and with flight personnel of the Soviet Air Force. These people perform complex functions, and they carry a tremendous responsibility for the people they transport. Take, for example, the Il-86 aircraft. It takes 350 passengers, and the crew consists of 3-4 persons. Of course, it is necessary to create appropriate conditions so that crews can execute their functions properly.

I would also talk about one more peculiarity that absolutely has to be kept in mind. The fact is that our aviation, in general, is not at a poor level, which is also indicated in comments of the foreign press. The income from the export of Soviet civil aviation aircraft equipment last year amounted to R1.2 billion foreign currency rubles; 150 helicopters and 60 aircraft were sold. We also trained 5,000 foreign crewmembers, and repaired dozens of aircraft. But, I must tell you that this foreign income, including that in dollars, is beginning to decrease. Thus, while in the 1970's the income was about 15%, today it is only 6 percent. The question arises: But can we compete with them, and can we engage that market in which, I want to emphasize this, it is much easier to buy than to sell? In order to sell, it is necessary to conduct serious and important work.

I will allow myself to take up more of your time, if, naturally, I am not breaking the rules. A need could arise in the world for one more producer of commercial aircraft. It is entirely possible that the Soviet Union will be this producer. Therefore, we have to apply our efforts to acquire the opportunity to make money on our aircraft, and not just to supply the needs of Aeroflot, but also those that could arise in this country in pertinent economic relations.

Concluding, I would like to say the following: The defense complex and the aviation industry are obliged to make their contribution to ensure the production of consumer goods and to eliminate the crisis which was

talked about here. We must understand clearly where our "economic ship" should land, and what we will receive as a result. But we must not forget that we have a certain level of technology and, in implementing conversion, we must not lag behind others in our main task.

People's Deputy Views 'Willful Decollectivization'

PM2712144389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
19 Dec 89 Second Edition p 3

[Article by USSR People's Deputy V. Fokin, chairman of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic State Planning Committee, published under the rubric "People's Deputy's Forum": "Architects or 'Site Foremen?'"]

[Text] Kiev—Virtually every single deputy who spoke at the Congress [of USSR People's Deputies] on problems of economic reform touched on the ideas of local self-management and regional economic accountability. With each passing day, these ideas become more and more closely intertwined with the political and social problems which are now perhaps the main factors of our life's destabilization. Economic sovereignty is, if not the only one, perhaps one of the most effective ways to harmonize interethnic relations and to ensure collaboration between union republics and the center.

I am convinced that, at certain stages, a concentration of political and economic power in the center is simply necessary in order to create a national economic complex capable of ensuring high levels of social development for a federal state's territories. Such conditions prevailed in the early twenties, when our state faced a most complex task—to overcome the centuries of backwardness, to create a modern industry, and to uphold its independence. The Soviet people performed their historic mission at the cost of harsh trials.

I think that the absolute centralization of economic management proved justified at that period and, at the same time, totally exhausted itself. It is only to be regretted that the orientation toward uniformity in the organization of the USSR peoples' economic life prevailed in the thirties and lasted virtually to this day.

Let us turn to V.I. Lenin's legacy: "The opponents of centralism constantly promote autonomy and federation as means for struggle against the vagaries of centralism. In actual fact... it does not in any way preclude but, on the contrary, presupposes the fullest possible freedom for different localities and even different communities within the state to elaborate diverse forms of state, social, and economic life" (*Complete Collected Works*, Vol 36, pp 151-152).

These are the tenets underlying the "General Principles for Restructuring the Leadership of the Economy and the Social Sphere in Union Republics" elaborated by a special commission comprising leading scientists and leaders of planning organs from the country and the union republics. Despite substantial differences of opinion, when formulating the starting provisions of this

document they nonetheless succeeded in mapping out nontraditional ways to solve the problem, ways which conform with the interests of each republic and create sound prerequisites for the country's balanced social and economic growth, and in finding a common economic platform for the improvement of interethnic relations.

Of course, one can and must speak of this document's shortcomings. In addition to verbosity and excessive detail when it comes to individual provisions, it also lacks important elements as regards territorial management. There is a vague definition of the diversity of forms of ownership and of republics' economic autonomy. There is no clarity as regards the organization of interaction between local, republican, and union budgets. An especially large number of questions arise when laying down the dividing lines of powers and enshrining the rights of union and local management organs. Consistency is needed here. Since we recognize the need to free production structures from departmental diktat, and we are simultaneously striving to vest power in its entirety with the soviets, financial levers become the sole means for exercising this power. It is these levers, I think, that ought to be handed over at local level.

Various options for shaping the country's budget system were considered in the process of work on the draft "General Principles." Specifically, there was discussion of proposals to pay into a republic's budget all revenues arising on its territory, with subsequent transfer of a proportion of these funds (according to normatives) to the union budget. But the general opinion inclined toward the expediency of having enterprises and organizations, regardless of their departmental subordination, participating in the formation of budgets at all levels—state, republican, and local budgets.

This approach in itself does not seem to give rise to any objections. I think, however, that we cannot accept the method for regulating the revenue side of republican budgets by reducing the proportion represented by the most reliable source remaining at a republic's disposal—turnover tax on union enterprises.

It is well known that machine building, ferrous metallurgy, coal mining, and ore extraction account for a large share in the Ukraine's economy. Their financial state is unstable. At times this renders local budgets unjustifiably dependent on the results of union enterprises' work. An experiment conducted in Zaporozhye showed that the local budget incurred a revenue shortfall of more than R2.1 million because the "Dneprospetsstal" Plant failed to fulfill its profits plan. Moreover, the deductions were set at only 5.2 percent.

Turning back to what I said earlier, I would like to express my own viewpoint: The draft "General Principles" is still not complete. More work must be done on it, taking into account the 3,500 observations received following its publication in the press. I deem it inexpedient for the supreme organ of power to ratify such a document for each one of the 15 republics, since this

would probably run contrary to the very logic of the USSR's federal nature as a single union state.

With the passage of time, the "apportionment of powers" between the federation's components could be changed depending on the attained levels of political and economic development, once again on a voluntary-treaty basis. But all must embark on this together and according to a single set of laws, aiming for uniformity in diversity. Otherwise major difficulties would be unavoidable. What specific difficulties?

Different degrees of economic autonomy place the members of the Soviet federation in deliberately unequal conditions. For example, next year's state plan for republics switching to economic accountability is restricted only by indicators for deliveries to all-union stocks and interrepublic supply flows. The old method has been applied to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]: While consumer goods production volumes were agreed in terms of physical indicators with the USSR State Planning Committee, the target in terms of money has been raised by R2 billion.

It is very hard to imagine regional economic accountability without price formation reform. How are we to organize equivalent commodity exchange between republics, seeing that the current price system is totally discredited while the elaboration of a new one is being put off? It is hard to expect a successful fulfillment of the food program if kolkhozes [collective farms] have to purchase "Kirovets" tractors at a price "equivalent" to 412 tonnes of sugar beet. The situation is no better as regards regional purchase prices, which were fixed on the basis of actual production costs and cover not only the objectively necessary expenses caused by zonal specific features but also economic mismanagement. The current prices today also place union republics at a disadvantage when it comes to evaluating the created added product.

For the same reason, it is officially estimated that imports of products in the Ukrainian SSR exceed exports by R6.2 billion. But the deficit in interrepublic exchanges is determined not so much by the social productivity and quality of labor, but by unobjective wholesale and purchase prices invented behind closed office doors. If economic activity were to be guided by world market indicators, the exports of products from the republic would exceed imports by more than R7 billion.

The central axis in politics is power, while in economics it is ownership.

It is primarily necessary to revive masters in agriculture. Under Lenin's decree back in 1917 the land was handed over as the property of those who worked it. The methods used subsequently to collectivize the peasants' farms are well known: Unjustified cruelty, suffering, and tears. But history cannot be rewritten. Collectivization did take place. Kolkhozes and sovkhoses [state farms] fed the people during the years of industrialization, during the war years, and in the struggle against postwar

devastation. They are also feeding them today. Not enough? Yes, not as much as we would like. But let us try to figure out why.

Is it not because grain growers have been deprived of autonomy in the choice of economic structures and have been transformed into almost indifferent day laborers? Is it not because the unpopular theory of "unpromising villages" and the forcible amalgamation of kolkhozes bled the countryside dry and led to interfarm antagonism and a catastrophic loss of labor resources?

The thought automatically crosses your mind: How durable the system must be if, even in these conditions and under the effect of these blows, it has not collapsed. When speeches and various articles revive the image of the patriarchal muzhik who, in times past, fed "all Russia and Europe" with butter from Vologda and "grain from little Russia," when the economic sovereignty concept of one union republic contains the thesis that "land is transferred in perpetuity to the peasants, with the right to sale and inheritance," you automatically start doubting the realism of what is happening.

I think that a dangerous naivete, to put it mildly, is displayed by those who, in the wake of the popular writer and "humor specialist," call: "Distribute the land! Distribute the plants! Distribute everything that comes in—things can't get worse." In what way is willful decollectivization better than forcible collectivization?

Society is undergoing far-reaching transformations. There is no shortage of perestroika "site foremen." But are there any architects?

I mean the ones who are duty bound to submit for nationwide discussion not just individual elements and details but an entire project of the new society as a whole, a kind of end model for transformations. This should be a single idea uniting everyone, a goal that everyone is aware of, a nationwide program.

I think that restructuring the system for managing the socioeconomic complex by regions ought to be pursued on the basis of unity of goals and tasks of the country's long-term development. Of course, in combination with the union republics' economic sovereignty. So far we only have a general formula: "Strong center—strong republics." What is more, this formula is perceived not as an axiom, but as a theorem which still has to be proved.

The growth of national self-awareness, the emancipation of opinions, civic activeness—all these are wonderful signs of the new time. But who can answer this: How is it possible to ease tension in the consumer market and combat shortages and inflation without constructive labor activeness, without boosting production volumes?

Given the quantity of unsolved problems, how are we to implement the basic idea of economic sovereignty: "Those who work better live better?" Do we shift responsibility for the level of the people's prosperity onto a

republic's government? Fervor and ambition are impermissible in these conditions. Common sense and restraint must decide everything. Impatience and intolerance could prove to be the greatest danger for our society.

Sverdlovsk Food-Supply Problems Outlined

*LD0401190190 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1530 GMT 4 Jan 90*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Now, we will discuss a topic that is unpleasant and painful for us. For this, we have to return to last year, when the situation of empty shop shelves in Sverdlovsk grew strained on 29 December; that was in the days before the holiday, which usually promise people joy. We already know about the plenum of the Sverdlovsk City Party Committee [gorkom], the decisions adopted there, and the complaints addressed there to trade workers. Nevertheless, I believe, the problem goes much deeper than what we learned from a short TASS paragraph.

[Begin recording] [Reporter E. Erkomayshvili] What set off the spontaneous rallies was the coupons for spirits issued on New Year's Eve and the impossibility of buying anything with them. I repeat, however, that was merely what set them off. The root cause was the extremely bad supply of industrial and food goods, the sharp reduction in the range of produce at public catering enterprises, and problems in everyday life. In this situation, leaders of the city and oblast, deputies from local soviets, people's deputies, and representatives of public formations are appealing to the people of Sverdlovsk, in personal meetings and through the mass media, for calm, discipline, and responsibility. [Video shows a militiaman addressing a crowd through a bull horn, a shop with sparsely filled shelves, uniformed men in helmets walking through a crowd that appears to be blocking the path of a trolley.]

[V.D. Kadochnikov, first secretary of the Sverdlovsk Gorkom and member of the Gorkom bureau] For the past 2 years, our funds for food have been constantly reduced, and this was in conditions in which discipline—primarily in supplies—is strained to the utmost. In other words, goods are not being supplied to support those funds. We are an industrial oblast that is among the top three for the production of industrial goods in the Soviet Union. Naturally, we cannot provide ourselves fully with food products, since we have just .003 of a hectare of agricultural land per inhabitant. We can provide only half of our essential produce. The other half is supplied to us from state resources, and we cannot yet live without it. But is this being fulfilled? Virtually all our suppliers have not been up to the mark. Tatariya has fulfilled just 13% of the plan for meat supplies, and Bashkiriya has delivered one-third—and they are not isolated cases. Let me note that last year the people of Sverdlovsk did significantly better and fulfilled 99% of their contractual deliveries.

Indeed, the situation is not simple. Measures have been adopted, and we believe that they are adequate. The leaders of the oblast—the obkom and the oblast executive committee [oblispolkom] have appealed repeatedly to the RSFSR and union governments and to the CPSU Central Committee. There have been promises, but they have not been implemented. Great work is being conducted by the party organization and the oblispolkom to increase the output of agricultural produce. We have such plans, and we are working on their implementation.

We also discussed this at the Gorkom plenum, where once again we defined tasks for ourselves and again addressed not a request, but a demand, to both our government and the Party Central Committee for the adoption of urgent measures to insure guaranteed supplies of food products for the people of Sverdlovsk commensurate with our labor contribution. [end recording]

Hydroelectric Station To Be Transferred

*LD0801094790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0500 GMT 8 Jan 90*

[Text] At a session of the Volgograd Oblast Soviet, a decision has been adopted to transfer the Volgograd "22d CPSU Congress" hydroelectric power station to a new operational regime more favorable to the river's ecology. The decision means that from Volgograd to the Caspian a stretch of more than 1,500 km of the river has remained a normal regime undisturbed by reservoirs and wrongly regulated flow damaging to the fish stocks.

Scientific

'Mir' Cosmonaut Activities Updated

Crew Prepares for Space Walk

*LD0801041490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0202 GMT 8 Jan 90*

[Text] On 8 January the crew of the Mir scientific research complex will undergo a crucial stage in the work in near-Earth orbit—they will make a space walk. Aleksandr Viktorenko and Aleksandr Serebrov will begin the direct preparations for the space walk at 1700 Moscow time [1400 GMT]. The cosmonauts will mothball the complex's main systems on the outer surface of the complex and then they will check the space suits yet again. The space walk is planned for late in the evening.

Semiconductor Material Experiment

*LD0501142790 Moscow TASS in English 1410 GMT
5 Jan 90*

[Text] Moscow January 5 TASS—The fourth month of the orbital flight of Soviet cosmonauts Aleksandr Viktorenko and Aleksandr Serebrov is drawing to an end.

In accordance with the plan of preparation for extravehicular activities, the crew over the past two days

checked the equipment necessary for a space walk and underwent medical examination. Training sessions in space suits are being held today.

Yet another experiment was performed on the Gallar installation under the programme for the space study of materials.

The process of growing gallium arsenide monocrystal through directed crystallisation was carried out for the first time in micro-gravitation conditions to obtain a semi-conductor material with improved characteristics.

The cosmonauts continue experiments to measure and evaluate the dynamics of ionised cosmic radiation levels in the near-Earth space.

Data being gleaned by means of highly sensitive dosimetric equipment are used to monitor and forecast the radiation situation along the flight path of the manned orbital complex.

Experiments involving life forms delivered by the Progress M-2 spacecraft are being performed on board the Mir station.

Their purpose is to research into the functional changes of the vestibular apparatus and reactions of the nervous systems in the amphibians, the crustacean and mollusks as well as to study the dynamics of the development and growth of chlorella and rice tissue culture.

The flight of the manned orbital complex Mir is proceeding normally. The cosmonauts are in good health.

Other Experiments Described

*LD0601120890 Moscow TASS in English 1135 GMT
6 Jan 90*

[Text] Moscow January 6 TASS—By TASS Correspondent Rena Kuznetsova:

Soviet cosmonauts Aleksandr Viktorenko and Aleksandr Serebrov have already spent four months on the orbital space station Mir.

During this period, they carried out a wide range of scientific research and experiments for various sectors of the economy.

The cosmonauts completed an experiment, started on December 26 on the "Gallar" melting installation, in which they obtained semiconductors with new properties.

With the help of the "Maria" spectrometer they measured fluxes of high-energy charged elementary particles in outer space.

They conduct regular astrophysical observations, using the astrophysical module "Kvant," probe the earth's surface with the help of onboard equipment and conduct visual observations.

A month ago, the station received the "Vika" device producing oxygen by water electrolysis. The device has already been prepared for work.

Viktorenko and Serebrov conduct regular medical checkups, in which they use the "Chibis" pneumatic-vacuum suit imitating gravity, an exer-cycle and a "running track."

Physicians say the cosmonauts' health is good and that they show high interest and initiative during scientific research and experiments.

The crew are now intensively preparing for their first space walk, scheduled for January 8. They have checked and prepared necessary equipment and space suits.

During the space walk, the cosmonauts will install star sensors outside the station to orient it with the help of stars, and will remove samples of French composite materials from outer panels.

Viktorenko and Serebrov plan five space walks during this flight.

Minister on Development of Chemical Industry

*LD0401110190 Moscow TASS in English 1034 GMT
4 Jan 90*

[Text] Moscow January 4 TASS—Raising the level of export-oriented chemical and petroleum processing is the principal way to develop the export resources of the Soviet chemical and oil processing industries, Minister Nikolay Lemayev told TASS.

The sector must boost the output and export of chemical fibre, structural plastics and other finished products, he emphasised.

"Much has already been done in this respect: The enterprises of the sector now sell about 1,500 designations of goods to 85 countries.

"Petroleum products account for the bulk of exports. But trade in chemical and petrochemical products is also gathering momentum.

"The marketing of aromatic hydrocarbons, ortho- and paraxylene, benzene, synthetic rubber, automobile tires, paint and varnish materials abroad has almost doubled over the past three years.

"As far as the geography of the sector's foreign trade is concerned, socialist countries account for a large share of exports. In the chemical field alone, trade turnover with them runs at almost four billion roubles a year.

"In exchange for Soviet goods, they deliver dyes, photographic materials, chemical reagents, and consumer goods to the Soviet Union.

"The expansion of trade in this field is being promoted by the establishment of direct contacts between the enterprises and organisations of socialist countries.

"Currently discussed large-scale industrial construction and modernisation projects with the participation of foreign firms are expected to promote the development of the sector's export resources," Lemayev said.

The Tobolsk petrochemical complex, worth two billion dollars, which is to be built in cooperation with Western companies, has now become the largest joint-venture project in the Soviet Union, he pointed out.

"The economic, legal and social aspects of building petrochemical plants in other Siberian cities situated close to local sources of feedstock—in Surgut and Novy Urengoy—on similar terms are now being studied," Lemayev said.

"An agreement on cooperation in the production of polyolefines was signed with the Italian Montedison company a month ago, during Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Italy.

"Under the agreement, the company will deliver appropriate equipment to the Soviet Union. The cost of the equipment will be offset by the deliveries of part of the output.

"This form of foreign economic activity seems quite promising, since it makes it possible to introduce foreign technology without the expenditure of foreign currency," Lemayev said.

Aral Scientific Research Center Established

*LD0301231790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
2200 GMT 3 Jan 90*

[Text] The "Aral" scientific research coordination center, which has been opened in Nukus, is designed to resolve the problem of the salvation of the Aral Sea and of ecological stabilization in the region. It has been set up with the rights of an independent institute attached to the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology and the USSR Academy of Sciences. The center has been set the task of studying and assessing the ecological situation in the Aral Sea Basin and of determining the feasibility of measures for making a rational use of water and land resources.

With the setting up of the "Aral" center, the first stage has been completed of organizing the Institute of Ecology and Water Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences in the basin of the Aral Sea, whose opening was planned by the decision on the Aral of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers. Up until now, the implementation of the planned measures was being hampered because the local scientific and production base lagged behind and due to the shortage of qualified scientific cadres.

Ship Equipped To Receive Soviet TV Programs

*PM0401143790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Jan 90 Second Edition p 2*

[TASS report: "To the Atlantic Via Satellite"]

[Text] Odessa, 1 Jan—It will be possible to watch the New Year's television programs from Ostankino on board the passenger liner *Maksim Gorkiy* in the Atlantic.

A satellite television complex installed on the ship has helped in this.

Military

Varennikov Quizzed on New Regulations

*PM0501153990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 31 Dec 89 Second Edition p 2*

[Unattributed interview with Army General V. Varennikov, USSR deputy defense minister and commander in chief of Ground Forces, under the rubric "Draft New Regulations: Competent Opinion": "Eight Thousand Suggestions"; date, place not given]

[Text] The Commission for the Preparation of Draft General Military Regulations received 8,000 suggestions. At our request its chairman—Army General V. Varennikov, USSR deputy defense minister and commander in chief of Ground Forces—shares with us his views in this connection.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] This question had long been appearing in the editors' mail: When, at long last, will a mechanism for studying public opinion on fundamental aspects concerning every serviceman begin working in the Army and Navy? And now, for the first time (at least, in the memory of the present generation of officers), we are collectively discussing drafts of military regulations.... Commenting on the fact of their publication, the Commission for the Preparation of the Drafts emphasized that it expected a great deal from their discussion. To what extent were those hopes realized?

[Varennikov] We received more than 8,000 suggestions. Letters from servicemen, veterans of the Armed Forces, and civilians expressed a sincere interest in deepening perestroika in the Army and Navy. We also familiarized ourselves with the large number of letters sent to the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA editorial office and to other military publications. In addition to studying the suggestions which came to us from the staffs of military districts, groups of forces, and fleets, from the offices of the commanders in chief of the branches of the Armed Forces, and from the main and central directorates of the USSR Ministry of Defense, officers and generals of the working group set up under the commission traveled to the troops for closer scrutiny of collective thought. So there was a broad and active discussion of the drafts, which really produced a great deal. Suffice it to say that

the working group and the commission examined 5,413 suggestions with regard to the Internal Service Regulations alone.

It is also appropriate to remark that the discussion of the drafts by broad sections of public opinion helped to a certain extent to activate perestroika processes in the Armed Forces. The discussion participants frequently raised or touched on questions not within the jurisdiction of the general military regulations but of great significance for formulating the prospects for military organizational development and concerning cadre policy in the Army and Navy, material supplies, and other urgent problems. We took an attentive approach to these, too. Staffers of the Social and Psychological Problems Center are analyzing these suggestions with a view to forwarding them for consideration to the appropriate leading organs.

I would like to take this opportunity to express sincere appreciation and gratitude to all participants in the discussion.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] In addition to approving the new elements enshrined in the draft regulations, the readers' mail frequently expressed the idea that they do not fully reflect the spirit of the times and that this is an attempt at cosmetic repairs to our Army home. Of course, there is a mass, so to speak, of permanent details of the military way of life which do not change over the decades without detriment to combat readiness. But in this case it is a question of something else—people are concerned about how far we can advance with the help of new regulations along the path of the democratization of army and naval life....

[Varennikov] The draft general military regulations submitted for discussion were mainly drawn up during 1985-1987, when perestroika in the Armed Forces was only beginning to announce its presence. Therefore, naturally, they could not reflect some present approaches. But I cannot agree that the present, amended drafts represent only "an attempt at cosmetic repairs." Yes, the principle of continuity has found expression in them. We have taken account of the 70-year experience of building and developing the Armed Forces. But, at the same time, in the course of amending the draft regulations many new points have been added to them which in many areas of the organization of military service reflect the spirit of perestroika in the USSR Armed Forces. The Internal Service Regulations, for example, have been fundamentally reworked. Their structure has been changed, and new chapters and sections have been included in the regulations.

In particular, the point has been revealed that citizens' rights and duties proclaimed by the USSR Constitution are realized in respect of servicemen through legislation on the state's defense. Servicemen's basic rights are specifically set forth—the right to perform military service, the right to annual leave, weekly rest days, regularized on-duty time, and so forth.

Taking into account the suggestions received, an addition has been made to the serviceman's duties—to respect the national feelings, customs, and traditions of the USSR peoples. The point that Russian is the language of management and office work in the Armed Forces has been enshrined. The point which forbade a serviceman from writing an appeal bypassing his immediate superior has been excluded. The rights and duties of servicemen who have been captured have been amplified with regard to the (1949) Geneva conventions.

There were suggestions to abandon the wording in the regulations "a commander's (chief's) order is law for subordinates." They were motivated by doubt about the need to fulfill orders which might be of a manifestly criminal nature. It is the commission's unanimous opinion that it is impossible to agree with those suggestions. From a juridical viewpoint, of course, the expression "an order is law" is inexact. But the order is the basic act of management in the Armed Forces, and the wording "a commander's (chief's) order is law for subordinates" is a figurative simile emphasizing the importance of unquestioning obedience as a principle of the organizational development of the Armed Forces. In our view, this wording is also permissible because the regulations will acquire the force of law after approval by the USSR Supreme Soviet. Consequently, the commander's (chief's) order as a norm of the Regulations will also acquire the force of law. In our view, the inclusion in the Regulations of a point on the possibility of not fulfilling an order would create conditions under which a subordinate could question any order. Meanwhile, as is known, arguments over the nature of an order are inadmissible in a combat situation. It is a matter for a senior chief or prosecutor's office to decide whether or not an order is criminal.

All these are, of course, far from simple questions. They have been gone through carefully by military jurists, sociologists, political workers, and military historians. The experience of fraternal armies and the normative regulations that exist in other states' armies have been studied. In our view, there is no infringement of democracy here. Democratization presupposes the assertion of all servicemen's equal responsibility before the law, the military oath, and the regulations. For political officer personnel this means, in addition, political and moral responsibility before subordinates for the quality of management and the state of affairs in subunits and units and on ships.

The same applies to glasnost. Pluralism of opinions does not run counter to military procedure. On the contrary, practice shows that success attends the commander who takes the opinion of subordinates into account in his work. But neither glasnost nor diversity of opinions presupposes criticism and discussion of commanders' orders. An order is sacred.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] As is known, we have encountered many difficulties in perestroika in the main area—in combat and political training. In the draft regulations

there is an attempt to enhance its prestige and to hold commanders more rigidly to account for omissions in organizing the training process. What else, in your view, must be done to make combat and political training, as stated in the draft Internal Service Regulations, really the main component of servicemen's everyday life?

[Varennikov] Of course, you will not improve combat and political training by regulation demands alone. Although rigid control over their observance by all commanders and chiefs without exception would undoubtedly be of definite benefit. Much here will depend on how we all follow the letter of the regulations and how we manage to ensure the conditions necessary for normal life and training. What is needed is measures of an organizational and economic order and new approaches in practically all spheres of the life and activity of the troops and naval forces. In particular, we pin definite hopes for better qualitative indicators in combat training on the further deepening of perestroika in the troops' staff structure.

What is important, in my view, is that people are becoming increasingly intransigent toward indulgences and simplifications in the training process. Today they are no longer satisfied with the results that suited them not so long ago. This can be seen, for example, from the speeches at the All-Army Officers' Assembly. People are concerned not about assessments as such but about a real increase in combat proficiency.

And again. People are now following with great interest the experience of perestroika in the Armed Forces. Constructive criticism of the existing shortcomings in them is perceived with understanding. But a more competent approach is needed here. Certain publications clearly lack this. Superficial, one-sided, and at times simply unobjective coverage of Army and Navy life affects the prestige of military service and people's mood. Concepts such as duty, honor, dignity, and loyalty to the military oath have, unfortunately, almost vanished from the pages of certain popular journals and newspapers. No place is found for a heroic, romantic style or for thoughts about the lofty purpose of military service. The impression is created that persons very far removed from these problems engage in shaping public opinion on defense questions among the civilian audience.

Is it not because of this that unthinking pacifism and a negative attitude toward military duty are penetrating our barracks with each successive draft intake? All this cannot fail to complicate the training of servicemen.

Nevertheless, as I have already said, changes are tangible in the Army and Navy milieu itself and in the officer corps above all.

What form are they taking in practice? Above all, there is the search for ways to enhance the effectiveness of lessons and exercises and to make them as close as possible to real battle conditions. And the new combat regulations contribute to this. I am sure that the quality

of the work of officers and, in particular, of the subunit commanders who actually "forge" combat readiness will be affected positively by new measures for the material encouragement of their professional training and by the system of additional payments for class ratings, for performing alert duty, and for work under extreme conditions.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] In pondering on the draft regulations, some of our readers put this question: Are we not putting the cart before the horse? For the regulations must be a document derived, so to speak, from the USSR Law on Defense and the Law on Compulsory Military Service. These, as is known, are still only being drawn up....

[Varennikov] Yes, the draft regulations are directly dependent on the substance of the legislative acts being drawn up on defense questions. We took the provisions of these draft laws into account in our work. Therefore, it was expedient, in our commission's opinion, to conduct a discussion, to work out new regulations, to examine them in the USSR Defense Ministry commission, and to submit them to higher organs.

Obviously, they must be submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet successively—first the legislative acts on defense questions and then the draft general military regulations. Or another option—to submit all at the same time, in a single package.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How will the work on the draft regulations proceed further, and what, in general, is the mechanism for making "amendments" to the regulations?

[Varennikov] It seems to me that the session of the Commission for the Preparation of the Draft General Military Regulations proceeded perfectly democratically. The procedure was as follows. The drafts were examined successively—first the Internal Service Regulations, then the Disciplinary Regulations and the Garrison and Guard Service Regulations. The draft of each set of regulations was examined chapter by chapter, and within each chapter—successively—the suggestions of the discussion participants, which were, or were not, included in its contents. In addition, the commission members' suggestions were listened to during the discussion of each chapter. They were adopted or not adopted. The majority of the commission's members—they were representatives of all branches of the Armed Forces, all categories of troops, the Defense Ministry's main and central directorates, and the Main Military Prosecutor's Office—spoke on the questions discussed.

The commission approved and included in the draft regulations the additions and changes proposed by the working group, which had studied the suggestions received during the discussion. Taking this into account, it has been entrusted with preparing the drafts for examination in higher organs. The commission's members have been recommended to take an active part in

the subsequent finalization of the drafts before their submission to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

It would be a mistake to think that all the provisions of the drafts in preparation will be to everyone's liking. But, as the ancients said, laws are created not to be loved but to be respected. And respecting the regulations means fulfilling them rigorously.

Head of New Information Body Interviewed

PM0401143590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
31 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 6

[Interview with Major General V. Manilov, chief of the USSR Defense Ministry Information Directorate, by B. Litovkin: "We Have No Secrets"; date and place not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Excerpts] An information directorate has been set up at the USSR Defense Ministry. Major General V. Manilov has been appointed to head it. He is 50 and has been in the Army 31 years. He has served with the Southern Group of Forces, in the Transcaucasus, and in command and political posts. He has worked on a district newspaper and on KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. He is a graduate of the V.I. Lenin Military Political Academy and the General Staff Academy. He has been in the Defense Ministry apparatus for the past 11 years. He is a candidate of philosophical sciences.

[Litovkin] Valeriy Leonidovich, what aims and tasks face the new directorate? What is its structure, if it's not a secret?

[Manilov] We have no secrets. On the contrary. The creation of our component in the Defense Ministry structure is designed to expand the sphere of glasnost in such a specific sphere of social life as the military sphere. There is growing interest not only on the part of the Soviet people but also outside the country in our Armed Forces' life and activity. A lack of accurate information gives rise to fabrications, and this does not help our cause.

Our task is to help people obtain firsthand, so to speak, full, weighty, and—this is particularly important—rapid and accurate information on and relating to the country's Armed Forces.

The administrative structure is simple: One of our main subdivisions will handle the preparation of information material on the most topical problems of defense building, another will collate, analyze, and systematize all information concerning the Army and Navy one way or another, while another subdivision is the Defense Ministry Press Center, for which we will all in fact be working. [passage omitted]

[Litovkin] What specifically has been done?

[Manilov] Quite honestly, not very much for the time being. We are in the formative stage. We are selecting cadres. We are looking for premises for the press center.

We are counting on help from the Soviet Army Central House or the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center. We are "arming ourselves" with computers and office equipment. We are preparing for the accreditation of Soviet and foreign journalists, for the first briefings, for press conferences, for "roundtables," and for individual contacts.

'Sevastopol' Crew Members Discuss Current Issues

PM0301145590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 1 Jan 90 First Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Captain Second Class M. Lukanin: "'I Understand Where My Place Is Today....' 'Sevastopol' Crew: Thoughts on the Times and the Party, on the Citizen's Position, and on the Serviceman's Duty"]

[Text] What is taking place in society and in the party? What course are we steering, where will we arrive? How to consolidate all healthy forces around the aims of perestroika? It was with great concern and directness that these questions were raised at the recent extraordinary plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. They can also be heard voiced out loud in the army and navy party organizations.

What do the Communists and nonparty people think, how do they assess the situation? In the formation political section I was told: "On the missile carrying cruiser 'Sevastopol' the party organization suggested that the crew express its attitude toward the realities of our day and toward the party's present-day situation in society and the situation within the party. We advise you to attend...."

Captain Third Class N. Skibin: I did not think that I, who have not been a communist for long, would be among those who are now being blamed for so many sins. For the collapse of the economy, for stagnation, for Stalin's crimes, for Brezhnev's lack of talent, and.... Intellectually I understand that the party is responsible for its members and every party member is responsible for the party as a whole. But my heart objects: But what have I got to do with it? Surely it wasn't me who organized the persecution of dissidents, who pushed those who "dared to have their own opinion" into the psychiatric hospitals and camps and sent them to be shot? Surely it wasn't me who promoted a sick and arrogant leader to the summit of power?

Any party, any organization consists, let us not forget, primarily of people. Different people, incidentally, thanks to whom perestroika began. The healthy nucleus in the party has always comprised the majority under all "leaders." I think none of us intends to idealize himself personally. But if you have always tried to fulfill your duty honestly, have not acted against your conscience, have not sought allowances (and there are millions of us like this!) then why should I live with a guilt complex

today? Yet it looks as though it is precisely this feeling which some people are trying to introduce into Communists' consciousness.

Who are they, these "some people?" Those who are eager for power, who "keep their own counsel." Let's think about it: Surely it is no accident that there is so much talk now over Article Six of the USSR Constitution? It seems to me that one of the main reasons here is to deliver a blow to the army, removing it from party influence and disarming it ideologically. It is not hard to imagine what will immediately fill the vacuum and who will be promoted as our "spiritual mentors" on the murky waves.

Captain Second Class V. Rakhlenko: That's it! It would seem that we have grown accustomed to a lot recently, but when I hear how some newfound prophets are going so far as to idealize the tsarist regime in Russia and are promoting to the rank of hero an odious figure of Russian history such as Stolypin—I am simply lost for words. Reverence for a butcher and hangman, a sworn enemy of the revolutionary movement—that's called democracy? Enough, gentlemen, have you read Lenin, those works of his which, for instance, describe capitalism's development in Russia connected with the proletariat's impoverishment and very harsh exploitation? It is a pity that we have learned most often merely to take some quotations from Lenin, yet it would be useful to take a new and attentive look at the enormous statistical material he cites. Statistics do not attest even marginally to any social prosperity so that the proletarian revolution was not a "whim of the bolsheviks," as some people are trying to prove today, but a historical necessity for the unfortunate working masses.

Yes, we are now reconsidering a lot from our past and are mercilessly assessing deviations from Lenin's course. But here is the interesting question: Why do some of our renowned writers and economists believe that if we renounce the socialist ideal we shall unfailingly become like Sweden, for instance? In my opinion we shall simply slide into chaos and lose our civilized countenance which, incidentally, is confirmed by the present outbreaks of extremism. Incidentally, I believe that individual informal movements, particularly those preaching nationalism, have already proved their kinship with extremism sufficiently graphically.

No, the calls to keep down the party are far from innocuous. It was all the stranger to read recently in the local youth newspaper an article which tried to justify "theoretically" the idea that in the process of democratization the army should be outside politics. That is, it should "switch off" from society, take no part in the elections, and so forth. In other words, it should become an obedient mass apathetic toward everything and "incapable" of arguing. That is what the "rule-of-law" state seems like to us, where some of its citizens are automatically deprived of the most important political rights and freedoms.

Senior Lieutenant S. Tupchiyenko: Nonetheless, since talk has turned to the informal public movements, we must understand more deeply what has made some of them, for instance the people's fronts in the Baltic, "Rukh" in the Ukraine, and so forth, mass-based movement that are popular with a substantial section of the population. Was it the work only of inflammatory speeches? Of populist slogans? I think not. People now more than ever do not accept the half-truth—that, in my view, is the reason for the success of the informal organizations which have been very successful in "tearing away each and every mask." The information coming today from the party organizations is evidently not entirely satisfactory or entirely unsatisfactory. After all, how much gossip is circulating around the "Gdlyan question" alone, for instance. Why is the path to total clarity in such cases so long?

Or take the following element. The informal associations often cunningly borrow and present as their own some of the CPSU's conceptual developments on particular radical issues of society's development. Why do we surrender the initiative? He who sits out in the trenches at the decisive moment inevitably loses.

Captain Third Class N. Skibin: May I make a rejoinder? In my opinion, as regards the struggle for power, here everything is far simpler. It is primarily the mafia which is countering society's healthy forces in this struggle. Yes, let's call things by their names and there is no point in making out that this is a normal democratic process.

Warrant Officer A. Kratyuk: I agree. Not a single truly democratic movement will ever allow manifestations of violence and bloody excesses, as was the case in Novyy Uzen, Fergana, and other parts of the country. "We shall die but we shall achieve our purpose"—surely that is not a call for a democratic path of development? If only because the party proposes the ideas of consolidation instead of confrontation, it deserves the most profound respect. If problems are resolved as individual forces in the "people's fronts" suggest, the result will be deadlock.

Seaman M. Chikhvadze: Allow me to say also what I think about some modern "pillars of democracy." I was born in Tskhaltubo, I am a Georgian, my father and mother are nonparty people. I recently signed an application to our party organization asking to be accepted as a candidate member of the CPSU. Sometimes I see people looking at me in surprise. I realize why and it offends me. Do not believe someone who says that antiparty feelings are strong in Georgia. Believe me, it is not from hearsay that I know who is trying to arouse the people in our republic and for what interests.

For instance, my brother, a simple house painter, who has worked for his living—will he spend days at meetings for "independent democracy for Georgia?" He has to work, he has no hidden millions, no private houses. It is the people who are afraid of losing what they have stolen,

who are afraid of having to answer for their dishonest way of life, who have suddenly become "freedom fighters."

That is why, to tell the truth, I am so offended when people ask me, as it were with a subtext, why I am joining the party. I simply feel where my place should be today and who I should travel with and who not.

Senior Seaman S. Sych: I understand you, Malkhaz. You have made a decision, and hair-splitting questions about why you have done this are indeed inappropriate here. In my time people also wanted to hear me give the standard assurances when I was admitted: I want to be in the front ranks and so forth. All that is so, after all before announcing your wish to become a Communist you think over so much and reject so many doubts.

Whereas in the past little changed in a man's life with admission to the party, now, as I understand it, the situation is completely different. It is as though you were taking your place on one side of the barricades. There is no place here for banal assurances. I am an optimist, I believe in perestroika—that is why I do not conceive of myself outside the party. It has by no means lost its authority. If we are talking of our collective, then in the past few months alone six seamen and petty officers have joined the ship party organization. Incidentally, that is more than at any time in the past.

Captain Second Class A. Cherkashin: It seems to me that we should assess our deeds in a more principled manner. Look at our party organization and indeed at other party organizations. The combat training plan in the subunit is fulfilled reluctantly, to a poor standard, yet we remain passive. We prefer not to intervene, not to risk our position. A careerist and toady beats a path to the leader's chair—and again we close our eyes. An injustice is done—we do not bar the way to the bureaucrat who has gone too far. So people form an opinion of the party organization. Hence both our authority and that of the party as a whole....

Those are the opinions. Different and perhaps contentious in some respects, but people agree on the main thing: Only the party can consolidate all society's healthy forces around the ideas of revolutionary transformation.

The "Sevastopol men" are also unanimous in the view that perestroika demands a clear view, a precise stance, and the will to act. From each of us, and primarily from CPSU members. Because the path into the future is laid by the vigor of those in the fore.

Secret 1937 Military Order Published

90U10250A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 52, 30 Dec 89-5 Jan 90 p 6

[Article by attorney M. Grekov: "The 'Secret' Stamp Is Removed"]

[Text] Until recently, the military archives restricted access to many documents and materials of the central

organs of the Ministry of Defense. As a result, the activity of the central apparatus of the USSR MO [Ministry of Defense] was not treated fully in many military historical works.

In April 1989, by an order of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the stamp of secrecy was removed and the orders of the People's Commissar of Defense, published from 1937 to 1941, were acknowledged to have lost their force. The matter concerns the orders and directives of K. Ye. Voroshilov, the resolutions of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, documents that summarized the results of combat training of troops, which approved combined arms and combat regulations, and so forth.

Currently, military historians are preparing a collection of documents entitled "The History of the Building of the Red Army: The 1937-1941 Orders of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense," which will be published by Voenizdat [Military Publishing House].

In order not to appear unsubstantiated, I am offering a text of Order No 082 of 21 June 1937 to ARGUMENTY I FAKTY. In our opinion, this document is key to an understanding of the situation that prevailed in the Red Army in the middle of 1937. The order is being published for the first time in the open press.

The order of the USSR People's Commissars of Defense and of Internal Affairs "Concerning the Discharge of Servicemen, Participants in Counterrevolutionary and Saboteur Fascist Organizations, Who Repented of Their Crimes, Who Voluntarily Gave Themselves Up, and Who Without Concealment Disclosed Everything They Did and About Their Accomplices."

No 082. 21 June 1937.

In a number of military districts, there were cases of acknowledgment of guilt by persons of the command, supervisory, and Red Army staffs who were involved in the activity of counterrevolutionary fascist and saboteur organizations, or who knew about their existence, but did not report them to organs of Soviet authority.

After reviewing the cases of sincere repentance for their criminal activity and a voluntary full and thorough report about it to the command and to organs of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, and who also named all of their accomplices and persons whose criminal activity they knew about, we order:

1. To commanders, chiefs, military commissars, and special departments of the GUGB [Main Administration of State Security], NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] of the USSR, servicemen, participants in counterrevolutionary and saboteur organizations, who repent of their crimes and who without concealment disclose both everything that they did and name all of their accomplices and like thinkers, are not to be subjected to detention and arrest, and criminal proceedings are not to be initiated against them.

Appropriate instructions are being given at the same time to all organs of the office of the prosecuting attorney by Procurator General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Comrade Vyshinskiy.

2. Military councils of districts (armies, fleets) will report immediately to the People's Commissar of Defense about all cases of voluntary admission of guilt of repentant criminals who are guilty of participating in counterrevolutionary plots against the Soviet Government and who named all of their like thinkers and collaborators, and also persons whom they know to be enemies of the people.

Simultaneously submit their views both about the possibility, in each individual case, of retaining a repentant and pardoned criminal in the ranks of the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army], and also about his future service use in the army.

This order will be read in all companies, cavalry squadrons, batteries, air squadrons, commands, ships, depots, headquarters, directorates, and establishments of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

[Signed] USSR People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov. USSR People's Commissar of Internal Affairs General Commissar of State Security N. Yezhov.

Commentary of a Lawyer

The published document deserves great attention. Its analysis helps to evaluate the state of legality in the country during the middle of 1937 and to understand what means were employed in the Red Army in the campaign to fight against "spies and saboteurs," which led to the obliteration of the cream of the command staff and the undermining of military might on the eve of the war.

First of all, about the legal nature of the document. Before us we have an order, that is, a legally binding act

that was issued by two departments—the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the country. This is not a law and, like every legally binding act, the order should have been based on the law and could not contradict it. Meanwhile, the criminal law which was operative at the time did not contain a standard that would have excused from criminal responsibility persons who were involved in the activity of counterrevolutionary fascist and saboteur organizations, in the event of acknowledging guilt, sincere repentance, and reporting information about accomplices.

The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Criminal Code that was in effect at that time, for example, viewed participation in crimes that pursued the objective of "restoring the authority of the bourgeoisie" and the possibility, through the commitment of crime, of damaging the interests of the state or the workers," and also "commitment of a crime by a group or a band," as aggravating circumstances (Article 47 of the RSFSR UK [Criminal Code], 6 April 1927 and 10 April 1930 versions).

Crimes committed by servicemen that were damaging to military might were punished by firing squad (Article 58 1b UK RSFSR in the 20 July 1934 version).

Voluntary rejection of the commitment of a crime entailed responsibility for already actually committed actions.

Thus, order no 082 of 21 June 1937, signed by Voroshilov and Yezhov, was illegal, and its authors obviously exceeded their authority.

As is seen from the text of the order, "appropriate instructions" were also given to organs of the office of the public prosecutor by USSR Procurator General A. Vyshinskiy, who, while obligated to conduct the highest supervision over legality in the country, was one of the principal characters in the tragedy of the lawlessness of the thirties.